

J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, "'A structure, not an event': Settler Colonialism and Enduring Indigeneity," *Lateral* 5.1 (2016).

<https://doi.org/10.25158/L5.1.7>

This content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Copyright is retained by authors.

Forum: Emergent Critical Analytics for Alternative Humanities

Issue 5.1 (Spring 2016)

Settler Colonialism

"A Structure, Not an Event": Settler Colonialism and Enduring Indigeneity

J. Kēhaulani Kauanui

ABSTRACT J. Kēhaulani Kauanui discusses the distinctive shifts toward examining Patrick Wolfe's theory of settler colonialism as 'a structure, not an event.' Kauanui argues that a substantive engagement with settler colonialism also demands a deep rethinking of the associated concept of indigeneity—distinct from race, ethnicity, culture, and nation(ality)—along with the field of Native American and Indigenous Studies.

I begin this essay¹ by unpacking what I mean by "enduring indigeneity" in my title and what that means to an understanding of settler colonialism. Here I use it in two senses: first, that indigeneity itself is enduring—that the operative logic of settler colonialism may be to "eliminate the native," as the late English scholar Patrick Wolfe brilliantly theorized, but that indigenous peoples exist, resist, and persist; and second, that settler colonialism is a structure that endures indigeneity, as it holds out against it.

Wolfe's essay "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native"² is often cited as the principal work representing the concept and theory of the settler colonial analytic. And although Wolfe insisted on making it clear time and again that he did not create the field of settler colonial studies—that Native scholars did—within the field of American Studies (as just one example), he tends to be most frequently cited as if he had. Indeed, this one article of his (although not his first writing on the subject, nor the last) also seems to be the most cited, perhaps because it offers so much in one piece by distinguishing settler colonialism from genocide, contrasting settler colonialism from franchise colonialism, and—through comparative work focused on Australia, Israel-Palestine, and the United States—showing how the logic of settler colonialism is premised on the elimination of indigenous peoples.

As Wolfe noted, because settler colonialism "destroys to replace," it is "inherently eliminatory but not invariably genocidal."³ He was careful to point out that settler colonialism is not simply a form of genocide, since there are cases of genocide without settler colonialism, and because "elimination refers to more than the summary liquidation of Indigenous peoples, though it includes that."⁴ Hence, he suggested that "structural genocide" avoids the question of degree and enables an understanding of the relationships between spatial removal, mass killings, and biocultural assimilation.⁵ In other words, the logic of elimination of the native is about the elimination of the native *as native*. And yet, to exclusively focus on the settler colonial without any meaningful engagement with the indigenous—as has been the case in how Wolfe's work has been cited—can (re)produce another form of "elimination of the native." Because settler colonialism is a land-centered project entailing permanent settlement, as Wolfe points

out in this same essay, "Settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event."⁶

In this essay, I want to revisit the oft cited phrase from Wolfe's work—that settler colonialism is a structure not an event—to explore why it is that the same locution often seems to stand-in for a serious engagement of his theory and is also perhaps the most neglected aspect of his theory. Moreover, I want to feature a discussion of indigeneity as a counterpart analytic to settler colonialism and offer some of my critical reflections as to why any meaningful engagement with theories of settler colonialism—whether Wolfe's or others'—necessarily needs to tend to the question of indigeneity. Settler Colonial Studies does not, should not, and cannot replace Indigenous Studies.

At a panel during the 2015 annual meeting of the American Studies Association (ASA), "The Settler Colonialism Analytic: A Critical Reappraisal," Alyosha Goldstein identified how Wolfe's project has been reduced to this phrase, among a couple others, and how this reference has come to index a certain approach within American Studies, among other fields.⁷ Goldstein has identified some of the problematic aspects of this institutionalization of the work as a subfield, including the effects when these refrains become extracted and circulated; they foreclose or bracket other formations—such as franchise colonialism and slavery—in ways that may sidestep how they are not only entangled, but also are co-constituted. He also noted that shallow references to the theory too often treat it as a self-contained type that can travel, or that it is totally discrete, rather than intertwined with other social processes. Goldstein also suggested that the ways in which the citational practice of the theory is enacted tends to produce a binary of settler and native.⁸

In the context of American Studies, Robert Warrior laid out the relationship between Native American and Indigenous Studies (NAIS) and Settler Colonial Studies, "and also the enthymemic context of raising the issue, American studies." In "Settler Colonial Studies and Native American and Indigenous Studies," a position paper presented at the 2015 annual meeting of the ASA, he documented the ratio of Settler Colonial Studies panels and Indigenous Studies panels on the annual programs of the ASA since 1997. Warrior explained, "I had a growing anxiety, however (based not just on the program committee meeting, but from other conversations and observations), that the rise of Settler Colonial Studies has become—not everywhere by any means, but in some circles—an answer to the chronic need for more attention to and awareness of Native and Indigenous studies."⁹ He identified two exceptional years when there were more Native-focused sessions, both of which he links to the presence (and labor) of indigenous scholars: at the 1998 meeting in Seattle, which he attributed largely to Ned Blackhawk's role on the program committee (while he was a graduate student), and a decade later in 2008 at the meeting in Albuquerque when Philip Deloria was president.

That Settler Colonial Studies seems to have gained more traction than NAIS within the field of American Studies is perhaps ironic given that it was NAIS scholars who arguably introduced settler colonialism as an analytic to the field of American Studies in the first place. And this was because NAIS was not being taken seriously enough in the ASA, and American Studies as a field has privileged the frameworks of postcolonialism and multiculturalism. Also, within works attentive to minoritarian discourse, indigeneity is rarely distinguished from race if mentioned at all. For years, it seemed as if scholars—not only in American Studies, but in related fields, as well as even (or especially?) American history—could barely speak of US colonialism. Warrior mentioned the "slog" of helping American Studies figure out what its relationship to Native Studies can and should be. Indeed, Warrior has been a key scholar in this endeavor.

The 2002 annual meeting of the American Studies Association included a panel, "American (Indian) Studies: Can the ASA be an Intellectual Home?," which featured Robert Warrior, Jean O'Brien, and Philip Deloria. This set of presentations, later published as a forum in the *American Quarterly*, examined the question of whether or not the association in particular, and therefore the field in general, was conducive for the growth and development of Native Studies. As one answer to the question, by 2005, Warrior set out to launch a steering committee to found a new association—that which became the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association (NAISA), founded in 2008.¹⁰

Why have few scholars taken up the question of indigeneity when it is something that implicates most aspects of American culture, politics, policy, and society because the United States is a settler colonial state? How can one understand the US Republic without accounting for the violent removal of the original occupants, indigenous peoples—the preexisting sovereign nations? Since attentiveness to indigenous peoples always entails an examination of prior occupancy, sovereignty, and nationhood, many scholars have arguably relegated it to the field of Native American Studies. Certainly, the study of indigenous peoples is foundational to American history, culture, society, and politics. Understanding settler colonialism as a structure exposes the fact that colonialism cannot be relegated to the past, even though the past-present should be historicized. The notion that colonialism is something that ends with the dissolving of the British colonies when the original thirteen became the early US states has its counterpart narrative in the myth that indigenous peoples ended when colonialism ended.

Works on local settler history and settler governmentality explain the structure. Jean O'Brien, in *Firsting and Lasting: Writing Indians out of Existence in New England*, theorizes the persistent myth of the vanishing Indian.¹¹ She argues that local histories became a primary means by which European Americans asserted their own modernity while denying it to Indian peoples. O'Brien examined more than six hundred local histories from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Ranging from pamphlets to multivolume treatments, these narratives shared a preoccupation with establishing the region as the center of an Anglo-Saxon nation and the center of a modern American culture. They also insisted (often in lamenting tones) that New England's original inhabitants had become extinct, even though many Indians still lived in the very towns being chronicled. Erasing and then memorializing Indian peoples also served a more practical colonial goal: refuting Indian claims to land and rights. O'Brien found that in order to convince themselves that the Indians had vanished despite their continued presence, local historians and their readers embraced notions of racial purity rooted in the century's scientific racism and saw living Indians as "mixed" and therefore no longer "truly Indian." Adaptation to modern life on the part of Indian peoples was used as further evidence of their demise. But Indians did not—and have not—accepted this effacement. This formula persists as a pervasive part of the contemporary normalization of settler colonialism.

Taking settler colonialism as a structure seriously allows US scholars, for example, to challenge the normalization of dispossession as a "done deal" relegated to the past rather than ongoing. Mark Rifkin's *Settler Common Sense* is useful here.¹² He examines how, even while settler colonialism can be characterized as a structure, a system, and a logic, affective networks need to be explored as part of understanding how settler colonial governmentality comes to be lived as the self-evident condition of possibility for (settler) being. Examining how canonical American writers take part in the legacy of displacing Native Americans, he asks, how do varied administrative projects of settlement and accompanying legal categories, geographies, and subjectivities become part of the everyday life of non-Natives? Rifkin addresses that feeling of givenness and the kinds of

social trajectories from which it emerges and which it engenders. Instead of suggesting that quotidian forms of settler sensation, self-hood, and possession follow obviously from policy and official legal mandates, he argues that the (shifting) boundaries of settler governance help provide orientation, inclination, and momentum for non-Native experiences of the everyday.

What does it mean to engage the assertion that settler colonialism is a “structure not an event”? One obvious case is the Nakba as an ongoing process—rather than an isolated historical moment of catastrophe marking the 1948 Palestinian exodus, when Jewish Zionists expelled more than 700,000 Palestinian Arabs from their homes and homeland during the war that forged the state of Israel.¹³ In North America, there are numerous attempts to remove indigenous peoples from their lands for corporate resource extraction ranging from oil to minerals and water, causing environmental devastation with genocidal implications. One example is Alaska’s Bristol Bay mine project, which has been described as “Ground zero for the next big environmental fight.”¹⁴ It is a dispute over a proposed copper and gold mine near Alaska’s Bristol Bay—a remote area that is home to several Alaskan native villages and nearly half of the world’s sockeye salmon. Six native governing entities have asked the EPA to invoke its powers under the Clean Water Act to block the mine on the grounds that it would harm the region’s waterways, fish and wildlife.¹⁵

On the flip side, in asserting indigeneity as a category of analysis, the question of its substance always arises. Just as critical race studies scholars insist that race is a useful category that is a distinct social formation rather than a derivative category emerging from class and/or ethnicity, indigeneity is a category of analysis that is distinct from race, ethnicity, and nationality—even as it entails elements of all three of these. However, indigenous peoples’ assertions of distinction and cultural differences are often heard as merely essentialist and therefore resembling static identities based on fixed inherent qualities. As such, what remains for some scholars as well as national and international governmental actors is the question as to whether indigeneity has any substance that can be used as a foundation to make a claim. In terms of both cultural and political struggles, one of the tenets of any claim to indigeneity is that indigenous sovereignty—framed as a responsibility more often than a right—is derived from original occupancy, or at least prior occupancy. Like race, indigeneity is a socially constructed category rather than one based on the notion of immutable biological characteristics.

But taking up indigeneity as a category of analysis is not one and the same as the study of indigenous peoples. For example, within the fraught debates about US immigration policy, bringing indigeneity into the frame necessarily exposes nativism and how it undergirds the US as a settler colonial society. In another example, during Occupy Wall Street, indigenous activists and critics challenged the use of the term “occupy” in relation to an actual history of settler colonial occupation. As Joanne Barker has fiercely noted, this indigenous dispossession was the historical precondition for Wall Street itself—a street with a wall built by the Dutch, in part, to keep the Lenape people out of their homeland in what became lower Manhattan—what has become a metonym for the US finance industry—all built on indigenous dispossession.¹⁶ This history and present perfectly illustrate what Wolfe meant by settler colonialism as “a structure, not an event.” Still, it cannot be a stand-in for the other Lenape histories and for focus on their culture and life ways. Meanwhile the Lenape people self-govern outside of their traditional homeland of Manahatta (now known as Manhattan)—as far as Kansas, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, and other cities—where they continue to exist as native governing entities—while other clans of the Lenape remain in their expansive traditional territory from other parts of what is New York, through New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.¹⁷

Since settler colonialism is a structure and not an event, and because indigenous peoples are still subject to that structure—an ongoing genocidal project—NAIS must be engaged in relation to Settler Colonial Studies for any meaningful examination of the US state in the context of American Studies, Cultural Studies, and other related fields.

[Editors' note: Responses to this piece by Beenash Jafri ("[Ongoing Colonial Violence in Settler States](#)") and Melissa Gniadek ("[The Times of Settler Colonialism](#)") are published in *Lateral* 6.1 (Spring 2017), with [a response by Kauanui](#).]

Acknowledgements

I want to thank the co-editors of this special forum for their encouragement. I also offer a big mahalo to Rana Barakat for reading earlier drafts of this piece and offering her intellectual and moral support. The last edits of this essay were completed in the immediate wake of Patrick Wolfe's death. He was not only a colleague; he was a friend who will be missed dearly for his important work, humor, and comradeship.

Notes

1. This essay is based on comments presented on a roundtable, "New Directions in American Studies," held at the 2014 annual meeting of the American Studies Association. [↗](#)
2. Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (Dec. 2006): 387–409. [↗](#)
3. Ibid, 387. [↗](#)
4. Ibid, 390. [↗](#)
5. Ibid, 403. [↗](#)
6. Ibid., 388. Wolfe's earlier work also advanced the same analysis: "The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event." See *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (London and New York City: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1998), 2. Wolfe's first book provided a history of settler colonialism in Australia through a history of anthropology that explores the links between metropolitan anthropological theory and local colonial politics from the 19th century up to the late 20th century, settler colonialism, and the ideological and sexual regimes that characterize it. The work is an incisive analysis of the politics of anthropological knowledge given its production through the historical dispossession and continuing oppression of indigenous peoples. [↗](#)
7. Also, Wolfe did not coin the concept of settler colonialism, although through his work, the analytic has gained important traction and visibility. That work includes his long time, direct intellectual engagement with scholars in Native American and Indigenous Studies, enabling an ongoing conversation—much of which has been US-based—which has enabled visibility in the American Studies context. US-based Palestinian academic and civil servant Faye Sayegh first used the concept in his 1965 work, *Zionist Colonialism in Palestine* (Beirut: Research Center, Palestine Liberation Organization, 1965). Notably, French Marxist scholar Maxime Rodinson addresses it in his book *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?* (New York: Monad Press, 1973). And Palestinian scholar Rosemary Sayigh used the framework of settler colonial in her 1979 book, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries; A People's History* (London: Zed Books, 1979). Japanese American scholar J. Sakai also included some treatment of the concept through his 1983 Marxist focus on white workers in *Settlers: The Mythology of the White Proletariat* (PM Press, 2014). In 1992, Kanaka Maoli scholar and activist Haunani-Kay Trask wrote about "settlers of

color" in Hawaii and their complicity with colonial structures of domination in "Settlers of Color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony: 'Locals' in Hawai'i," *Amerasia Journal* 26, no. 2 (2000): 1-24. Later, by 2008, Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura co-edited the volume *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), which took up Trask's challenge by documenting the role of Asian locals in Hawaii in relation to Kanaka Maoli. See also, Lorenzo Veracini, *Israel and Settler Society* (London: Pluto Press, 2006). Notably, Nira Yuval-Davis and Ella Shohat, among others, have consistently delineated the distinctions between the postcolonial Third World and the still colonized Fourth World in their respective works, which point to the differences between franchise colonialism and settler colonialism. Nira Yuval-Davis, *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class* (London: Sage, 1995); Ella Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial,'" in *The Pre-Occupation of Post-Colonial Studies*, eds. Fawzia Afzhal-Khan and Kalpana Rahita Seshadr (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 126-139. 

8. Some have also argued that Wolfe's theory sets up a white-black binary that does not resemble other contexts, as though his most cited article applies this to the three case studies he focuses on. His discussion of this binary is specific to his discussion of the United States as he examines the contrasting racialization of indigenous and African peoples. In the case of Australia, the term "black" refers to indigenous peoples—whether hurled as a pejorative by settler descendants or embraced by those who are Aboriginal—and for that reason it cannot be said to be part of a black-white binary. And in the case of Israel/Palestine, there is no operative racial binary between those who are Israeli and those who are Palestinian since one can obviously be both Jewish and Arab, and the dividing line is based on a Zionist appropriation of Judaism—between those who are Jewish and those who are not. This is not an Anglo-specific theory, since the three cases studies Wolfe examines together—Israel/Palestine, the United States and Australia—include colonial settlers who are other than Anglo, namely Celts and Ashkenazi Jews. Additionally, Wolfe responded to the charge of perpetuating a binary between settler and native with his recently edited volume, *The Settler Complex: Recuperating Binarism in Colonial Studies* (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 2016). 
9. For a critical examination of this split in the Palestinian context, see Rana Barakat, "Writing Palestinian History: Settler Colonialism versus Indigenous Studies," Conference Paper for "Zionism as a Settler Colonial Movement," held by Mada al Karmil, Arab Center for Applied Social Research, December 16, 2015, Ramallah, Palestine. Also, for a look at the ongoing political contestation over the use of the settler colonial analytic in Palestine, see Brenna Bhandar and Rafeef Ziada, "Acts and Omissions: Framing Settler Colonialism in Palestine Studies," *Jadaliyya*, January 14, 2016, accessed January 14, 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/23569/acts-and-omissions_framing-settler-colonialism-in- 
10. Notably, two of those on the ASA session (Warrior along with O'Brien) co-founded the association with me and three other colleagues, K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Jace Weaver, and Ines Hernandez-Avila. And perhaps ironically—or maybe not at all—it was during an ASA meeting (2005) when Warrior and O'Brien invited me to team up with them to build NAISA. 
11. Jean M. O'Brien, *Firsting and Lasting: Writing Indians out of Existence in New England* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
12. Mark Rifkin, *Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014). 

13. For works that historically document and theorize the Nakba, see: Walid al Khalidi, "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 1, Special Issue: Palestine 1948, (Autumn 1988), 4-33; Walid al Khalidi, *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006); Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Thought* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992); Ahmad Sa'di and Lila Abu Lughod, *Nakba: Palestine, 1948 and the Claims of Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Elias Khoury, "Rethinking the Nakba," *Critical Inquiry* 38 (Winter 2012), 1-18; Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: One World Books, 2008). 
14. Juliet Eilperin, "Alaska's Bristol Bay Mine Project: Ground Zero for the Next Big Environmental Fight?", *The Washington Post*, June 1, 2013, accessed January 12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/alaskas-bristol-bay-mine-project-ground-zero-for-the-next-big-environmental-fight/2013/06/01/c4f528e6-ca00-11e2-9245-773c0123c027_story.html. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Joanne Barker, "Manna-Hata," *Tequila Sovereign*, October 10, 2011, accessed January 12, 2016, <https://tequilasovereign.wordpress.com/2011/10/10/manna-hata/>. 
17. For more information, one can look at the work of the Manhattan-based Lenape Center, "a non-profit organization based in the ancestral Lenape island of Manhattan whose mission is continuing the Lenape cultural presence." Accessed January 25, 2016, <http://www.thelenapecenter.com>. 

Bio



J. Kēhaulani Kauanui

J. Kēhaulani Kauanui is a Professor of American Studies and Anthropology at Wesleyan University, where she teaches comparative colonialisms, indigenous studies, critical race studies, and anarchist studies. Kauanui's first book is *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity* (Duke University Press, 2008). Her second book is titled, *Paradoxes of Hawaiian Sovereignty*, and is a critical study on land, gender and sexual politics and the tensions regarding indigeneity in relation to statist Hawaiian nationalism (forthcoming with Duke University Press, 2018). Kauanui serves as a radio producer for an anarchist politics show called, "Anarchy on Air." She previously hosted the radio show, "Indigenous Politics," which aired for seven years and was broadly syndicated. She is an original co-founder of the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association.



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY) License, unless otherwise noted.
ISSN 2469-4053

Chapter Title: PATRICK WOLFE ON SETTLER COLONIALISM

Chapter Author(s): J. Kēhaulani Kauanui and Patrick Wolfe

Book Title: Speaking of Indigenous Politics

Book Subtitle: Conversations with Activists, Scholars, and Tribal Leaders

Book Editor(s): J. Kēhaulani Kauanui

Published by: University of Minnesota Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctv8j71d.31>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

University of Minnesota Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Speaking of Indigenous Politics*

PATRICK WOLFE ON SETTLER COLONIALISM

I interviewed Patrick Wolfe (1949–2016), one of the premier scholars of settler colonialism, in 2010, shortly after we first met in Boston. At the time, he was a Charles Warren Fellow in U.S. history at Harvard University. Prior to that, he was a Charles La Trobe Research Fellow in the history program at La Trobe University in Australia. Wolfe was the author of a pathbreaking book, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (1999). In 2008 he was appointed to the Organization of American Historians' Distinguished Lectureship Program. At that time he was working on a comparative history of settler-colonial regimes in Australia, the United States, Brazil, and Israel-Palestine. That book, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (2016), was released shortly before his death in 2016, as was his edited volume, *The Settler Complex: Recuperating Binarianism in Colonial Studies*.

This interview took place on July 13, 2010.

J. Kēhaulani Kauanui: Aloha. Before we dive in, I want to ask if you'd be willing to share a bit about your personal and professional background.

Patrick Wolfe: Yes, certainly. I'm a professional working academic, I'm afraid. I set up the teaching of Koori history—that's Indigenous southeast Australian history—at the University of Melbourne and introduced elders being paid proper money to give lectures. I gave up after a few years because I'm a "Gubbah"—a white guy—and it seemed wrong to me that a white guy should be teaching Aboriginal history when there weren't any Aboriginal people also teaching it. I don't mind white guys teaching it so long as they're not the only ones.

So I left that, and I'm glad to say that the University of Melbourne Aboriginal history section subsequently thrived quite well. I've since written about a lot of comparative Indigenous issues, partly because of the experience of teaching Koori history in Melbourne—there's a lot of American students there because exchange students tend to look for something they can't do at home. The University of Melbourne offers very few things you can't do in California. Koori history—that's one thing you can't do even in San Francisco. So I used to get

a disproportionately large number of U.S. students, and when I'd say to them "Why are you doing this course? Where is your interest in Aboriginal history coming from?" 95 percent of them, even the Black ones, would say, "Well, I'm interested in civil rights and maybe doing some kind of work with Black groups and I wanted to come and do some work with Black groups in Australia."

To which I would say, "Yeah, but how about Indigenous people? How about Native Americans? That's the parallel. Just because Aboriginal Australians are called Black, that's just some kind of shared name, misleadingly bracketing them together on the basis of skin color. The real parallel is dispossessed Indigenous people; you know about them? Where's your interest there?" And their eyes would glaze over and they'd say, "Well, I don't think I ever met one," to which I'd say, "Well, probably not knowingly, but I bet you have." And it would go from there.

So that led me to think that there's more to this—when I say "just," I don't mean in a belittling way—there's more to this than just Indigenous history in southeast Australia. There's a whole thing going on here around Indigenous politics and the consequences of invasion and dispossession and genocide, and it's not limited to Australia. I wanted to see what we can say that's universal about Indigenous dispossession everywhere and what's particular to local situations.

JKK: "Black" is a term used to describe Indigenous peoples in Australia, and that comes out of a British colonial history, right?

PW: I wouldn't like to say it only comes out of a British colonial history, because Indigenous people in Australia very happily call themselves Black. If you go to a party—on occasions I've been to a party where I've been the only non-Indigenous, Gubbah person—they call it a "Black Out." Kooris call themselves Blackfellas, and we're Whitefellas. No doubt it also came out of some kind of colonial background, but it's been taken over and made their own by Indigenous people for their own ends and for their own identity purposes.

JKK: I know from time that I've spent in graduate school in Aotearoa/New Zealand, at the University of Auckland, Maori also now self-identify, or did more strongly in an earlier period in the seventies and eighties, as Blacks. And you mention "Gubbah" or Whitefella. In terms of your self-identifying that way, that is really unusual for a lot of white men. Could you speak a little bit more to that in terms of that self-identification and that acknowledgment, especially in the midst of Indigenous peoples?

PW: I am an Australian settler. That doesn't mean that I have voluntarily dispossessed anybody, it doesn't mean that I've stolen anybody's child, it doesn't mean that I've participated in any massacres—it's not about my individual consciousness and free will. In terms of my individual free will, I'm a reluctant settler. I would rather not be existing on somebody else's stolen land. But the fact of the

matter is that I wouldn't have had a university job if Indigenous people hadn't had their land stolen from them in Australia.

So, in a structural sense, in terms of the history that has put me where I am and Indigenous people where they are, my individual consciousness, my personal attitude has got nothing to do with this. I am a beneficiary and a legatee of the dispossession and the continuing elimination of Aboriginal people in Australia. As such, whatever my personal consciousness, I am a settler, which is to say "Gubbah" in Indigenous terminology, so I am happy to accept that terminology.

JKK: In Hawai'i there is some debate about theorists of what is being termed "Asian settler colonialism" that deals with the contentious history of Asian immigrants coming in as plantation labor under coercive or exploitative conditions. Here I am referring mainly, but not exclusively, to the edited volume by Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura titled *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawaii*. It prompts questions as to whether or not we should discern different kinds of settlers, and it begs the question of whether all settlers are colonialists. This leads me to ask where you see race fitting into your analysis of what constitutes settler colonialism, especially whiteness.

PW: Okay, that's a really tricky and interesting one, as you know. When I'm in Hawai'i, I'm a haole, obviously. I may only be a haole for three days visiting, but I'm a haole. Yes, of course, Japanese indentured people, Filipinos, a whole lot of other non-U.S., nonwhite people from the Pacific were put to work in horrific conditions on pineapple and other plantations in Hawai'i two or three generations ago, so those people have endured colonial exploitation, there's no question about it whatsoever.

I think a parallel there would be, for instance, enslaved Africans in the U.S. Now, looked at from their point of view, they have experienced a colonial history, and it is therefore not right to lump them together with the colonizers, the white folks who brought them there under oppressive and coercive conditions in the first place. Now of course I accept that degrees exist within the population that dispossessed and replaced Native peoples, of course I accept that. But can we just bracket that off for a moment and come back to it?

JKK: Yes, but I want to point out that Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos were drawn to the continental U.S. for agricultural labor—and with the Filipinos, they came as colonial subjects—so wouldn't that be the parallel in the U.S. and not enslaved Africans? Isn't the question of chattel slavery different here?

PW: From the Native point of view, when it's a zero-sum contest—you or me, for land, for livelihood, for the places that are special, sacred to you that keep your society alive, culturally, spiritually and every other way as well your economic subsistence, just putting food on your table—it doesn't matter if the people are

enslaved or coerced or co-opted. They are still taking your food. They are still part of the invasive society that is taking your land over and driving you off. They may be an unwilling part, just as I said to you I'm a reluctant settler. They may be a lot more reluctant than I am insofar as they may be forced—I chose to go to Australia, after all.

But nonetheless, structurally, in the terms I was talking about before, like it or not, whether or not they collaborate with Indigenous people, they remain part of the settler project. *Asian Settler Colonialism* is edited by a couple of Japanese-descended settlers who have had the courage to come out and say, "We have come through the colonial plantation experience, our people have suffered, but nonetheless, vis-à-vis Natives, vis-à-vis Kanaka Maoli, we are settlers. Which is to say, structurally, we are part of the social process of dispossession." That doesn't mean that they haven't suffered; that doesn't mean they're bad guys. Willingly or not, enslaved or not, at the point of a gun or not, they arrived as part of the settler-colonial project. That doesn't make them settlers in the same sense as the colonizers who coerced them to participate—of course not—but it does make them perforce part of the settler-colonial process of dispossession and elimination. I can't stress strongly enough that it's *not* a matter of volition on their part, and certainly not of culpability. It's just a structural fact.

JKK: Also, I want to note that what I think is really important about what they are doing—and you've just mentioned it, in terms of the social process of dispossession—they do talk about settler *practices*. And that's of course part of the subtitle: "The Habits of Everyday Life." I think that that's what's so striking about your work, is that you insist that settler colonialism is a practice.

PW: Okay, well, why don't we go back to something I've already said, which is the number of U.S. students that would come to Australia and say that they saw a comparison between the politics of Indigenous people in Australia and the politics of African Americans, of Black people in the United States, the descendants of African slaves. I found myself thinking, "Well, what *is* the difference?" And, of course, the difference is that, in order to establish the European colonial society, two entirely different contributions were extracted from these separate populations. So far as enslaved people, or you may say convicts to Australia, or indentured people—South Asians going to Guyana or Fiji, wherever it may be—the coerced, subordinated labor that is brought in by the Europeans to work the land in the place of the Natives, they're there for their labor. It's their bodies that are colonized in the case of enslaved people who are subject to being bought and sold, that's what they provide. Indigenous people, by contrast, provide the land. Indigenous people's historical role in settler colonialism is to disappear so far as the Europeans go, to get out of the way, to be eliminated, in order that the Europeans can bring in their subordinated,

coerced labor, mix that labor with the soil, which is to say set it to work on the expropriated land and produce a surplus profit for the colonizer.

So there are three points to this triangle. There is the colonizer—and I won't just say European, because, for example, in the case of the Japanese, the same kind of thing has applied. I'm a European colonizer, though, so let's talk about European colonialism, which in any event is the bigger global phenomenon. So we'll say Europeans in that sense. The European applies coerced and/or enslaved labor to the land which has been expropriated, which has been taken away, which has been stolen from Indigenous people. So at first you can say: invasion generally is a violent process because nobody gives up their land voluntarily. Whatever the Europeans say about Natives rolling up their blankets and fading away, like the Israelis say about the Palestinians, dissolving into the night—that doesn't happen. People do not give up places where their old people are buried, where they have been born and bred for generations, where they've lived, where their gods are. They do not give that up easily, so it's invariably a violent process.

Europeans usually win, helped by alien diseases and cannons and all the rest of it. Europeans usually win in that violent confrontation. Let's call that the frontier, though the frontier is a very misleading term because it suggests a nice clear black-and-white line with Natives on one side, Europeans on the other. It doesn't work that way. The frontier, it seemed to me the more I thought about it, isn't just a line in space, albeit a misleading line in space—there are all sorts of transitions going on backward and forward across it so it's not a hard and fast line—but it's also a line in time. What happens once the Natives have been violently suppressed—assuming they have been pacified, depending on whose terminology you use—there are still some left around.

Now, the colonizers have to establish a colonial society in their place, on their land. To do that, you have to have a system of laws and regulations; the playing field has got to look level. You're bringing migrants in. They can be unruly; they can want rights that they're often not given first off. A rule of law has to be applied and applied consistently, otherwise the incoming settler society would get out of order. Therefore, the Natives who have survived the initial catastrophe of invasion and violent dispossession, you can't just carry on shooting them on sight. It doesn't work for the settler rule of law that has to appear to be conducted fairly and legitimately.

Therefore, the way in which remaining Natives are eliminated shifts. It becomes more legal and more genteel. It looks better. It is necessary for settlers to continue eliminating Natives for all sorts of reasons, but one is a very important political one. If you're a settler, theoretically at least, you've come with a social contract, you've done all those European things involving subjecting yourself to the rule of the sovereign and you've consented, the whole deal. Natives never did that; their rule of law was prior to colonial rule, independent

of it. It springs from a separate source. The colonizers' legal system simply can't deal with that. It can't deal with something that originates outside of itself. So, even on a political level, quite apart from the economic competition, all traces of Native alternatives need to be suppressed or contained or in some way eliminated. This continues after the so-called frontier era but, as I said, in all sorts of genteel ways. Territorially, Natives tend to get banged up on reservations or stations or missions or whatever it is. Now, they may be still alive, and the rhetoric might well shift so that, instead of being marauding savages who are going to rape the white man's women and all this sort of stuff, which is the justification for killing them on the frontier, instead of that they become a kind of romantic dying race and it's the job of the missionary to smooth the pillow of their passing. The rhetoric shifts radically, but the outcome remains consistent with elimination.

When you gather people together and contain them in a fixed locale, you are still the colonizer; you are still vacating their erstwhile territory and rendering it available for colonization, whether it's farming or pastoralism or plantations, whatever it is. They're not on the land anymore. They're confined to a mission. So, even though the missions or stations or reservations are held out as a process of civilizing—"We are giving them the boons, the benefits of this superior culture that we have historically invented"—even though the rhetoric shifts, just by confining them, you continue to eliminate them, to clear their territory to make way for colonial settlement.

You go further down the track, and assimilation begins to kick in, whether it's in the U.S. or Australia—and, I think, in Hawai'i. Native identity gets compromised—as you've shown in the Hawaiian case in your wonderful book *Hawaiian Blood*, and in other cases as well—with blood quantum regulations. Blood quantum eliminates Natives from the reckoning of authentic Natives who count. Of course, in the colonial situation, any Native person is liable to have non-Native relatives somewhere in their ancestry. That's a routine outcome of being invaded. It's used as another way of excluding Natives or eliminating them.

JKK: Yes, the contemporary legal definition of "Native Hawaiian" as a "descendant with at least one-half blood quantum of individuals inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778" originated in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921 [HHCA] in which the U.S. Congress allotted approximately 200,000 acres of land in small areas across the main islands to be leased for residential, pastoral, and agricultural purposes by eligible "Native Hawaiians." Many Kānaka Maoli—Indigenous Hawaiians—contest the federal and state definition of "Native Hawaiian" at 50 percent not only because it is so exclusionary but because it undercuts indigenous Hawaiian epistemologies that define identity on the basis of one's kinship and genealogy. Thus, I emphasize the strategic, socially embedded, and political aspects of these Indigenous practices.

The blood quantum rule operates through a genocidal logic in both cultural and legal contexts and undermines identity claims based on genealogy that are expansive. In the blood quantum and legal debates about property during the debates that led to the passage of the HHCA, issues of where the Chinese and Japanese stood in Hawai'i—in relation both to whites and Hawaiians—were prominent. Eventually, I realized that in many ways, some subtle, others crude, the racialization of Hawaiians was coconstructed in relation to Chinese and Japanese presence in the islands. As I detail in the book, both elite whites and Hawaiians framed the post-overthrow push to rehabilitate Kānaka Maoli in anti-Asian terms by contrasting Kānaka Maoli as U.S. citizens and the Chinese, and especially Japanese, as “aliens.” During the early twentieth century, the whiteness of American citizenship was sustained by a series of Asian exclusions, and this racialization of Asians as perpetual “outsiders” would play a key role in the outcome of Hawaiian blood quantum debates.

In Hawai'i at this time, Asian groups occupied a racial place somewhat similar to African Americans in their structural relationship to whites during Reconstruction in that they were considered an economic and political threat. The emancipation of black slaves motivated southern whites to search for new systems of racial and economic control, and by the 1890s they passed Jim Crow segregation laws to isolate and intimidate African Americans. In Hawai'i, like the U.S. continent, white Americans perceived the Japanese as a distinct danger as both a source of labor competition and a nationalist threat in the emerging world order. Their presence in Hawai'i was seen as antithetical to the goals of Americanizing the islands, especially after World War I, a concern that only grew by the time of the HHCA debates, when their numbers were increasing in the islands.

So, with that in mind as a particular context, let us turn back to the question of slavery, whiteness, and indigeneity.

PW: This, I think, is where you can get the contrast between enslaved people and Indigenous people very clearly, and also how you can get the way that the process of elimination continues. It's a structure. It's an ongoing process, not a one-off event. It continues right through colonial society. And in the case of blood quantum, it comes through very clearly. Let's think of the U.S. example. As I said, the enslaved and their descendants who were bought and sold were used for one purpose, and that purpose was labor, whereas Indigenous people were there for one purpose, that was to disappear, to surrender their land. Given that Africans were valuable property, you wanted as many as you could get. So the offspring of an enslaved person and a white partner—it doesn't matter what their skin color is, how they present phenotypically, how light or dark they are—they remain a slave, they're valuable property. But, of course, if you're out on the western frontier of the United States, the last thing you want is more Indians, so you're murdering them, or you're cooping them up on reservations.

But what happens racially? What happens to the offspring of a Native, usually a woman—ninety-nine times out of a hundred it's a woman, right? The offspring of a Native woman and a colonizer experiences the opposite of what happens to Black people. With Black people, any amount of African blood whatsoever makes you a slave. Initially, this meant that offspring inherited the status of their mothers—though Maryland was an early exception—but as time went by, slavery became the lot of everyone with African ancestry. After Emancipation this situation became racialized, so that anyone with African ancestry was classified as Black, a situation that reached its apogee in the one-drop rule, which continues into the present in an informal, unstated kind of way. You can have blue eyes and blond hair, but if somewhere back in your ancestry there's any Black person—bam, you're a slave or, today, under the one-drop rule, you're a Black person. Compared to that, let's look at what happens to Natives, whose role, as we've said, is to vanish from the land rather than to provide labor. In their case, the opposite applies. The colonial system wants fewer and fewer Natives, and guess what? It seeps through into the way they're racialized, into their very identities, the identities the colonial society tries to impose upon them.

So the Native case is opposite to the one-drop rule, which makes—isn't this fantastic? there's a real irony here—makes Black blood absolutely powerful in relation to white blood. In the case of Native blood, by contrast, any admixture of white blood compromises your indigeneity, makes you a half-blood or a half-caste or whatever racist term serves to eliminate people. So my point is that invasion doesn't stop at the frontier. It carries right on, right through colonial society in these less violent—that's what I meant by more genteel—ways, more thoroughly legal, bureaucratic ways. But the end outcome, which is eliminating the alternative, prior Native presence, is consistent. Is that clear enough?

JKK: Yes, it is. And you did mention earlier that settler colonialism is a zero-sum game, and I know that elsewhere you've referred to the dominant feature of its exploitative nature as a winner-take-all project. And that's what you mean by total replacement. So thinking through in terms of the legal disappearance or things that are based on legal mechanisms of civilizing Indigenous peoples, it's precisely through that rather than, say, through massacres that settler-colonial societies can continue to describe their projects as ones based on progress or that they're supposed to be seen as benign or kind to the Native.

PW: Absolutely. "We have come bearing you a gift, the gift of civilization and advancement." And assimilation, which ultimately has the effect of destroying Native society, reducing them demographically, is invariably—and I haven't come across a single settler colony where this doesn't happen—invariably, assimilation is held out as giving Natives the same opportunities as the white man. You steal children at the age of three and you put them in boarding

schools and you abuse them, often sexually as well as psychologically, for years on end. Very often, except in the case of a few remarkable people, you put people out at the other end of that system who suffer for the rest of their life with appalling social and psychological pathologies. They'll still be prejudiced against, picked on in the street by cops because they look different, and all the rest of it. They won't actually get any of the advantages that they were promised would be the fruits of the civilizing experience. They will rather have been completely messed up, their families and the wider Native society will have suffered as a consequence, and this is held out as a special gift of civilization, giving the Native the same opportunities as the white man.

JKK: We have been discussing a couple examples of Anglo-settler societies, Australia and the United States, and can also obviously bring Canada and Aotearoa /New Zealand into the picture more. Yet I would suggest that the average American would probably be reluctant to see the U.S.A. alongside the other three nations, given their ongoing ties to the British monarchy. Can you speak to that in relation to the persistent myth of American exceptionalism, that idea that the formation of the U.S.A. was about liberation, freedom, and equality framed as the opposite of any monarchical society?

PW: Right. First, perhaps this illustrates the answer I'm trying to give: when Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce were fleeing California, they were ultimately tracked down, with appalling consequences, by the U.S. Cavalry. But when they made their great trek, where were they headed? The answer is Canada, so they had no doubt as to who was the worse settler colonizer between the republican and democratic U.S. or a monarchy. And they were by no means—this is not in defense of monarchy, by the way—they were by no means the only colonized people who tried to escape across the Canadian border. African people did too. So, without defending monarchy, let's just say that republican egalitarianism is not a good thing for people who are not part of the club.

The problem with republican citizenship and popular democracy is that those who are outside the realm of this citizenship have no rights. It's a profoundly dehumanizing segregation of the rest of the world from yourself—your citizens, who participate in all these contractual deals to run your society equally and all the rest of it. In terms of what political system is involved, the important question is not whether you speak English, French, or Dutch, not whether you've got a king or a queen or you're republican. The only thing that really counts in regard to settler colonialism is the outcome for the Natives.

I can't imagine a Native confronting a poisoned water hole or a bayonet or whatever instrument of violence they're forced to confront . . . I can't imagine them saying, "Well, at least I'm being killed by a republican rather than a monarchist." I mean, what sort of difference is that going to make? So let's get below the surface of those political distinctions to the real concrete relationships that

are applying here. This leads us to the distinction between franchise colonialism and what I call settler colonialism, which refers to a foreign society invading a Native society and trying to take over all of it so as to replace the Natives rather than use them as labor. Settler colonialism brings its own labor. It tries to eliminate the Natives and do something completely new with the land that was theirs.

JKK: So, this gets at what makes a settler society different than, say, British relations to India.

PW: The situation in India was quite different. There, the colonizers didn't go to get rid of Indians and import English people in their place. Quite the contrary; the colonizers went to sit on top of that society and set it to work for them on their own land. So it's a bit like the relationship of slavery insofar as Natives were valuable. They were indispensable to the project of extracting surplus value through colonialism. The British went to India for mining and to do things like grow jute and opium and tea and cotton and a whole lot of primary products that would then be made up in the metropolis—Manchester cotton mills and so on. The Industrial Revolution, which in most European history books is represented as something that was internal to Europe and proves how superior Europeans are, was a global phenomenon that took raw materials that were made up in these factories from the situation of colonial exploitation, whereupon it used the same colonies as expanding markets for these factories' finished products. Primary production may have been going on in the Deep South in the U.S., it may have been going on in India, it may have been going on in Egypt—to cite three that reference cotton, since I mentioned Manchester. The point is that the Industrial Revolution not only required settler colonialism in order to function. It also required other forms of colonialism, as in the case of the British-Indian colonial regime, which I call franchise colonialism.

Franchise colonialism required a situation where whites oversaw a system in which natives worked for them. Now, that means that the natives remain a large majority, so whites had to have native collaborators to help run the system. They had to have superior access to violence and all the rest of it, better troops. It's always a kind of fragile, vulnerable situation colonizing somewhere like India, or, for that matter, a franchise colony like the Dutch East Indies—today, it's Indonesia—was for the Dutch. When the colonial-nationalist movement gets under way, resists the Europeans, and finally throws them out, the whites turn out not to have been established in the same way that settler colonizers have been established. As I've said, in going to wherever, Australia, settlers didn't go to get Aborigines to work for them, at least not as their first priority. They went to Australia to replace Aborigines and themselves become Australians, so their children would be Australians and Australia would then go on forever.

Europeans in franchise colonies like India, they go to sit on top of native society. England remains home. They send their children back to boarding school in England. When they turn sixty, they retire back to England before encroaching senility can spoil the illusion of their super-humanity. They remain based in England, overseeing the natives in a different kind of colony. Therefore, come the success of the colonial-nationalist movement, when finally, the English get thrown out and they go back to London, they vanish, and the faces on the legislative benches change color. Indians take over. They tend, unfortunately, not to alter the system that the British imposed on them too much, because the elites who ran the nationalist movement were educated at Oxford and Cambridge and the British knew who they were handing over to. Basically, they were handing over to brown Englishmen, so they weren't the kind of changes that you'd hope for from a national independence movement. Nonetheless, the fact is that the British had remained a minority dependent upon native labor and therefore native society was ultimately in a position to throw them out. By contrast, the victims of settler genocide, all the programs of elimination that have gone on in settler colonies, those Natives become a minority and can't realistically dream of sending the Whitefellas home.

So it's a different situation. And if I may say at this point, what I mean by settler colonialism is precisely this drive to elimination, this system of winner-take-all. I don't just mean that settler colonies are colonies that happen to have settlers in them. There were tea planters in British India. People go on and on at me about the French in Algeria, and rather like we said earlier, what difference does it make if you're monarchical or republican? In the case of French colonialism, the French colonies aren't just places that we rule from outside. They're part of France. In formal political terms, Algeria was meant to be part of mainland France, so the French settlers who went there were seen as somehow different from settlers elsewhere. It was a settler society that somehow was more organically wedded to the mother country than somewhere like Hawai'i—at least, prior to statehood—or the United States or Aotearoa/New Zealand. All the same, the fact of the matter is that the French settlers relied on native labor. Come the Algerian independence movement, they get thrown out. Whatever the constitutional niceties, whether they're meant to be part of France or not doesn't matter. They're there to be thrown out, because they're a minority dependent on native labor. You can say something similar about South Africa, where whites are something like 15, 16 percent of the population. Yes, they're settlers, yes they stayed there, but it's just a colony that happens to have settlers in it. It's not a settler colony in my sense. Does that make sense?

JKK: Most definitely. And also, I am thinking it through in terms of the notion of progress and the notion of the past. One of the most cited passages in your work is that “invasion is a structure and not an event.” I would like it if you could speak to the persistent ideological notion that settler colonialism was just

an event, that invasion was merely an event, and that that is how they are able to maintain the farce that it's long past, rather than an ongoing process.

PW: As an Indigenous person, you're very well aware of these things. These are some of the best-targeted questions I've ever had, so if I could just thank you for that and also acknowledge that, because you're Indigenous, you know what you're talking about in a way that so few scholars do.

So, yes, settler invasion is an ongoing process. That's why I remain a beneficiary and a legatee of the invasion of Australia. That's why I categorize myself as a settler. The prime minister of Australia, the then prime minister John Howard, refused to apologize to Indigenous people for the abduction of the so-called "stolen generations" of Aboriginal people, generally of mixed ancestry, who were taken away by the Australian state. We're not sure how many. It's somewhere around one in five to one in seven Aboriginal children were stolen from their families by the Australian state or by various states within the Commonwealth of Australia throughout the twentieth century.

And a great movement arose to get Mr. Howard to apologize on behalf of the Australian state for what happened. I personally think that movement was a great mistake, because what happened was that the whole issue of Aboriginal rights came to depend on whether or not one man would apologize for the stolen generations—not for the frontier homicides, not for the initial seizure of land or two centuries of systematic destruction, all the rest of it. And also the problem was that an apology would enable them to say, "Okay, now we've apologized, now everyone can go home, forget about it and move on." This is exactly what the subsequent prime minister, Kevin Rudd, did say when he issued his apology. He didn't ask whether or not Aboriginal people would accept his apology. He just unilaterally declared that his apology meant that Australia should now move on. No question of compensation, no question of reparations, nothing like that. In fact, the reverse: the apology provided Rudd with a pretext to rule reparations out, explicitly and deliberately, at the same time. So I think that there are all sorts of problems with the whole apology business.

But nonetheless, to get back to your question, the reason that John Howard refused to apologize—which actually was tactically very stupid, as I said, if he realized he could get away with an apology and have it all over within a week, that would have suited him much better. But anyway, the reason that this bull-necked man refused to apologize was, as he kept saying over and over again, "Yes, bad things went on in the past, but I wasn't there, I didn't do anything wrong, I didn't kill anybody, I didn't steal any children. It's a later time now," failing to recognize that history results from causes and from preconditions, and that the cause and the precondition for contemporary Australian affluence and democracy and all the rest of it is the initial robbery, genocide and continuing elimination of Aboriginal people. Without that happening, as I said, I couldn't have had a job in history at La Trobe University.

So that's the sense in which it's very important to acknowledge that invasion is something that reverberates through continuing history in all sorts of ways. And the Indigenous presence, the Indigenous alternative, needs to be suppressed. Either that or we come to a fair deal. Now, coming to a fair deal doesn't mean finding a bunch of coconuts—brown on the outside and white on the inside—and setting them up in state-designed bureaucracies that just become yet another organ of the settler state. It doesn't mean that. It means handing over to Native sovereignty. How are you going to run your affairs? Who are you going to choose, as opposed to elect? You don't need to go through the Westminster system. Whatever your system of choosing—an elder who will speak for you, or elders who will speak for you, whatever you choose—you go for it, and when you're ready, we'll talk together about what we can agree on. Anything less than that is a state-fabricated charade which is not only running parallel to the real challenge of an open negotiation between an invaded people and their invaders. Actually, these prefabricated, pretending-to-be-Native but actually part of the white colonial system bureaucracies are part of the invasion, because they take away Native initiative. They channel it into areas, into bureaucratic zones, that are always already predominated by being part of the colonial bureaucracy.

JKK: And that actually resonates with what you said earlier in the interview, around the colonials themselves really not wanting to acknowledge anything that exists prior to their own system. And that's what Indigenous scholar from Australia, Aileen Moreton-Robinson, who's a premier scholar of whiteness studies there, talks about: the anxiety of settler-colonial societies regarding that persistent Indigenous sovereignty question.

PW: That anxiety is crucial and very telling. I think it has huge political potential. Aileen Moreton-Robinson nails it perfectly.

JKK: Now, I want to go back to something—you mentioned Palestinians earlier. And we've been talking a bit about American exceptionalism. Certainly there is a question, especially as of late, with the recent attack on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, about Israeli exceptionalism undergirded by American power. I wonder if you could speak to the question of Israeli-occupied Palestine, perhaps in relation to not only settler colonialism as a process but also the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions [BDS] movement.

PW: Well, first, blinded in ways that one can sympathize with by the Holocaust, people look at Israelis as victims. And, of course, those who died in the Holocaust were victims, as well as their families, and the children who have been subjected to the memories of Auschwitz survivors and so on, and who've had to live with their guilt. Of course those people are victims. But, it's rather like saying the Japanese in Hawai'i suffered terribly in the plantations, but that doesn't stop them being part of the settler-colonial process.

We're not talking about whether individuals are victims or not. We're talking about the fact that, from 1882 on, which is when the first Zionist settlement in Palestine was established, the first so-called *aliya*, which means "uplift," which means "ascent to the Promised Land," European Jews who were suffering pogroms and oppression and all sorts of horrific things in Europe that one should never understate, the Zionist solution to that was, "We are being persecuted, especially within eastern Europe—the so-called Pale of Settlement, the Polish/southwest Russian border, but also traditionally throughout Europe—we are being persecuted because we haven't got a nation. We haven't got a place that we can call our own, with our own sovereignty and independence. So, like the other peoples around us in nineteenth-century Europe, we need a nation with its own territory."

The only problem is there's no land left in Europe to found a nation in, so initially they were thinking Argentina, then they thought Uganda, at one point the Portuguese offered them Angola, but increasingly it became Palestine—the place, they claimed, that Jews originated from, before being driven out by the Romans in A.D. 70, when the Second Temple was destroyed, this whole mythology. It actually is mythology, in the erroneous sense: there were Jews all over the Diaspora well before A.D. 70. Moreover, not all of those who were in Palestine left, but that's a different story. The point is that some of the European arm of world Jewry who were generally called Ashkenazim, meaning European Jewry—as opposed to Sephardim, who are the Jews who were driven out Iberia, out of Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth century and tended to settle in places like Morocco, as opposed to Yemenis and other Mizrahim who were in places like Iraq and Libya and so on—the point is that some members of the Ashkenazi branch of Jewry decided upon Zionism, though Zionism largely remained a minority tendency until the Nazi era. Zionists decided they would establish a civilized, secular, European colonial nation-state like France or Germany, which had ceased being monarchies and had united themselves and become secular, church-and-state-separated states in the nineteenth century. They were going to have one of those in Palestine. So they set out to establish an autonomous state based on agricultural communities that would be self-sufficient. Of course, having been excluded from agriculture and productive industry in Europe, so that they'd been forced into parasitic occupations like money-lending and condemned as such—this is where the racist image of the Jew as greedy hoarder came from—these people arrive in Palestine quite incompetent as agriculturalists.

Yet they want to exclude the Natives. They want to build a Jewish-only nation-state in somebody else's country, Palestine. That's what settler colonialism is. So they set about first persuading colonial authorities who ruled Palestine, first the Ottoman Empire and then, after World War I, the British Empire under a mandate granted by the League of Nations. The so-called

Yishuv, the Jewish settlers in Palestine, set about first getting the colonial powers to allow more and more Jewish immigration into Palestine from Europe and, second, expanding their contiguous land base so as to build a colonial state-in-waiting there.

So they're different from an ordinary settler colony in that they had to proceed through legal channels. This they did, until they reached the point where they were strong enough to throw out both the colonial authorities, in this case the British mandate authorities, and complete the job of driving Palestinians off their land. This happened in the Nakba—the calamity, the catastrophe as it's called—of 1948, that overtook Palestinians, when something like 65 percent of the Palestinian people were violently driven from their homes, driven to flee outside Mandate Palestine. Their houses were taken from them, either bulldozed or blown up or, more often than not, had Jewish settlers put into them, these people in many cases being Holocaust victims who had been brought from Europe.

So there's tremendous world sympathy. Indeed, the United Nations vote to divide Palestine into Jewish and Palestinian sectors, which took place on November 29, 1947, only happened because the Soviet Union finally came around and cast its votes in favor of Israel. Why did they do that? Because they chose to read Israel as an anti-British colonial movement rather than as a settler-colonial movement. Zionism has these two faces. Now, it is very odd, is it not, that the last European settler colony to be established on Earth—which is Israel, which has displaced Palestinians from their own country and replaced them with Jews, has stolen their country—that the last one on Earth—Tibet isn't a European colony—should have been set up in 1948, after the UN declaration, and at a time when decolonization was the international climate of the moment?

After World War II, the United Nations was all about the British leaving India, the British and French and Portuguese and Spanish leaving Africa, the French and the British leaving southeast Asia, the Dutch leaving the East Indies—that's the mood of the moment. Yet Israel is set up at the same time. A settler colony is established in an anticolonial atmosphere. That is bizarre until one understands that Zionism has two faces: one is it's a resistance to persecution, the Holocaust being the ultimate extreme, but it's a persecution that goes on in Europe. The other is, it's a settler-colonial movement, so it's as if the abused child has grown up to be an abuser—the Zionist response to the persecution of Jews in Europe being to steal somebody else's country outside of Europe.

So, once it's understood in that dual way—as having two faces, I mean—that Zionism is both a response to persecution and a settler-colonial movement, then you're partly back to the situation of Hawaiians in relation to the Japanese, or Native Americans in relation to enslaved Africans. “Yes, these

people have suffered but, hullo, they're driving me off my country, they're killing me." They're part of a settler system, regardless of their personal history and their consciousness. Palestinians own that country. They're being driven out of it and being replaced, with the approval, the sanction, and the military and economic support of the West.

We, as Australians, as people from the United States—I distinguish Hawai'i from that, and I distinguish Native Americans from that because you're not part of the system—but people like me, like it or not, and I certainly don't like it, are responsible for the contemporary, current-day Israeli colonization of Palestine. Now, in terms of the time scale I talked about previously in places like the U.S. and Australia, that is like going back before the missions and before the assimilation. It's still the frontier era in Israel/Palestine. There's no assimilation going on. Palestinians aren't being given land rights in certain places. They're still at the frontier invasion stage, and it's in this day and age, in the twenty-first century.

When genocide was going on in the nineteenth-century United States, international communications were different. There weren't cell phones that you could film with, there wasn't a whole global communications framework whereby what was going on could be seen. I'm not justifying it, but it's pretty different to something going on under the nose of the world, in full view of the world and still being suppressed and successfully lied about, which is what's happening to the settler colonization, the invasion, of Palestine as we speak.

When students or people who've heard my talks ask me: "How did the Europeans ever get away with the atrocities that they committed on the Australian and American frontiers? How could a Wounded Knee or a Coniston massacre go unavenged? How could whole peoples be driven from their ancestral homelands in broad daylight?" When they ask me this question, which they very often do, I have to answer: "Why are you surprised? They didn't even have the Internet or satellite TV in the nineteenth century. We have those things today, we have instant global communication, events relayed live into people's living rooms, but settler-colonial outrages are being perpetrated, nineteenth-century style, under our noses in occupied Palestine every day of the week. So why should the nineteenth century have been any different? There's no reason for surprise."

JKK: Yes, that's right, and does that suggest to me that you do support the BDS campaign?

PW: Absolutely. I have nothing to do with anything Israeli whatsoever. And anti-Zionist Israeli Jews, they support it too. They're saying, "This is wrong—not in our name, don't help it."

JKK: As you know, I serve on the advisory board for the U.S. Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel as well as the broader boycott movement for sure.

PW: Again, absolutely, I'm completely in support of it. Actually, in the contemporary U.S. and Australian academy, that does involve a risk. The Zionist lobby—please don't call it the Jewish lobby, by no means all Jews are Zionists and, by the way, not all Zionists are Jewish. We're talking about a political movement: Zionism. Anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism have nothing to do with each other. The Zionist lobby in countries like the U.S. and Australia is so strong. Helen Thomas is a recent example, even though I think her remarks were ill-judged and stupid. Nonetheless, what's happened to her so quickly, this grand old lady of United States journalism, how that day she was suddenly forced to resign—doesn't that show the power and the risk that you take when you speak out in favor of the oppressed, invaded Palestinian nation?

JKK: Yes, and when you mention that in Palestine right now it is the frontier era, I mean this for me really highlights the issue. I saw for myself in January 2012, when I traveled there as part of a five-scholar delegation. Obviously, within settler-colonial studies as a field of study for intellectual work in the academy, you know, comparative studies are important, but the settler colonials themselves undertook and still undertake a comparative approach to their own policies, their own military tactics. And I think that Israel modeling its occupation of Palestine in ways similar to what early Americans did to tribal nations throughout the nineteenth century in North America is really key. Speaking to a different comparative angle, could you offer your analysis of analogies between Israel and South Africa?

PW: Yes, I don't accept that apartheid and what's going on in Palestine are the same thing, for the reason that the Bantustans, the special Native places that the South African government set up, were set up for the purpose of exploiting Native labor. You were confined to your Bantustan unless you were being domestic labor, or you were working the mines or the farms or the factories of white South Africa, in which case you had to run around with a pass showing you were on your way to or from work, you had permission to be there. But the Bantustans were pools of labor which the workers would be taken out of and used as suited the white authorities, the apartheid authorities.

Palestinians are just being driven out. They're no pool of labor. Sure, they come in handy as cheap and hyper-exploitable labor so long as they're still around, but Israel's primary goal is not to exploit them but to get rid of them. This is why they're energetically and systematically being replaced by anybody but a Palestinian. Bring in a million Russians, call them Jews, it's fine. A significant portion of them are Christians. They end up growing up and getting arrested in Israel running around in Nazi uniforms. Doesn't matter—they're not Palestinian. That's very different from South Africa, where segregation was for the purposes of exploitation for labor. For Palestinians, segregation is being marginalized. Israel is doing everything it can to free itself from any hint of dependence on Palestinian labor because it wants to get rid of them. So

Zionism is a form of apartheid in that it's racist, exclusive, and oppressive. Israel's behavior squarely fits the international definition of the crime of apartheid under the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and so on. All the same, it's not premised on the same basis as South African apartheid was; it's premised on elimination rather than exploitation. We have to recognize different forms of apartheid. They're all unacceptable.

JKK: And that really gets back to the core, which is the Indigenous sovereignty question rather than a color line. I want to ask you something else as we're wrapping up the interview.

Since your book *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* was published just over a decade ago, the field of settler studies has grown to focus on collaborative and comparative theories of this process. I want to ask you how you see this new field developing.

PW: Well, with mixed feelings. As you say, that book came out rather early—embarrassingly early, actually, seeing as I haven't done another book since. As a result, since it was fairly early, and it keeps getting quoted and cited, people quite often ask me, "What do you think?" almost as if they're asking me, "What's happened to your offspring?" which is completely inappropriate. I didn't invent settler-colonial studies. Natives have been experts in the field for centuries.

I have mixed feelings, to be honest. What for me is a political practice—my intellectual practice is an activist practice so far as I'm concerned, which is not to say that I skim on the facts. It's not to say that I cut corners. It's rather to say that I think the more you look at the facts, the more they stand up. The more rigorously you conduct your research, the more you establish that dispossessed Indigenous people have got the most substantial grounds for complaint and the most substantial claim for reparations and reversal of anyone on Earth. So I'm an activist-intellectual because I think that the truth speaks for itself and I believe you should keep uncovering the truth.

The problem is that I'm not sure that this applies to a mushrooming academic industry which spawns new theories and new buzzwords at the drop of a hat. I have that kind of concern.

JKK: Yes. And in conclusion, is there anything in particular with which you would like to close?

PW: Yes. There is one thing, and this applies to all settler-colonized peoples, but I want to select the one we've been talking about last, the one that is so central and at the frontier stage as we speak. The last thing I want to say is: Viva Palestine! Long live Palestine! Palestine will be free, from the river to the sea!

Settlers of Color and "Immigrant" Hegemony: "Locals" in Hawai'i

Haunani-Kay Trask

For a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity.

Frantz Fanon¹

The world's indigenous peoples have fundamental human rights of a collective and individual nature. Indigenous peoples are not, and do not consider themselves, minorities. . . . Self-determination of peoples is a right of peoples. . . . Under contemporary international law, minorities do not have this right.

Sharon Venne²

The indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or referendum.

U.S. Public Law 103-150

The "Apology Bill"³

As the indigenous people of Hawai'i, Hawaiians are Native to the Hawaiian Islands. We do not descend from the Americas or from Asia but from the great Pacific Ocean where our ancestors navigated to, and from, every archipelago. Genealogically, we say we are descendents of Papahānaumoku (Earth Mother) and Wākea (Sky Father) who created our beautiful islands. From this land came the *taro*, and from the *taro*, our Hawaiian people. The lesson of our origins is that we are genealogically related to Hawai'i, our islands,

HAUNANI-KAY TRASK is a Native Hawaiian nationalist, professor of Hawaiian Studies at the University of Hawai'i, and author of *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i*.

as family. We are obligated to care for our mother, from whom all bounty flows.

History and Settler Ideology

After nearly two thousand years of self-governance, we were colonized by Euro-American capitalists and missionaries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1893, the United States invaded our nation, overthrew our government, and secured an all-white planter oligarchy in place of our reigning *ali'i*, Queen Lili'uokalani.⁴ By resolution of the American Congress and against great Native opposition, Hawai'i was annexed in 1898. Dispossession of our government, our territory, and our legal citizenship made of us a colonized Native people.

Today, modern Hawai'i, like its colonial parent the United States, is a settler society. Our Native people and territories have been overrun by non-Natives, including Asians. Calling themselves "local," the children of Asian settlers greatly outnumber us. They claim Hawai'i as their own, denying indigenous history, their long collaboration in our continued dispossession, and the benefits therefrom.⁵

Part of this denial is the substitution of the term "local" for "immigrant," which is, itself, a particularly celebrated American gloss for "settler." As on the continent, so in our island home. Settlers and their children recast the American tale of nationhood: Hawai'i, like the continent, is naturalized as but another telling illustration of the uniqueness of America's "nation of immigrants." The ideology weaves a story of success: poor Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino settlers supplied the labor for wealthy, white sugar planters during the long period of the Territory (1900-1959). Exploitative plantation conditions thus underpin a master narrative of hard work and the endlessly celebrated triumph over anti-Asian racism. Settler children, ever industrious and deserving, obtain technical and liberal educations, thereby learning the political system through which they agitate for full voting rights as American citizens. Politically, the vehicle for Asian ascendancy is statehood. As a majority of voters at mid-century, the Japanese and other Asians moved into the middle class and eventually into seats of power in the legislature and the governor's house.⁶

For our Native people, Asian success proves to be but the latest elaboration of foreign hegemony. The history of our colonization becomes a twice-told tale, first of discovery and settlement by European and American businessmen and missionaries, then

of the plantation Japanese, Chinese, and eventually Filipino rise to dominance in the islands. Some Hawaiians, the best educated and articulate, benefit from the triumph of the Democratic Party over the *haole* Republican Party. But as a people, Hawaiians remain a politically subordinated group suffering all the legacies of conquest: landlessness, disastrous health, diaspora, institutionalization in the military and prisons, poor educational attainment, and confinement to the service sector of employment.⁷

While Asians, particularly the Japanese, come to dominate post-Statehood, Democratic Party politics, new racial tensions arise. The attainment of full American citizenship actually heightens prejudice against Natives. Because the ideology of the United States as a mosaic of races is reproduced in Hawai'i through the celebration of the fact that no single "immigrant group" constitutes a numerical majority, the post-statehood euphoria stigmatizes Hawaiians as a failed indigenous people whose conditions, including out-migration, actually worsen after statehood. Hawaiians are characterized as strangely unsuited, whether because of culture or genetics, to the game of assimilation.


Of course, the specific unique claims of Native Hawaiians as indigenous peoples are denied through the prevailing ideology of "power sharing." Here, power sharing refers to the spoils of the electoral system which are shared, in succession, among "ethnic groups." Politically, "power sharing" serves to reinforce the colonial position that Hawaiians are just another competing "ethnic group" waiting their turn for political dominance. Disguising the colonial history and subordinated position of Natives, while equating Natives and non-Natives, the ideology tells a false tale of just desserts. Empirically, of course, subjugated peoples cannot willingly share anything. In the case of Hawaiians, we have nothing left to share. Our lands and resources, taken at the overthrow and transferred at annexation to the American government and later to the State of Hawai'i are, literally, not under our control. But the utility of the propaganda of "power sharing" is that it begs the question of *why* Natives should share power, while reinforcing the refrain that those in power have justly earned their dominant place. Given that Hawaiians are indigenous, that our government was overthrown, and that we are entitled, as a nation, to sovereignty, the argument that we should share power with non-Natives who benefit from the theft of our sovereignty is, simply, grotesque.

When the centenary of the American invasion of Hawai'i, overthrow of the Native government, and forcible annexation of

the archipelago are commemorated by thousands of protesting Natives in 1993 and 1998, anti-Hawaiian sentiment among growing numbers of Asians and *haole* is already a political reality. One recent example of this new form of prejudice is the assertion of a "local nation."⁸

Ideologically, the appearance of this "local nation" is a response to a twenty-year old sovereignty movement among Hawaiians. Organized Natives, led by a young, educated class attempting to develop progressive elements among Hawaiians, as well as to create mechanisms for self-government, are quickly perceived as a threat by many Asians uneasy about their obvious benefit from the dispossession and marginalization of Natives. Arguing that Asians, too, have a nation in Hawai'i, the "local" identity tag blurs the history of Hawai'i's only indigenous people while staking a settler claim. Any complicity in the subjugation of Hawaiians is denied by the assertion that Asians, too, comprise a "nation." They aren't complicit in maintaining institutional racism against Natives, nor do they continue to benefit from wholesale dispossession of Native lands and sovereignty. In truth, "local" ideology tells a familiar, and false, tale of success: Asians came as poor plantation workers and triumphed decades later as the new, democratically-elected ruling class. Not coincidentally, the responsibility for continued Hawaiian dispossession falls to imperialist *haole* and incapacitated Natives, that is, not to Asians. Thus do these settlers deny their ascendancy was made possible by the continued national oppression of Hawaiians, particularly the theft of our lands and the crushing of our independence.

This intra-settler competition between *haole* and Asians is a hallmark of colonial situations. Such contests serve, especially if severe, to mask even further the dispossession and marginalization of Natives. Asians—particularly the Japanese—like to harken back to the oppressions of the plantation era, although few Japanese in Hawai'i today actually worked on the plantations during the Territory (1900-1959). But at the threshold of a new century, it is the resilience of settler ideology which facilitates and justifies non-Native hegemony: "immigrants" who have struggled so hard and for so long *deserve* political and economic supremacy. By comparison, indigenous Hawaiians aren't in power because they haven't worked (or paid their dues) to achieve supremacy. In more obviously racist terms, Hawaiians deserve their fate. We suffer the same categorical character flaws as other Native peoples. To wit, we are steeped in nostalgia or cultural invention; we yearn for the past instead



of getting on with the present. Or we are, as a collective, culturally/psychologically incapable of learning how to bend our energies toward success in the modern world.

Against this kind of disparaging colonial ideology, Hawaiians have been asserting their claims as indigenous people to land, economic power and political sovereignty for at least the last twenty years. Hawaiian communities are seriously engaged in all manner of historical, cultural, and political education. *Hālau hula* (dance academies), language classes, and varied resistance organizations link cultural practice to the struggle for self-determination. In this way, cultural groups have become conduits for reconnection to the *lāhui*, or nation. Political education occurs as the groups participate in sovereignty marches, rallies, and political lobbying. The substance of the "nation" is made obvious when thousands of Hawaiians gather to protest the theft of their sovereignty. The power of such public rituals to de-colonize the mind can be seen in the rise of a new national identification among Hawaiians. After the 1993 sovereignty protests at the Palace of our chiefs, Hawaiians, especially the youth, began to discard national identity as Americans and reclaim indigenous identification as Natives.

Re-forming a *lāhui* that had allegedly disappeared in 1893 continues to serve the process of decolonization on at least two levels. The first is one of throwing off colonial identification as Americans. The second is understanding our Native nation as eligible in both international law and American law for inclusion in policies of Native sovereignty. Hawaiian resistance today is anchored in the increasing knowledge that Hawaiians once lived under their own national government as citizens of the Hawaiian rather than the American nation. Thus, the citizenship of our Native people and the territory of our nation, that is, the land base of our archipelago, are the contested ground. *The struggle is not for a personal or group identity but for land, government, and international status as a recognized nation.*

The distinction here between the personal and the national is critical. Hawaiians are not engaged in identity politics, any more than the Irish of Northern Ireland or the Palestinians of occupied Palestine are engaged in identity politics. Both the Irish and the Palestinians are subjugated national groups committed to a war of national liberation. Hawaiians, although not in the stage of combat, are nevertheless engaged in a kind of national liberation struggle. The terrain of battle now involves control of lands and natural resources, including water and subsurface minerals. Any negotiations over settlements other than land involves millions of dollars. By these actions is the *lāhui* seen to be, and experienced as, a palpable national entity.

If Hawaiians have a pre-contact, pre-invasion historical continuity on their aboriginal territories—that is, on the land that had been ours for two thousand years—“locals” do not. That is, “locals” have no indigenous land base, traditional language, culture, and history that is Native to Hawai‘i. Our indigenous origin enables us to define what and who is indigenous, and what and who is not indigenous. We know who the First Nations people are since we were, historically, the first people in the Hawaiian archipelago. Only Hawaiians are Native to Hawai‘i. Everyone else is a settler.

Local Asians also know, as we do, that they are not First Nations people. But ideologically, Asians cannot abide categorization with *haole*. Their subjugation at the hands of *haole* racism, their history of deprivation and suffering on the plantations, demand an identity other than settler. Faced with insurgent Hawaiians on the left, and indifferent or racist *haole* on the right, young Asians politicize the term “local.” Primarily a defense against

categorization with *haole*, especially *haole* from the American continent, "local" identification has been strengthened in response to "Native" insurgency. As the sovereignty front gains ground and as more Hawaiians assert an indigenous primacy, defensive Asians begin to concoct a fictitious socio-political entity based in Hawai'i. Hence the strangely disconnected idea called "local nation."⁹

The projection of a "local nation" as but the latest ideological evolution of "local" Asian identity is a telling illustration of how deeply the threat of Hawaiian nationalism has penetrated the fearful psychologies of non-Natives. Various ethnic groups in Hawai'i are fronting their "local" claims to residency and political ascendancy in our aboriginal homeland precisely at the time when organized political power on the part of Natives is emerging. Challenging the settler ideology that "we are all immigrants," Native nationalism unsettles the accustomed familiarity with which *haole* and Asians enjoy their dominance in everyday Hawai'i. Behind their irritation, however, Asians sense a real political threat. They know the stakes in the various organized sovereignty initiatives are substantial.

The Japanese American Citizens League-Honolulu (JACL-Honolulu) is a recent example of how settlers front their alleged support of Hawaiian sovereignty (the JACL-Honolulu passed a lukewarm sovereignty resolution) while attacking Hawaiian leaders who represent the sovereignty movement.¹⁰ In fall of 1999, the local Honolulu dailies had a field day attacking Hawaiian sovereignty leader and Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) Trustee, Mililani Trask, because she referred to Senator Daniel Inouye as the "one-armed bandit" in an OHA meeting. Trask explained the nickname was originally given to Inouye by his own Japanese army comrades in the second World War. (It was also the nickname commonly used for him by his good friend and former Hawai'i Governor, Jack Burns, among others.) The nickname referred to Inouye's admitted theft of jewelry from dead wartime noncombatants. The arm on which he wore the jewelry was later blown off, a fate his war buddies named "*bachi*," roughly translated as "bad karma," what we Hawaiians might call "*hoka*," or getting one's just desserts for a bad deed.¹¹

Release of Trask's use of the term was done by OHA trustees on the Inouye dole. These were the same trustees Trask had criticized for supporting Inouye's longstanding refusal to include Hawaiians in the Federal policy on recognized Native nations. The lo-

cal newspapers, particularly the right-wing, missionary-descended *Honolulu Advertiser*, ran a biased news story without comment from Trask and a racist cartoon with her cut-off right leg stuck in her mouth.¹²

Never mind, of course, that the "one-armed bandit" epithet was given to Inouye by his own comrades, nor that the substantive issue was Inouye's twenty-five-year lock on all federal funding for Hawai'i which, following Democratic Party procedure, has gone only to Inouye favorites, none of whom support Hawaiian control of Hawaiian lands and entitlements.

In the end, the issue of Inouye's interference in the sovereignty process, including his massive funding to compliant Hawaiian friends, received little coverage in the press. Trask's detailed reply to the *Advertiser* went unreported until Trask called her own press conference to release all information regarding Inouye's control of the sovereignty process. The *Advertiser* then admitted they had received her reply via e-mail but claimed it "wasn't retrieved" by press time. Trask finally paid to have the details of Inouye's political interference printed in the OHA paper.¹³

The JACL-Honolulu, meanwhile, played their customary reactionary role, targeting Trask and successfully obscuring her analysis. In the public controversy which followed, the anti-Hawaiian politics of the JACL were never addressed. The JACL and its spokesperson Clayton Ikei published a letter in the *Hawai'i Herald*, and copied it to other media, asking Trask to avoid "future resort to divisive racial and ethnic characterizations" of Inouye.¹⁴

Neither Ikei nor the membership of the JACL showed any interest in the substance of Trask's criticism of Inouye, namely that he was interfering in a Native process. Following their usual practice, the JACL, like the Japanese membership of the Democratic Party, obscured the issue of their control over Hawai'i politics and Native resources by vilifying a Native leader who criticized non-Native interference by Inouye and his friends.

Politically, the JACL, the Honolulu dailies, and Dan Inouye had once again teamed up to disparage and berate a Hawaiian leader. The JACL continued the familiar role of the Japanese in Hawai'i by opposing Hawaiian control over Native lands, water, and political representation. Inouye's twenty-year refusal to introduce Federal legislation recognizing Hawaiians as Native peoples eligible for inclusion in the Federal policy on recognized Native nations was never mentioned, let alone criticized by any of the involved parties in the controversy, including the JACL.

Clearly and swiftly, the JACL had acted to support the power of the Japanese-controlled Democratic Party while disparaging a Hawaiian leader who sought to analyze and expose that same control.

This collaborationist role of the JACL is in stark contrast to the critical support given to Trask and the sovereignty movement in general by a new group, Local Japanese Women for Justice (LJWJ), formed as a result of the Inouye-Trask controversy. Comprised entirely of local Japanese women led by Eiko Kosasa and Ida Yoshinaga, the group published a lengthy piece in the *Honolulu Advertiser* (and later in the Japanese newspaper, *Hawai'i Herald*) criticizing both the *Advertiser* and the JACL for attacking a sovereignty leader. The anti-sovereignty role of certain Japanese leaders in Hawai'i, like Inouye, was also analyzed, as was the role of the JACL in supporting Japanese internment during the second World War.¹⁵

The response of the JACL, written by Bill Hoshijo and David Forman, to their Japanese sisters was swift and nasty. They defended internment of their own people, while simultaneously arguing that the war years were a complex and difficult time for all. Refusing to acknowledge their collaborationist role in continuing Hawaiian subjugation, they also once again defended the record of Dan Inouye. True to form, the JACL failed to counter any of the substantive positions their Japanese sisters had argued.¹⁶

This critical exposure of the JACL frightened their supporters and other Japanese leaders, including one Eric Yamamoto, a professor at the University of Hawai'i Law School. For the past several years, Yamamoto has been busy publishing scholarly articles supporting "reconciliation" between Hawaiians and some of the Christian churches who benefited from missionization in Hawai'i, including theft of Native lands and complicity in the overthrow of the Hawaiian government.¹⁷ Yamamoto and JACL leaders, like David Forman, view the JACL as a friend to Hawaiians despite their attack on Trask and her supportive Japanese sisters in LJWJ.

Of course, as a law professor, Yamamoto knows full well that no amount of alleged "reconciliation" can equal the return of lands, money, and self-government to the Hawaiian people. Moreover, substantive "reconciliation" would mean Hawaiian control of the sovereignty process from beginning to end. Such Native control, however, is opposed by the JACL and their fellow non-Native travelers.

The role of groups such as the JACL, as well as other Asian supporters, like Yamamoto, has clearly been to organize Asians against a nationalist Hawaiian agenda while arguing that everyone in Hawai'i must participate in the sovereignty process.

Of course, the notion that settlers should participate in any form in the sovereignty process is ludicrous. In principle and in practice, Native sovereignty must be controlled by Natives. Just as Federally-recognized tribes on the American continent do not allow non-Natives to represent their peoples, so Hawaiians should not allow non-Natives to determine our strategies for achieving sovereignty. Simply put, "Native" sovereignty is impossible when non-Natives determine the process.

The current Task Forces appointed by Senator Daniel Akaka and charged with considering the relationship between Hawaiians and the State and Federal governments have sitting non-Native members, including David Forman and Eric Yamamoto. Because of non-Native participation, the principle and practice of Native self-determination is violated. As with the findings of past Task Forces and Commissions, nothing will be recommended which advances Native control over land and waters now enjoyed by the state and federal governments and non-Native citizens of Hawai'i.

There are other Asians, not on the Task Force, who have decided that the role of a "go-between" is essential to the relationship of Asians and Hawaiians. Predictably, this role highlights the activities of the self-styled and self-appointed mediator, rather than the sovereignty issue itself, as critical to any resolution of conflict. In practice, the "go-between" is a double agent. While professing private support to Hawaiians, such double agents actually lobby our few Asian allies to stay within the Japanese fold, that is, to refrain from publicly criticizing Asians who attack Hawaiian leaders.

Jill Nunokawa, civil rights counselor at the University of Hawai'i, is one among many young Asian professionals who, when asked, refused to lend public support to Local Japanese Women for Justice (LJWJ). According to Eiko Kosasa, co-chair of LJWJ, Nunokawa expressed the concern that a public defense of Mililani Trask was bad for the Japanese since Trask was not only criticizing Inouye but Japanese power in general, including their control of Hawaiian lands and entitlements. Nunokawa told Kosasa that Hawaiians were "going down the race road," and she did not wish to join them there. Tellingly, the Hawaiian sovereignty move-

ment—that is, justice in the form of self-determination—was represented by Nunokawa as the “race road.” Here, Native control of Hawaiian lands, waters, entitlements, and above all, representation at the national level is thus characterized as a “race” issue.

But the real “race” issue to those who control our lands is not the assertion of Hawaiian claims but the loss of Japanese control. In other words, the fear Nunokawa expressed is a pervasive fear Japanese feel about Hawaiian sovereignty since current Japanese control of Hawaiian lands and waters through their control of the State apparatus is directly challenged by Native sovereignty. The Japanese know that they have, as a group, benefited from the dispossession of Hawaiians. Justice for us would require, among other things, an end to Japanese Democratic Party control over Hawaiian lands and waters. Given that the Japanese as a political block have controlled Hawai‘i’s politics for years, it is obvious that substantive Hawaiian sovereignty requires that Japanese power brokers, specifically, Senator Dan Inouye, the JACL, and the rest of the Japanese-dominated Democratic Party, would no longer control Hawaiian assets, including land and political representation.

When movement Hawaiians remark that “Japanese can’t be trusted” in the struggle, they are thinking of false friends like Nunokawa, Yamamoto, and the JACL. No matter their much-touted support in resolutions, articles, and personal statements, these alleged Japanese supporters always come down on the side of the reigning Democratic party since they are direct beneficiaries of its continuing power. As history proves, power is never freely relinquished by those who wield it.

The women in LJWJ, meanwhile, are themselves under attack by Japanese politicians in Hawai‘i. Because these women dared to speak publicly against continued Japanese control over Hawaiian lands, resources, representation, and sovereignty, they have been isolated and severely criticized by the Japanese community. Even members of their families have carried out harsh retribution against them.

Such retribution points up the need for larger and larger groups of critical-thinking Asians to support a form of Hawaiian sovereignty created by Hawaiians, rather than the state or federal governments or non-Hawaiians. Truly supportive Asians must publicly ally themselves with our position of Native control over the sovereignty process. Simultaneously, these allies must also criticize Asian attempts to undermine sovereignty leaders. Until young



At the federal trials of Hawaiian "trespassers" on Kaho'olawe Island, Hawaiians used symbols of our Native past to illustrate opposition to American colonization. The gourd helmet took on a new meaning in this context as a sign of resistance and pride.

Photograph by Ed Greevy

Japanese leaders, such as Nunokawa, are willing to stand publicly with Hawaiian leaders such as Mililani Trask and her Japanese female supporters in Local Japanese Women for Justice, the anti-sovereignty, anti-Hawaiian effect of groups like the JACL will continue to grow.

While settler organizations like the JACL continue to stir up hatred against Native leaders, the real issue of justice for Hawai-

ians is intentionally obscured. As enunciated in the Ka Lāhui Master Plan, this justice would mean a "federally-recognized" Native Hawaiian land base and government that would establish a nation-to-nation relationship with the American government as is the case today with nearly 500 American Indian nations. Such a relationship would mean plenary powers for the Hawaiian nation over its territories. At present, these territories are controlled by the State and Federal governments which regulate public use.

Once Hawaiians reclaim these lands, public and private relationships between Natives and non-Natives will be altered. For example, settlers will have to pay taxes or user fees to swim at Native-owned beaches, enjoy recreation at Native-owned parks, drive on Native-owned roads, fly out of Native-owned airports, educate their children at public schools on Native-owned lands, and on, and on. Above all, non-Natives will have to live alongside a Native political system that has statutory authority to exclude, tax, or otherwise regulate the presence of non-Natives on Native lands. The potential shift here frightens non-Natives because it signals the political and economic ascendancy of Natives. At the least, Native power means no more free access by non-Natives to Native resources.

Indigenous Peoples and Minorities in International Law

The growing tensions between Asians and Hawaiians in Hawai'i have a corollary in the development of indigenous peoples' human rights in international law. In Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, peaceful relations between nations are seen to depend upon the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The question that has occupied the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (first convened in 1982 at the United Nations in Geneva) has been the definition of indigenous peoples and the elaboration of their rights. The primary document here is the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A product of twenty years' work by indigenous peoples themselves as well as human rights lawyers and jurists, the Draft Declaration is the most complete international document on the rights of indigenous peoples.

The Declaration was preceded by two major studies conducted by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by U.N. Rapporteurs Espiell (1974) and Deschenes (1985), as part of the broad concern regard-

ing the definition and therefore rights of both minorities and indigenous peoples.¹⁸

In Hector Gros Espiell's study "peoples" were to be considered as, and treated as, categorically different from "minorities." He based his distinctions on U.N. language regarding rights to self-determination and de-colonization. He concluded that, under international law, self-determination is a right of peoples and not minorities. The critical link for Espiell was the presence of colonial and alien domination. In addition to being a principle of international law, then, self-determination is a right of "peoples" under colonial domination.

In 1985, a Canadian, Justice Jules Deschenes, submitted a report on minorities to the Sub-Commission. His discussion of "minority" clarified the relationship between a minority and a majority as critical. He defined "minority" as:

A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.¹⁹

At the same time Deschenes was conducting his study another Rapporteur, Martinez Cobo, was undertaking a project on indigenous peoples for the Sub-Commission. His definition of indigenous peoples aided in the clarification of exact differences between minorities and indigenous peoples:

Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or part of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions, and legal system.²⁰

In Rapporteur Martinez Cobo's final report, the identification of indigenous peoples received a great deal of clarification. For example, Cobo argued that indigenous peoples must be recognized according to their own conceptions of themselves. No

attempt should be accepted which defines indigenous peoples through the values of foreign societies or the dominant sections of societies. Artificial, arbitrary, or manipulatory definitions, Cobo argued, must be rejected by indigenous peoples and the international human rights community. Finally, Cobo emphasized that the special position of indigenous peoples within the society of nation-states existing today derives from their rights to be different and to be considered as different.

Part of that difference inheres in the *critical identification of historical continuity*. Cobo listed several kinds of historical continuity into the present, including the following:

- a) Occupation of ancestral lands;
- b) Common ancestry with original occupants of these lands;
- c) Culture, in general, including dress, religion, means of livelihood, forms of association, membership in traditional communities;
- d) Language.²¹

Finally, Professor Erica-Irene Daes, the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, has written that "acknowledging the significance of 'territory' may be necessary to address another major logical and conceptual problem: differentiating 'indigenous peoples' and 'minorities.' A strict distinction must be made between 'indigenous peoples' rights' and 'minority' rights. Indigenous peoples are indeed peoples and not minorities."²²

This is a primary distinction because, under international law, "minorities" do not have the right to self-determination.

The rights of indigenous peoples have also concerned governments whose countries contain a large percentage of indigenous peoples, such as Greenland. In 1991, the Parliament of Greenland argued for a clear distinction between the rights of minorities and the rights of indigenous peoples.

...the world's indigenous peoples have fundamental human rights of a collective and individual nature. Indigenous peoples are not, and do not consider themselves, minorities. The rights of indigenous peoples are derived from their own history, culture, traditions, laws and special relationship to their lands, resources and environment.²³

Finally, Justice Deschenes referred to his country's distinctions between indigenous peoples and minorities in the Constitution Act of Canada, arguing that the United Nations should take

guidance from Canada's example and define indigenous peoples and minorities separately.

Specific aspects of the Draft Declaration bear directly upon the differences between indigenous peoples and minority populations. Indigenous peoples are defined by pre-contact, aboriginal occupation of traditional lands. They are not minorities, no matter their number. In other words, the numbers of indigenous peoples do not constitute a criterion in their definition.

While the Declaration covers many areas of concern, certain rights are critical to the distinction that must be made between Natives and minorities. In Article 3 of the Draft, indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination (which minorities do not), and by virtue of that right indigenous peoples can determine their political status.

Political self-determination is tied to land rights and restitution. The doctrine of discovery by which the Americas, the Pacific, and so many other parts of the world were allegedly "discovered" is repudiated. The companion doctrine of "*terra nullius*" is identified as legally unacceptable. Thus, aboriginal peoples have a position from which to argue that traditional lands should be restored to them. In Article 26, indigenous

peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use the lands and territories. . . they have traditionally owned. . . . This includes the right to the full recognition of their laws, traditions, and customs, land-tenure systems and institutions for the development and management of resources, and the right to effective measures by States to prevent any interference with, alienation of, or encroachment upon these rights.²⁴

In Part VII, Article 31, the Declaration states:

Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government.²⁵

Interestingly, these rights are considered in Part IX, Article 42, to "constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity, and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world."²⁶

The Draft Declaration is a document still in formation. As the world's indigenous peoples make their expensive and arduous trek to Geneva each summer when the Working Group on Indigenous Populations convenes, the struggle for recognition and protection of the claims of Native peoples is strengthened. Whole

lifetimes are expended on the process of attempting to move the existing powers of the world to acknowledge and protect indigenous peoples. This process has changed the consciousness of indigenous peoples all over the globe, including Hawai'i. Indigenous peoples can now cite the U.N. Draft Declaration on Indigenous Human Rights in the struggle for protection of their lands, languages, resources, and most critically, their continuity as peoples.

On the ideological front, documents like the Draft Declaration are used to transform and clarify public discussion and agitation. Legal terms of reference, indigenous human rights concepts in international usage, and the political linkage of the non-self-governing status of the Hawaiian nation with other non-self-governing indigenous nations move Hawaiians into a world arena where Native peoples are primary, and dominant states are secondary, to the discussion.

Ka Lāhui Hawai'i

On the international stage, the vehicle which has represented Hawaiians most effectively is Ka Lāhui Hawai'i. Because it is the frontline organization of Hawaiian sovereignty, Ka Lāhui Hawai'i serves as the indigenous party representing Native, as opposed to settler, interests. Through its Master Plan, Ka Lāhui Hawai'i has given concrete policy shape to Native political aspirations. Mental de-colonization has led to a first stage of political de-colonization. Countering settler American ideology, the Plan depends for much of its argument on Native cultural understanding of Hawaiian history, politics, and economics. Like other embodiments of nationhood, the Ka Lāhui Master Plan is both an enunciation of principles and an agenda for political action.²⁷

Relying, in part, on international legal standards, the Master Plan endorses the rights and principles contained in four major international documents. These are the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, and the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations. Specifically, the rights to self-determination and to self-development are cited in the Master Plan as critical to Hawaiian sovereignty.

In terms of policies regarding the United States, the Plan rejects the current status of Hawaiians as wards of the State of Hawai'i, pointing out that wardship is usurpation of Hawaiian

collective rights to land and political power, as well as a violation of Native human and civil rights. Moreover, wardship classifies Hawaiians with children and the incompetent, revealing the racist intent of the classification.

Critically, the Plan rejects American nationality by asserting that self-determination means jurisdiction over lands and territories, and internal and external relationships, including the following: the power to determine membership; police powers; the power to administer justice; the power to exclude persons from National Territory; the power to charter businesses; the power of sovereign immunity; the power to regulate trade and enter into trade agreements; the power to tax; and the power to legislate and regulate all activities on its land base, including natural resources and water management activities and economic enterprises.

The current policy of state wardship for Hawaiians whereby the State controls Hawaiian lands and waters is repudiated. Given that the State of Hawai'i has maintained a policy of non-recognition of the indigenous peoples of Hawai'i and has consistently acted as the Native representative despite an extensive record of State neglect and mismanagement of the Native trusts, the Ka Lāhui Master Plan calls for termination of this policy.

Citing the 1993 Apology Bill passed by the U.S. Congress, the Plan notes the Apology acknowledges that "the indigenous Hawaiian people have never directly relinquished their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or referendum."²⁸

Therefore, the goals of Ka Lāhui Hawai'i are simple: final resolution of the historic claims of the Hawaiian people relating to the overthrow, State and Federal misuse of Native trust lands (totaling some two million acres) and resources, and violations of human and civil rights. Resolution of claims will be followed by self-determination for Hawaiians; Federal recognition of Ka Lāhui Hawai'i as the Hawaiian Nation; restoration of traditional lands, natural resources, and energy resources to the Ka Lāhui National Land Trust.

The burden rests with the United States and the State of Hawai'i to inventory and restore the lands of the Native trusts, both Federally and State-held, and to remedy all Federal and State breaches of the trust relating to these assets. The Federal and State governments must segregate the trust lands from other public and private lands. The United States must allocate not less than two million

acres of land (that is, all the ceded lands) drawn from State-controlled and Federally-controlled lands to the National Land Trust.

In the area of the National Land Trust, Ka Lāhui identifies the land and natural resource entitlements of indigenous Hawaiians within the entire archipelago. These entitlements include State-held trust lands, that is, Hawaiian homes lands and ceded lands; marine resources and fisheries; surface and ground water rights, and submerged lands; lands and natural resources under the Federal Government; energy resources such as ocean thermal and geothermal sources; minerals, airspace and the trust assets of the private trusts.

Although the Master Plan has many other specific areas relating to various concerns, such as the private Hawaiian trusts, the Plan also delineates an international relationship. Citing Chapter XI, Article 73, of the United Nations Charter, the Plan notes that the United States, as Hawai'i's "administering agent" accepted as a "sacred trust" the obligation "to assist the inhabitants of the territory of Hawai'i in the progressive development of their free political institutions."²⁹

In 1953, the Fourth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 742 requiring that the inhabitants of territories be given several choices in achieving self-government. These choices include: free association, commonwealth, integration (statehood), and independence, or "other separate systems of self-government."

The United States never allowed de-colonization in Hawai'i under the United Nations process, nor did it allow the inhabitants of the territory their right to choose options identified in Resolution 742. The plebiscite in 1959 allowed only one choice—Statehood—other than Territorial status. By not including other choices, the United States violated international human rights law as well as the human rights of Hawaiians.

Given that Hawai'i was removed at the request of the United States from the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories in 1959, the position of Ka Lāhui Hawai'i is re-inscription of Hawai'i on that list, thereby recognizing Hawaiians as still eligible for self-determination. In the meanwhile, Ka Lāhui has chosen to develop a culturally appropriate "separate system of self-government," which incorporates Hawaiian values and traditions. As part of this assertion, Ka Lāhui has called for segregation of Hawaiian trust lands and assets from the State of Hawai'i. Additionally, a record of extensive civil and human rights abuses of Hawai-

ians by the state and federal governments must be established and strenuous advocacy of Hawaiian rights and claims must proceed.³⁰

Natives and "Locals"

Apart from its embodiment of Native aspirations, the Ka Lāhui Hawai'i Master Plan can be read as a perfect illustration of the distance between Natives and "locals" in Hawai'i. The issues before Hawaiians are those of indigenous land, cultural rights, and survival as a people. In contrast, the issues before "locals" have merely to do with finding a comfortable fit in Hawai'i that guarantees a rising income, upward mobility, and the general accoutrements of a middle-class "American" way of life. Above all, "locals" don't want any reminder of their daily benefit from the subjugation of Hawaiians. For them, history begins with their arrival in Hawai'i and culminates with the endless re-telling of their allegedly well-deserved rise to power. Simply said, "locals" want to be "Americans."

But national identification as "American" is national identification as a colonizer, someone who benefits from stolen Native lands and the genocide so well-documented against America's Native peoples. Here, "identity" is not, as often asserted in Hawai'i, a problem for Hawaiians. It is, rather, a problem for non-Natives, including Asians. We are engaged in de-colonizing our status as wards of the state and federal governments and struggling for a land base.

Asians and *haole* have been thrown into a cauldron of defensive actions by our nationalist struggle. Either they must justify their continued benefit from Hawaiian subjugation, thus serving as support for that subjugation, or they must repudiate American hegemony and work with the Hawaiian nationalist movement. In plain language, serious and thoughtful individuals, whether *haole* or Asian, must choose to support a form of Hawaiian self-determination created by Hawaiians.

The position of "ally" is certainly engaged in by many non-Natives all over the world. Support organizations, like the Unrecognized Nations and Peoples Organization, for example, work on a global level to give voice to Native peoples at international forums, and even in their home countries. A few groups in Hawai'i primarily comprised of non-Natives (e.g., Local Japanese Women for Justice) serve the same function.

But the most critical need for non-Native allies is in the arena of support for Hawaiian self-determination. Defending Hawaiian sovereignty initiatives is only beneficial when non-Natives

play the roles assigned to them by Natives. Put another way, nationalists always need support, but they must be the determining voice in the substance of that support and how, and under what circumstances, it applies.

Of course, Hawaiians, like most colonized peoples, have a national bourgeoisie, that is, a class that ascends due to collaboration with the state and federal governments. This class serves to counter indigenous nationalist positions. Often, potentially "supportive" locals complain about the confusion surrounding the many sovereignty positions. But the easiest and most defensible position is the one which follows the Ka Lāhui Master Plan. No matter the future leadership of Ka Lāhui, the Plan will remain as the clearest document of this period in Hawaiian history. Non-Natives who support the Plan are, in effect, supporting all the struggles of indigenous peoples which created the Draft Declaration at the United Nations.

Finally, it must be recalled that history does not begin with the present nor does its terrible legacy disappear with the arrival of a new consciousness. Non-Natives need to examine and re-examine their many and continuing benefits from Hawaiian dispossession. Those benefits do not end when non-Natives begin supporting Hawaiians, just as our dispossession as Natives does not end when we become active nationalists. Equations of Native exploitation and of settler benefit continue. For non-Natives, the question that needs to be answered every day is simply the one posed in the old union song, "which side are you on?"

● Glossary

<i>ali'i</i>	chief
<i>haole</i>	originally all foreigners, now only white people
<i>hālau hula</i>	<i>hula</i> is the traditional dance of the Hawaiian people; <i>hālau hula</i> are dance academies that are currently enjoying a revival
<i>lāhui</i>	people, race, nation
<i>taro</i>	starchy tuber that is the staple of the Hawaiian diet; metaphorically, <i>taro</i> is the parent of the Hawaiian people

Notes

1. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), 44.
2. Sharon Helen Venne, *Our Elders Understand Our Rights: Evolving International Law Regarding Indigenous Rights* (Penticton, British Columbia: Theytus Books, Ltd., 1998), 82 and 77.

3. S.J. Res. 19, (U.S. Public Law 103-150), 103d Congress, 1st Session, 107 Stat. 1510 (November 23, 1993).
4. See U.S. President Grover Cleveland's message to the U.S. Congress in the "The President's Message Relating to the Hawaiian Islands," December 18, 1893," *House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53rd Congress, Second Session, 1893*, 445-458; called the Blount Report.
5. See Daniel K. Inouye, *Journey to Washington* (Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967); George R. Ariyoshi, *With Obligation to All* (Honolulu: Ariyoshi Foundation, 1997); Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983) and *Strangers From a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989). Also see various materials published to commemorate 100 years of Japanese settlement in Hawai'i: Roland Kotani, *The Japanese in Hawaii: A Century of Struggle* (Honolulu: Hawaii Hochi Ltd., 1985); Franklin Odo and Kazuko Sinoto, *A Pictorial History of the Japanese in Hawaii, 1885-1924* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1985); Dennis Ogawa and Glen Grant, *To a Land Called Tengoku: One Hundred Years of the Japanese in Hawaii* (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing of Honolulu, 1985).
6. For a detailed investigation of Chinese and Japanese political ascendancy as a class in post-Statehood Hawai'i, see George Cooper and Gavan Daws, *Land and Power in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985).
7. For statistics on Hawaiian population, housing, land, education, health, prisons, and employment, see Office of Hawaiian Affairs, *Native Hawaiian Data Book, 1998* (Honolulu: Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Planning and Research Office, 1998).
8. Candace Fujikane, "Between Nationalism: Hawai'i's Local Nation and Its Troubled Racial Paradise," *Critical Mass: A Journal of Asian American Cultural Criticism* 1:2 (1994), 23-57.
9. For an early discussion of the term "local," see Eric Yamamoto, "The Significance of Local," in *Social Process in Hawai'i* 27 (1979), 101-115. For later discussions, see Jonathan Okamura, "Aloha Kanaka me ke Aloha 'Aina: Local Culture and Society in Hawai'i," *Amerasia* 7:2 (1980); Eric Chock, "The Neocolonialization of Bamboo Ridge: Repositioning *Bamboo Ridge* and Local Literature in the 1990s," *Bamboo Ridge* 69 (1996), 11-25. Fujikane now appears to have some doubts about her earlier assertion of a "local nation." See "Reimagining Development and the Local in Lois-Ann Yamanaka's *Saturday Night at the Pahala Theater*," *Social Process in Hawai'i* 38 (1997), 40-62.
10. Japanese American Citizens League Resolution, "Reaffirming Support for the Restoration of Human, Civil, Property and Sovereign Rights of Hawai'i's Indigenous People," adopted at the 1992 JACL National Convention.
11. For the initial news coverage, see *Honolulu Advertiser*, November 10-13, 1999. In a 1989 interview with Mike Tokunaga, Democratic Party insider from the 1950s, Tokunaga recalled a 1959 story where Jack

Burns identified Inouye as the "one-armed bandit." Center for Oral History, "Oral History Interview with Mike Tokunaga by Larry Meacham and Daniel W. Tuttle on September 12, 1989" in *Hawai'i Political History Documentation Project, Vol. III* (Honolulu: Center for Oral History, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 1996), 1233. In the *Advertiser* story of November 11, 1999, Inouye's Japanese war comrades said they never used the term "one-armed bandit" to describe Inouye. In fact, as pointed out by Richard Borreca in a *Star-Bulletin* column on November 17, 1999, the nickname was used by John Burns when Inouye was first running for the U.S. Senate. Borreca claims that Burns used the term "jokingly" when asking why Inouye was planning to run for the Senate rather than the House of Representatives. The source for Borreca's article was Tokunaga's oral history.

In truth, the oral history reveals that Burns was angry at Inouye because the Party plan was for Inouye to run for the House. Why Burns could call Inouye "the one-armed bandit" without assault by the press is explained by the simple observation that critics of the Democratic Party, in this case, one Mililani Trask, are dangerous to continued Japanese control of the Party, and most critically, dangerous to the monumental power that the Democratic Party and the state apparatus wield over Hawaiian resources.

Trask's use of the "one-armed bandit" phrase was a false issue. The real issue was and remains Inouye's control over the sovereignty process. In this instance, the issue was lost amidst the well-orchestrated attack on Trask. In fact, the *Advertiser* story and vicious cartoon were perfectly timed to appear before, during, and immediately after Veterans' Day.

In a paid advertisement (titled, appropriately, "Inouye's Legacy to Hawaiians") printed in the 17:2 (February 2000) issue of the OHA newspaper, *Ka Wai Ola*, Trask detailed the *Advertiser* campaign to disparage her and to prevent the airing of critical issues regarding Inouye's interference in the sovereignty process. Needless to say, her side of the story was never printed in the two Honolulu dailies. Significantly, the issue of Inouye's interference in the sovereignty process which Trask had severely criticized, never saw the light of day.

12. Dick Adair, Cartoon, *Honolulu Advertiser*, November 12, 1999, A:12.
13. "OHA Trustee Won't Back Down," *Honolulu Advertiser*, November 11, 1999, A:1; Mililani Trask, "Inouye's Legacy to Hawaiians," *Ka Wai Ola O OHA* 17:2 (February 2000), 20-21.
14. Clayton C. Ikei, representing the JACL. See November 22, 1999 letter to Mililani Trask and the media, reprinted in the local Japanese American community newspaper. Clayton C. Ikei, "JACL Opposes Trask's Comments to Inouye," *Hawai'i Herald*, December 3, 1999, A-7 and Pat Omandam, "AJA Group Asks Trask Not to Be Ethnically Divisive," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, November 25, 1999, A:3.
15. Ida Yoshinaga and Eiko Kosasa, Local Japanese Women for Justice, "Local Japanese Should Understand Inouye's Real Agenda," *Honolulu Advertiser*, February 6, 2000, Focus Section:1 and reprinted as

- "Understanding Inouye's Real Agenda," *Hawai'i Herald*, March 3, 2000, A-4.
16. Bill Hoshijo and David Forman, Japanese American Citizens League, "JACL Fights Against Racism, No Matter Where It Comes From," *Honolulu Advertiser*, February 27, 2000, Focus Section:1 and reprinted as "JACL Speaks Out to Clear the Record," *Hawai'i Herald*, March 3, 2000, A-4.
 17. See Eric Yamamoto, "Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice," *UCLA Asian Pacific American Law Journal* 3:33, 33-74. Yamamoto discusses the participation of Hawai'i-based Asian American churches in the public apology by the United Church of Christ (U.C.C.) made to Hawaiians concerning the participation of the churches in the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy. The apology was made by Paul Sherry, President of the United Church of Christ, before some 15,000 people on the centenary of the overthrow at the Palace of our Chiefs, on January 17, 1993. In discussions with Hawaiian leaders preceding the apology, Paul Sherry responded to my criticism that such apologies were useless to the Hawaiian people. I suggested the U.C.C. return some of the lands the churches controlled in Hawai'i in lieu of an apology. Sherry responded that I was criticizing the church for attempting to receive what he called "cheap grace," an easy forgiveness achieved for very little. Given that reparation monies (totaling over a million dollars) from the church hierarchy went to Hawai'i churches rather than to Native Hawaiians, my conclusions were that while the U.C.C. attained their "cheap grace," we Hawaiians, as usual, received nothing. Also see Eric Yamamoto, *Interracial Justice: Conflict and Reconciliation in Post-Civil Rights America* (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
 18. See the discussion of these two studies in Venne, *Our Elders Understand Our Rights: Evolving International Law Regarding Indigenous Rights*, 77-83.
 19. *Ibid.*, 80.
 20. *Ibid.*, 80.
 21. *Ibid.*, 88.
 22. *Ibid.*, 146.
 23. *Ibid.*, 82.
 24. *Ibid.*, 212.
 25. *Ibid.*, 213.
 26. *Ibid.*, 215.
 27. Ka Lāhui Hawai'i, *Ho'okupu a Ka Lāhui Hawai'i: The Master Plan*, 1995 (Honolulu: Ka Lāhui Hawai'i, 1995).
 28. U.S. Public Law, 103rd Congress.
 29. *The Master Plan*, 5.
 30. *Ibid.*, 6-8.

PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

*A Journal of American
and Pacific History*

Published quarterly
by the University of
California Press
for the Pacific Coast
Branch of the
American Historical Association



For over sixty years, *Pacific Historical Review* has provided a forum for award-winning articles and discussions devoted to the history of American expansionism to the Pacific and beyond and the postfrontier developments of the twentieth-century American West. In addition to articles, *PHR* features historio-graphical and review essays, notes and documents, reviews of books, and professional news.

ORDER FORM—15% OFF INTRODUCTORY OFFER

☐ Yes, start my quarterly subscrip-
tion to *Pacific Historical Review*.

☐ Individual: ~~\$29~~ \$24.65

☐ Student: ~~\$19~~ \$16.15
(enclose copy of ID)

☐ Institution: ~~\$75~~ \$63.75

Name _____

Address _____

Methods of Payment (choose one)

☐ Check enclosed

(Please make your check payable to UC Regents.)

☐ Visa ☐ MasterCard

Add \$20 postage Outside North America
Canada residents add 7% GST
(R122058662)

Card No. _____

Exp. date _____

Authorized Signature _____

PH0AEX

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, JOURNALS • 2000 CENTER STREET, BERKELEY, CA 94704-1223
TEL: 510/643-7154 • FAX: 510/642-9917 • E-MAIL: JORDERS@UCPRESS.UCOP.EDU
WWW.UCPRESS.EDU/JOURNALS



Kia'aina Mililani Trask leading the January 17, 1993 sovereignty march to 'Iolani Palace.

Photo by Ed Greevy



Project
MUSE[®]

Today's Research. Tomorrow's Inspiration.

Colliding Histories Hawai'i Statehood at the Intersection of Asians "Ineligible to Citizenship" and Hawaiians "Unfit for Self-Government"

Dean Itsuji Saranillio

Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 13, Number 3, October
2010, pp. 283-309 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press



For additional information about this article

<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jaas/summary/v013/13.3.saranillio.html>

COLLIDING HISTORIES

*Hawai‘i Statehood at the Intersection of Asians
“Ineligible to Citizenship” and Hawaiians “Unfit
for Self-Government”*

dean itsuji **saranillio**

Said monies . . . being illegally expended [by the Hawaii Statehood Commission] are used to aid private purposes and individuals and are an illegal gift of public moneys to the proponents of statehood for Hawaii . . . to the exclusion and detriment of citizens and taxpayers of the territory of Hawaii opposed to statehood.

—Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell,
plaintiff in *Campbell v. Stainback*
et al. lawsuit filed on January 17, 1948
(anniversary of the U.S.-backed
overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom)

ON THE MORNING OF AUGUST 19, 2006, state representative Barbara Marumoto, dressed as the Statue of Liberty, and state senator Sam Sлом, waving a large American flag, led a group to ‘Iolani Palace to celebrate Admission Day—a state holiday that commemorates Hawai‘i statehood. This group’s state-sponsored commemoration, however, was blocked by Native Hawaiian grassroots activists who stated that ‘Iolani Palace was an inappropriate place to celebrate statehood because it is sacred grounds and also the site of the 1893 U.S.-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom.¹ Verbal arguments and near-physical confrontations followed and continued for more than an hour until the group celebrating statehood decided to leave. In 2008, again on Admission Day, more than twenty members of another Hawaiian group were arrested for seizing ‘Iolani Palace in an attempt to reinstate a Hawaiian government.

Similar actions opposing statehood celebrations took place in the months leading up to Admission Day on the fiftieth anniversary of Hawai'i statehood in 2009.² While the state of Hawai'i quietly commemorated its golden anniversary by holding a public conference to envision Hawai'i's future as a U.S. state, titled "New Horizons for the Next 50 Years," Hawaiian groups gathered outside to project a future wish for a world without U.S. imperialist influence. A twelve-foot-tall effigy of Uncle Sam, painted with dollar signs in his eyes and holding two large guns with the words "genocide" and "imperialism" written on each, led a march of more than a thousand protestors to the Hawai'i Convention Center where the conference was being held. The Uncle Sam effigy was pushed on a cart made to look like a U.S. military Stryker combat vehicle—a direct reference to a broad-based community struggle to oppose them being housed on the islands and the further contamination of lands used for live-fire training.³ Adding historical legibility and broader context to the protest, Uncle Sam's hat was decorated with feathers each with the name of a different nation whose sovereignty has been violated by the United States, such as First Nations, the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Iraq. In addition, around the Stryker vehicle were cutouts of bombs with the names of sites in Hawai'i and elsewhere that have been devastated by U.S. war and military training: Kaho'olawe, Mākua, Bikini, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Vieques. The demonstration aimed to disrupt the official histories publicized in the months leading up to Admission Day by expanding on these narrations' deliberate silences, specifically a genocidal history of U.S. territorial expropriation and U.S. military occupation, processes both productive of Hawai'i statehood. Outside the convention center, speakers addressed the consequences of the United States in Hawai'i and its connections to other sites of U.S. empire. The portion of the demonstration that received the most attention, however, was the cutting out and burning of the fiftieth star from the American flag.⁴

Contrary to the romantic images of Hawai'i peddled globally by a billion-dollar tourism industry, heated political battles between groups, each armed with opposing histories, occur frequently in Hawai'i. As the protests on Admission Day illustrate, continuing memory of the 1893 overthrow, a violation of Hawaiian national sovereignty and self-determi-

nation acknowledged and apologized for by the United States, continues to animate such counternarratives.⁵ For many, Hawai'i statehood is a manifestation of the overthrow, sustaining the relations of domination necessary for U.S. state, economic, and military assaults to continue into the present. In fact, the intensity of the Admission Day protests were not simply inspired by competing nationalisms but shaped by a wide range of ongoing state-sanctioned assaults against Native Hawaiians. Throughout 2009, Hawaiian groups protested Republican governor Linda Lingle's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse a decision by the Hawai'i Supreme Court, which ruled that the state could not sell or transfer so-called ceded lands until claims on these lands by a future Hawaiian government have been resolved. These are an estimated 1.8 million acres of Hawaiian crown and government lands that were seized by the United States at the time of imposed annexation and turned over to the state of Hawai'i through the 1959 Admission Act.

Other ongoing assaults against Native Hawaiians include a string of lawsuits seeking to dismantle all Hawaiian specific "entitlements" by claiming them to be racially discriminatory against non-Hawaiians; the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act, or Akaka Bill, which would create a federally recognized indigenous government, but a nation with no land guaranteed and potentially troubling future claims to autonomy from the United States; continued corporate, military, and residential developments that desecrate Hawaiian sacred sites and burials; the ecological dangers of multinational agricultural corporation genetically modified organisms (GMOs)⁶ testing in the islands; the continued use of Mākua Valley and Pohakuloa for live-fire military training; and an exorbitant rental and real estate market responsible for a growing diaspora and tent cities filled primarily with "house-less"⁷ Hawaiians, which line the beaches that tourists are told not to visit. Although this is far from a comprehensive list of ongoing issues, it illustrates the fact that many Native Hawaiians are engaged in continued struggle against state, military, and corporate actions whose interests are in direct conflict with Hawaiian political and cultural associations with Hawai'i. Indeed, the circulation of official state histories and exotic images of Hawai'i function to ideologically obfuscate and materially distribute a violent economy of occupation—domination

through subjugation, profit through desecration, leisure through exploitation, and the articulation of liberal and conservative notions of civil rights and democracy that render the U.S. occupation of Hawai'i a logical impossibility.

Contemporary criticisms of Native Hawaiian protests on Admission Day contend that such opposition is politically contrived and ahistorical, arguing that Hawaiians wholly embraced statehood, even playing crucial roles in its achievement.⁸ Such disavowals from positions of presumed omnipotence, however, are not without their own truths.⁹ Many in Hawai'i, including numerous Native Hawaiians, did support a state-led movement to gain their civil rights as "first-class American citizens," seeking to displace a territorial structure that benefited elite *haole* (white) settlers while also advancing a liberal and antiracist ideal that U.S. citizenship should not be limited to *haole* only. Often cited is the June 1959 congressionally mandated plebiscite, which revealed that of the 155,000 registered voters, 17 to 1 were in favor of statehood (132,773 to 7,971).¹⁰ Yet as Mililani Trask, former Pacific expert to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, has argued, the 1959 statehood ballot used in the plebiscite was written to limit the vote to either statehood or territorial status and did not include the United Nations' mandated options for "independence" or other "separate systems of self-government."¹¹ Furthermore, in the decades leading to the 1959 plebiscite, the state monopolized taxpayer monies to finance a protracted opinion campaign targeting a local and national populace to support statehood. This campaign's control of public resources, its volume and visibility, aimed to silence the opposition, even actively blocking movements or narratives from forming.

Given the fact that, for many, the history of Hawai'i statehood is a liberal moral allegory about the inclusion of nonwhite groups into the United States, what Governor Lingle affirmed as a "model of tolerance ahead of its time," the idea that the civil liberties achieved through statehood came at the expense of Native Hawaiian rights to self-government is cause for major contemporary conflict and animosity.¹² This essay offers a kind of "history of the present," tracing two mutually constitutive but competing projects in the post-World War II period—the racial project combating the exclusion of Asian Americans from a U.S. national polity, particularly Japanese Americans, as perpetual foreign threats who were

“ineligible to citizenship” and another project that sought to combat the colonial designation of Native Hawaiians as “unfit for self-government.” While the statehood narrative has become memorialized as a triumph of multiracial coalitions united against white racism, the fact that Hawaiians and their supporters voiced opposition to statehood citing the 1893 overthrow remains underresearched in current scholarship and nearly all but forgotten in public discourse. This was in fact deliberate, as the Hawaii Statehood Commission, a state agency responsible for capturing hegemony and normalizing public opinion for statehood, actively suppressed Native Hawaiian opposition. Indeed, in complex ways, Hawai‘i statehood, narrated as a liberal antiracist civil rights project, facilitated and normalized projects of both settler colonialism and empire. U.S. ambitions for global hegemony during the Cold War found a discursive alliance with selected narrations of Japanese American racial persecution and loyal military service, setting these narratives to public memory through global circulation, amusement, and publicity, while other narratives of Native Hawaiian colonial oppression were designated for historical deletion through intimidation and containment.

THE THREE PILLARS OF WHITE SUPREMACY

With each political project responding to its own unique location within changing conditions and overlapping formations of local and global power, certain analyses and insights of one racial project can help to illuminate blind spots or silences within the next. American Indian studies scholar Andrea Smith’s conceptual frame that white supremacy is comprised of distinct but interrelated logics—labor exploitation, genocide (settler colonialism), and war (Orientalism)—provides a useful framework for centering relational thinking in comparative ethnic studies scholarship. Smith argues that dominant conceptions of coalition politics are framed around a shared victimization by white supremacy, often resulting in the “oppression olympics”—where groups issue competing narratives over who is more oppressed. Smith’s intervention shows how different historical groups are not impacted by white supremacy uniformly and demonstrates how strategies for resistance are often themselves set by a system of white supremacy.¹³

While naming all the discursive logics of white supremacy is an elusive project, Smith's tactical assemblage of labor, genocide, and war helps to articulate an awareness of these overlapping yet nonequivalent forms of oppression, especially when liberal multiculturalism is pervasive in flattening the important historical and political differences between dissimilarly oppressed groups. The first logic of oppression she identifies is labor exploitation where Blackness is often equated with a certain "slaveability." A modification of this pillar for the specificities of Hawai'i's history can turn to numerous labor histories that have examined the production of a hierarchy of differently racialized ethnic groups in maintaining labor exploitation and its role in Hawai'i's militant unionism.¹⁴ The second pillar is genocide or settler colonialism through which indigenous peoples must "disappear" so that others can lay a claim over their land.

Genocide (whether through physical extermination or cultural assimilation)¹⁵ and its counterpart, settler colonialism, work hand in hand as a system of power that expropriates Native territories and eliminates Native modes of production in order to replace these seemingly primitive societies with settlers who are discursively constituted as superior, and thus more deserving over these contested lands and resources. This pillar is easily recognizable in the numerous Hawaiian histories tracing resistance to U.S. occupation, but also in recent scholarship in Asian American studies such as in Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura's anthology, *Asian Settler Colonialism*. Dylan Rodriguez's *Suspended Apocalypse* also relocates "Filipino American" subjectivities within a genealogy of white supremacist genocide and war.¹⁶

The last pillar, Orientalism or war, posits the need for a permanent foreign threat that allows the United States to be in a permanent state of war. Given Hawai'i's strategic military location in the middle of the Pacific, U.S. interests in Hawai'i have been largely dominated by the military.¹⁷ Whether it is the use of Hawai'i as a stopping point for U.S. soldiers involved in the Philippine-American war, Japanese in Hawai'i prior to and during World War II, the threat of Communists, or currently, in reference to so-called terrorists, numerous cultural representations have provided justification for the United States to fortify Hawai'i as a military outpost. Similarly, Orientalism translates into external and internal foreign threats, materializing in anti-immigration and naturalization laws that constitute

many of these groups as “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”¹⁸ Andrea Smith’s conceptual frame thus allows one to analyze different systems of power in complex unity by questioning how power simultaneously targets and operates through each group to participate in different historically produced and politically mediated forms of hegemony. According to Smith: “This way, our alliances would not be solely based on shared victimization, but where we are complicit in the victimization of others.”¹⁹

FROM WHITE RACIAL DICTATORSHIP TO LIBERAL MULTICULTURAL EMPIRE

In his intricate study of Hawai‘i statehood, *Last among Equals*, Roger Bell shows how southern senators blocked Hawai‘i’s bid for statehood because they wanted to keep congressional control for the Democrats and also felt nervous that new liberal Asian American senators might facilitate the passing of civil rights legislation.²⁰ In *Completing the Union*, John S. Whitehead compares the movement for statehood in Hawai‘i and Alaska and their particular utility as military posts during the Cold War.²¹ It is at the intersection of civil rights and the Cold War that we can gain a more expansive view of the converging interests that produced Hawai‘i statehood. Various scholars examining the Cold War have shown how the idea of the United States as a racially diverse nation based on harmonious democratic relations was mobilized for the purposes of U.S. global hegemony.²² For instance, Derrick Bell argues that the celebrated *Brown v. Board of Education* Supreme Court decision, which desegregated public schools in 1954, cannot be understood without considering how it served the economic and political interests of whites in policy-making positions who understood its benefits at home and abroad. Bell thus argues that the *Brown* decision helped to provide “immediate credibility” in the Cold War to “win the hearts and minds of emerging third world people.”²³

By the 1950s and 1960s, when decolonization throughout Asia, Oceania, Africa, and Latin America was transforming the world order and criticism of Western imperialism was the dominant international sentiment, Cold War warriors were aware that Hawai‘i statehood had ideological value for gaining the allegiance of newly decolonized nations. In 1950, Edward L. Bernays, called by some the “father of public relations,” was a visiting professor at the University of Hawai‘i. Bernays had been

widely known for his corporate and political propaganda campaigns, some of which included targeting women in the 1920s as new consumers for cigarette smoking, and perhaps most notably for his public relations work for the United Fruit Company in the 1950s that led directly to the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Guatemala in 1954 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).²⁴ While in Hawai‘i, Bernays argued for Hawai‘i statehood, stating that Hawai‘i’s citizenry—theorized as racially diverse but culturally American—should be showcased above all other American achievements for the world to see what only American democracy could accomplish. Bernays believed that Hawai‘i statehood would be beneficial both nationally and internationally to “dramatize” to Americans on the continent that diverse racial groups could in fact “live together in harmony,” while supporting American interests in the “Orient” by disproving Communist accusations that “imperialism and racism are our national policy.”²⁵ Hawai‘i’s majority Asian American and Pacific Islander population could thus serve as the new face of a militarily powerful and economically dominant United States—one that would ideologically assist the maintenance and establishment of U.S. military bases and secure access to resources and markets throughout Asia and the Pacific. In order to make Hawai‘i statehood more attractive in the eyes of Congress and the American public, proponents of statehood would begin to use Hawai‘i’s alterity to their favor. A diverse range of communities formed a historical bloc, including many Native Hawaiians, consenting to a presumably higher calling of U.S. nationality in order to demonstrate their merit through alternative versions of American modernity. Southern senators who had incessantly blocked statehood would come to view Hawai‘i and Alaska as “the frontiers of America’s new strategic position in the world.”²⁶ As Christina Klein cogently argues in *Cold War Orientalism*, Hawai‘i statehood had the ability to rearticulate U.S. imperialism as the spreading of democracy, which created a misleading distinction between European colonial powers and the United States.²⁷

While Hawai‘i statehood helped give American race relations a multicultural face before an international community, the local discourse of statehood in Hawai‘i furnished the Hawai‘i elite with the possibility of insulating, if not reconsolidating, their economic power that had been under threat.²⁸ Prior to World War II, a white settler elite worked to gain

statehood as a means of securing profitable tariffs for the sugar industry. By the end of the Second World War, however, statehood was desired by many to transition to and capitalize on a burgeoning tourism industry and postwar boom. As long as Hawai'i remained a territory and not a state, large U.S. banks and insurance companies were prohibited by their corporate indentures from issuing large loans or insurance policies. Malcolm MacNaughton, former president of both Castle & Cooke and the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, reflected on statehood in 1986: "We couldn't get this money. And air travel was increasing. Tourism was coming. . . . We needed this money. Statehood would get it for us."²⁹ This lack of investment capital inhibited businesses from managing and profiting from record numbers of tourists visiting the islands. The Hawaii Statehood Commission (1947–1959) was formed in this context to take over the statehood campaign from the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission (1935–1947) in order to lead a more aggressive movement for statehood.

The Hawaii Statehood Commission, like the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission before it, controlled and framed the rules of discourse for civil society surrounding statehood. Comprised of nine members who by law were required to be known supporters of statehood, the commission was authorized to disseminate information, correct misinformation, conduct national advertising and publicity campaigns, and routinely assist witnesses who appeared before congressional committees. Indeed, the Statehood Commission had intimate ties to the 1893 overthrow. Lorrin P. Thurston, eventual chair of the Hawaii Statehood Commission, was the son of Lorrin A. Thurston, who established the Hawaiian Bureau of Information, an agency created in 1892 that similarly used the press and publicity campaigns to shape public opinion surrounding the 1893 overthrow and gain public support for annexation. With two of the owners of the major newspapers in Hawai'i—the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* and *Honolulu Advertiser*—on this commission, statehood proponents were able to flood Hawai'i newspapers calling for an "article a day in daily newspapers" to reinforce and normalize public opinion in support of statehood.³⁰ These newspapers also disciplined those who opposed statehood by running articles that sought to discredit them. Indeed, the Hawaii Statehood Commission would come into contact with more than 1,700 daily newspaper editors throughout the United States, and, as Roger Bell notes, in the first

decade the number of editorials that favored statehood grew from 500 to about 3,000 annually.³¹

“THEY’RE NOT JAPS. . . . THEY’RE JAPANESE-AMERICANS”

One of the biggest obstacles facing statehood proponents was that Hawai‘i contained a large population of Japanese Americans who were construed by an American Orientalist discourse as inscrutable foreign threats. In the decades leading to World War II, and punctuated by the December 7 attack in 1941, American national identity was informed by what Moon-Kie Jung terms “anti-Japanese Americanism.”³² Japanese Americans who were linked to a belligerent empire in Asia were racialized differently from other nonwhite groups in Hawai‘i. Jung explains: “anti-Japanese racism was not based on an assured belief that the Japanese were inferior but on a fear that they were *not*.”³³ After World War II, this idea that Japanese were not inferior would work to their benefit. Statehood proponents responded to questions of Japanese American loyalty by pointing to the military heroism and massive casualties and injuries sustained by the 100th Infantry Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Nicknamed the “Purple Heart Battalion,” the 100th Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team received more than 18,143 decorations but also suffered an unusually high number of casualties and injuries at 9,486. Indeed, the high casualty and injury rates show how officers of the U.S. Army viewed Japanese American soldiers as expendable; even the soldiers themselves believed they were ordered on what were largely considered “suicide missions.”³⁴ At the onset of the war, many Japanese American men were designated 4C “enemy aliens,” a classification that not only made them ineligible for the draft but also cast further suspicion over their loyalty to the United States. After the war, however, with Japan pacified as a nonthreat and perceived as a new economic ally of the United States, key opportunities soon opened to transform prevailing perceptions of Japanese Americans as perpetual foreign threats.

In the postwar period, narrations of Japanese American loyalty and masculine sacrifice in World War II were popularized as a means to win statehood for Hawai‘i but also to reconcile two formidable empires—the United States and Japan. Historian Tom Coffman explains that Edwin O.

Reischauer, the principal architect of postwar U.S. relations with Japan (and eventual ambassador to Japan under John F. Kennedy), had argued in 1942 that the internment of Japanese Americans had “unwittingly contributed” to Japanese wartime propaganda. Such propaganda stated that Japan was fighting a war to stop the United States from spreading white supremacist domination throughout Asia. Reischauer wrote: “We should reverse this situation and make of these American citizens a major asset in our ideological war in Asia.”³⁵ As a result of President Truman’s decision to use atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, coupled with the later military occupation of Japan by the United States, Reischauer would highlight the need to celebrate with vigor the wartime heroics of the Japanese American veterans.

The 1951 MGM film *Go For Broke!* played one such role in challenging sentiments that the United States remained a white supremacist nation that restrained the civil rights of Japanese Americans.³⁶ The film first screened at the national Capitol on May 24, 1951, as well as internationally through much of Europe and Asia. Most prominently, however, the film screened in Japan on December 7, 1952, on the eleventh anniversary of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. In the film the heroism and valor of Japanese American soldiers are themselves deployed to rid the newly commissioned Second Lieutenant Grayson, played by Van Johnson, of his bigoted views of Japanese Americans. From the start of the film, anti-Japanese racism is addressed through a series of pedagogical lessons on liberal racial tolerance.³⁷

In order to portray the United States as a nation founded on democratic ideals, not white supremacy, the film needed to provide sufficient reasons why the United States interned 110,000 Japanese Americans. Grayson confides to his captain his belief that Japanese Americans remain dangerous when he asks if they use live ammunition at the rifle range, stating sarcastically that all he knew was that the Japanese were placed in “relocation centers” and maybe “the army just had some surplus barbed wire they wanted to use, was that it?”³⁸ The captain proceeds to admonish Lieutenant Grayson: “The army was facing an emergency at the start of the war—a possible invasion by Japanese troops. So all Japanese-Americans on the West Coast were evacuated as a precautionary measure. . . . I suggest you start getting acquainted.”³⁹ After fighting alongside the 442nd in

Italy and France, Grayson comes to respect his fellow soldiers. In a pivotal scene, which sets up the climactic rescue of the Texas Battalion by the *Nisei* soldiers, Grayson stands up for his Japanese American regiment to his unreformed racist friend Culley, who continually refers to the Japanese American soldiers as “Japs.” Embarrassed because some of the Japanese American soldiers overhear their conversation, Grayson asks Culley to step outside. Grayson lectures Culley, “They’re not Japs, Culley. They’re Japanese-Americans—*Nisei*—or, if you prefer, boodaheads [*sic*]. But not Japs. They don’t like it and neither do I.”⁴⁰ Grayson proceeds to scuffle with Culley, who eventually changes his views, but only after the 442nd and the 100th Battalion rescue the Texas Battalion.

Though white racism is repeatedly challenged throughout the film, white masculinity is simultaneously and continually reinforced. Japanese Americans are cinematically framed in the film in ways that highlight their short physical statures against the larger white American soldiers like Grayson. Such juxtapositions made Japanese Americans palatable to a white American audience by rendering them unthreatening to white heteropatriarchal order. In one particular montage, the soldiers are shown running through an obstacle course, but they are unable to leap over trenches or climb a wooden wall. Their inability to perform what “normal” soldiers are routinely able to do symbolically emasculates them. Racially different but nationally the same, the racial order of the United States would symbolically become more inclusive as a multicultural nation, yet continue to preserve notions of white supremacy. While Japanese American military sacrifice helped to mend U.S. relations with Japan, in Hawai‘i it also assisted both a movement for statehood and Japanese American ascendancy.

Japanese Americans represented a new political force that gave birth to a new arrangement of power in Hawai‘i. The emergence of various labor movements of plantation and dockworkers, changing demographics and their impact on voting, and the disenfranchisement of rights through martial law during World War II would alter Hawai‘i’s political landscape.⁴¹ Asians in Hawai‘i, indeed, had historical reason to agitate. Even previous to the 1900 Organic Act, when Hawai‘i adopted the immigration and naturalization laws of the United States, Asian groups were prohibited

from naturalization or voting by the 1887 Bayonet Constitution. This constitution, signed by King David Kalākaua under threat of force, also dramatically limited the influence of the monarch while disenfranchising a majority of Hawaiians from voting through income, property, and literacy requirements. Labeled “ineligible to citizenship” with the passing of racist American laws, this first generation would have to wait for their children to come of voting age to gain political representation. In 1936, Romanzo Adams, a University of Hawai‘i sociologist and proponent of the “immigration assimilation model,” predicted that by 1944 two-thirds of Hawai‘i’s Asian population would be able to vote, consequently increasing the strength of the “non-caucasian majority” and leading to a redistribution of power.⁴² Realizing that a previously closed window of political opportunity was poised to open, many Asian Americans helped revitalize the Democratic Party to challenge the Republican Party’s control over the territorial legislature. Ronald Takaki notes that Japanese American struggles against the *haole* oligarchy reflected a new consciousness, “a transformation from sojourners to settlers, from Japanese to Japanese Americans.”⁴³ By 1952, Congress passed the Walter-McCarren Act, making it possible for the first-generation Japanese to naturalize and vote; by 1954, Japanese Americans were the largest voting bloc in the territory, and the Democratic Party, with the support of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU), dislodged the Republican plantation oligarchy from the legislature in what has been termed in Hawai‘i as the “Democratic Revolution.”

Matsuo Takabuki, 442nd veteran, major player in land development, and a once controversial trustee of the Bishop Estate, writes that prior to the “Democratic Revolution” Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans participated in creating a “financial revolution.”⁴⁴ After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many white businessmen left Hawai‘i fearing further military attack and martial law.⁴⁵ This consequently led to an economic vacuum, enabling many Japanese American and Chinese American entrepreneurs to capitalize on abandoned businesses and wide open markets. Takabuki writes: “The Fukunagas of Servco started a small garage in Haleiwa, which grew into a large conglomerate of auto and durable goods dealerships, discount stores, and financial institutions. . . . The Teruyas’ small restaurant

and market in the 1950s and 1960s eventually became Times Supermarket. Chinn Ho started Capital Investment. K. J. Luke and Clarence Ching created Loyalty Enterprises, while Aloha Airlines began with Ruddy Tongg. As the number of local professionals, lawyers, and doctors grew in postwar Hawai'i, the economic, professional, and political landscape also changed rapidly.⁴⁶

Takabuki explains further that the major banks in Hawai'i—Bank of Hawai'i and Bishop Bank (now First Hawaiian Bank)—would not regularly offer business loans to anyone outside of the white economic circle. This led veterans Daniel Inouye and Sakae Takahashi to join in opening two banks: Central Pacific Bank (CPB) and later the City Bank of Honolulu.⁴⁷ With financial and administrative support from major banking institutions in Japan, many in the Democratic Party ventured in major residential and tourism-related real estate development projects since tourism had displaced agriculture as the dominant industry in the 1960s.

To be sure, during the territorial period, a complex transition between a white racial dictatorship and a liberal “multicultural” state emerged.⁴⁸ Ronald Takaki argues that Asian Americans in Hawai'i “by their numerical preponderance . . . had greater opportunities [than in the continental United States] to weave themselves and their cultures into the very fabric of Hawaii and to seek to transform their adopted land into a society of rich diversity where they and their children would no longer be ‘strangers from a different shore.’”⁴⁹ Roger Bell, on the other hand, notes that Native Hawaiians, after statehood, “had become . . . *strangers*, in their own land, submerged beneath the powerful white minority and a newly assertive Asian majority.”⁵⁰ In spite of a movement for genuine equality, the counterhegemonic strategies of Asian Americans against *haole* supremacy challenged, modified, and yet renewed a hegemonic U.S. colonial system. Major land development projects, particularly in hotels and shopping centers, slowed down, however, because of the aforementioned fear or lack of confidence by stateside lenders and insurers in Hawai'i's territorial economy. This motivated many Japanese Americans to push for statehood, alongside those on the other end of the political spectrum who were a part of or associated with the “Big Five” companies that dominated Hawai'i's economy. Such an emerging historical bloc and discursive alliance did not,

however, go unnoticed or unchallenged by others. During the war and after it, Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell emerged as a leading opponent of statehood, publicly opposing the statehood movement while fighting for other forms of self-governance for Hawaiians.

“SOMETHING INDEFINABLE WOULD BE LOST”

More than any other public figure in the 1940s, Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell was a public spokesperson for the suppressed voices of Hawaiian opposition to statehood. Kamokila, as she was commonly known, was the daughter of sugar planter James Campbell, which afforded her the economic means to speak against statehood in ways that most other Hawaiians who had been dependent on the government or the Big Five companies for work could not. Kamokila's mother, Abigail Ku'aihelani, was a key leader in organizing the 1897 Kū'e petitions against U.S. annexation—signed by more than 90 percent of the Hawaiian population throughout the islands opposed to imposed American citizenship.⁵¹ In fact, Kamokila was informed by a long matrilineal genealogy of Hawaiian resistance. Elected as a territorial senator from Maui County, Kamokila publicized her campaign by running a radio advertisement that spoke of the overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani.⁵² Kamokila thus challenged colonial assumptions that Hawaiians, particularly Hawaiian women, were incapable of self-government.

Kamokila maintained that with the attainment of statehood, “something indefinable would be lost,” and therefore throughout her political career she strove to achieve some form of self-governance, besides statehood, for Native Hawaiians.⁵³ In fact, Kamokila sought out other peoples whose American citizenship was forced upon them by the United States, namely Native Americans and other Pacific Islanders. For instance, after being elected to the territorial senate, Kamokila traveled to Washington, D.C., to obtain information on the potential of turning Hawaiian Home Lands as defined by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act into a kind of Native American reservation to be administered through the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Kamokila was asked by her Hawaiian constituents to investigate the Native American reservation system as an “alternative

proposal to the present set up,” arguing that the government had been negligent in placing Hawaiians on the land. While in Washington, D.C., Kamokila was able to hold meetings with influential and powerful elected officials, such as President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, and several senators, to discuss the possibility of placing Hawaiian Home Lands under the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Kamokila explained, however, that it was her discussions with the Bureau of Indian Affairs that made her “more and more drawn away” from the proposal and that she would seek alternative means of “correcting faults” in the commission.⁵⁴ In October 1944, still seeking to combat the political and economic oppression of Native Hawaiians, Kamokila committed what many considered to be political suicide. She sought Congressman Sterling Cole of New York to sponsor a bill that would transfer Hawai‘i from the Department of the Interior to the naval department. After visits to Guam and Samoa, Kamokila reasoned that because Hawaiians were unable to control immigration into Hawai‘i, naval control would actually limit the flow of immigration (as it had in Guam) and prohibit nonnatives from owning land (as it did in American Samoa).

In January 1946, when the first congressional hearings on statehood since World War II were held at ‘Iolani Palace, Kamokila would bring the issues of Hawaiian self-government, Big Five economic greed, and the numerical dominance of Japanese Americans to bear against statehood. Aware that her testimony would be one of the few in opposition to statehood, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission attempted to squeeze her into an afternoon with other witnesses. Kamokila skillfully forced the committee to provide a full day of testimony for her alone, stating that she needed more time for her graphs and charts to be prepared.⁵⁵ In fact, her testimony was much anticipated in Hawai‘i: earlier in the month, Kamokila had publicly withdrawn from the Democratic Party as a result of its endorsement of statehood.⁵⁶ She deliberately managed to get her testimony scheduled on January 17, on the fifty-third anniversary of the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. By skillful maneuver, Kamokila used this historic date to force a history of national dispossession of Native Hawaiians in conversation with the economic gains many believed would occur through statehood. Kamokila also knew that such an explicitly stated connection could mark her as “un-American” and invalidate her testimony.

On the day of her testimony, Kamokila chose to wear a black *holoku* gown with red and yellow *lei* and spoke for more than two hours to thunderous applause in front of a packed room of more than 600. Kamokila charged the Big Five companies with orchestrating the statehood movement as a means to advance their economic interests by attracting “outside capital and independent financial giants.” Striking at the heart of the business community’s desires for statehood, Kamokila declared: “I do not feel . . . that we should forfeit the traditional rights and privileges of the natives of our islands for a mere thimbleful of votes in Congress, that we, the lovers of Hawaii from long association with it, should sacrifice our birthright for the greed of alien desires to remain on our shores, that we should satisfy the thirst for power and control of some inflated industrialists and politicians.”⁵⁷

In her testimony, Kamokila also called attention to the links between Big Five economic domination and the fear and silence that many felt in opposing statehood. She shared an example of one such sentiment, sent to her in private, that implored her to speak on behalf of those who could not: “We can’t, Kamokila. My husband would lose his job.” Those present at the testimony, however, were able to express their sentiments collectively in their cheers and applause after her comments. For instance, large applause was heard after Kamokila’s response to Representative Homer Angell’s question that asked why statehood would not be able to address the problems she cited in the territorial structure. Kamokila responded with a thinly veiled reference to the 1893 overthrow: “Who is it that has put us in the position we are today but the people who are asking you for statehood?” When asked by the congressmen what kind of government she would want instead of statehood, Kamokila responded, “an independent form of government,” and then explained that if others wanted to live in a U.S. state, they could simply move to any of the forty-eight states in the nation.

Kamokila, however, also criticized the numerical dominance of Japanese Americans in racist terms. She implied that Japanese Americans aided the attack on Pearl Harbor and that their move from the plantations to small businesses could cause Japanese to “get a hold on the islands.” Kamokila’s statements reinforced the racist exclusion that Japanese Americans had long sought to counter. At the same time, her remarks against

Japanese Americans should not be taken as an invalidation of her aims to seek justice for Hawaiians for the overthrow of their nation. Kamokila had been arguing all along that statehood, especially as it was backed by a push for Japanese American ascendancy, was a continuation of Big Five hegemony.⁵⁸ Kamokila's anti-Japanese statements must thus be read against the backdrop of widespread circulation of heroic narratives about Japanese American loyalty during and soon after World War II, which facilitated U.S. imperial ambitions by strengthening the statehood movement. Such narrations actively obscured specific claims by Native Hawaiians beneath a domestic U.S. civil rights discourse and a peculiarly Asian American exceptionalist narrative. This exceptionalist framing that evolved into a discourse of Japanese Americans being distinct from whites but excellent at mastering assimilation and success in U.S. society, unlike Native Hawaiians, reaffirmed the United States as an exceptionalist nation-state devoid of both debilitating racism and settler colonialism. It also made it difficult for others to oppose statehood without being labeled racist against Japanese Americans.

What has been less visible to many, if not rendered natural and normal, is how Asian projects for equality with white settlers and inclusion into the United States have actually helped form political projects and identities in opposition to or at the expense of those Native Hawaiians seeking self-government. For instance, on April 9, 1893, a little more than two months after the U.S.-backed overthrow, Japanese plantation laborers submitted a petition that did not oppose the overthrow of Hawai'i but rather demanded their electoral participation in the new settler government, stating that they were the "physical and intellectual" equals of any of the other foreigners.⁵⁹ Likewise in 1894, Chinese in Hawai'i sent a petition, signed by hundreds of people, also seeking their right to participate in the new settler government.⁶⁰ Virgilio Menor Felipe writes that the term "Kanaka," which usually means Hawaiian, was used as a slur by Filipinos to also mean "'boy' or servant."⁶¹ Furthermore, in a study conducted in the 1950s, Joseph C. Finney argued that the "primitive stereotype" defined common views of Hawaiians as "lazy." As one woman listed as Japanese said: "You see the Hawaiians are . . . popularly known to be lazy, and they don't have a tradition for literacy and they're not the conscientious type,

industrious type.”⁶² This is itself an old tale of capitalism wherein Marx takes Adam Smith to task for creating a “nursery tale” about two sorts of people, “one, the diligent, intelligent and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living.” Marx goes on to argue that “in actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part.”⁶³

It is here that Andrea Smith’s conceptual framing of labor exploitation, genocide, and war can help us understand how efforts to combat one’s own form of oppression can lead unwittingly to participating in the oppressive logic of another.⁶⁴ Japanese Americans and their supporters challenged the view that they were perpetual foreign threats vis-à-vis cultural narratives of civil rights that anchored the Hawai’i statehood campaign and forged deeply by the histories of Japanese American persecution and later desires to capitalize on land developments in the postwar period. These cultural narratives, however, render invisible their role in maintaining and renewing hegemonic forms of settler colonialism and occupation. Smith’s framework further helps us also understand Kamokila’s predicament: in combating the notion that Hawaiians were destined to disappear and thus be replaced, she resisted this by heightening fear that Japanese Americans were foreign threats “ineligible to citizenship.” In fact, evidence exists to suggest that her statements were part of a strategy to gain political leverage to oppose statehood by purposely aligning with the conservative Right. Only two years earlier, Kamokila had in fact publicly opposed anti-Japanese racism, arguing that those “whose heart and mind are set against statehood for reasons based on prejudice, rather than ideals, those are the people of Hawaii who should be pitied rather than condemned.”⁶⁵ In hoping to prevent the latest elaboration of U.S. occupation through the vehicle of statehood, however, Kamokila appealed to a long and well-established fear among many white Americans that Japanese Americans were perpetual foreign threats; such appeals would work against her aims.

A few days after her testimony, Kamokila told the press that she had been asked to launch an island-wide petition to oppose statehood. This was a similar action, as previously mentioned, to what her mother, Abigail Ku‘aihelani, had helped accomplish when she and others toured the islands in 1897 with the Kū‘ē petitions to oppose U.S. annexation. This new peti-

tion, however, would not circulate because of the risk of providing the Big Five companies with a list of names that could be immediately used to “blacklist.”⁶⁶ In September 1947, Kamokila continued her opposition to statehood by opening the Anti-Statehood Clearing House. This clearinghouse was designed to counter the Hawaii Statehood Commission by collecting testimony in opposition to statehood that could be used to lobby Congress against statehood. Using her contacts made on her visits to Washington, D.C., Kamokila sent “anti-statehood information, reports and arguments to congress.”⁶⁷ This, in fact, gives more credence to the explanation of John A. Burns in 1960, congressional delegate (1957–1959) and governor of Hawai‘i (1962–1974), about the effectiveness of local opposition to statehood in Hawai‘i: “The reasons why Hawaii did not achieve statehood, say, ten years ago—and one could without much exaggeration say sixty years ago—lie not in the Congress but in Hawaii. . . . For the most part it has remained under cover and has marched under other banners. Such opposition could not afford to disclose itself, since it was so decidedly against the interests and desires of Hawaii’s people generally.”⁶⁸ One year later Kamokila struck a major blow to the Hawaii Statehood Commission by revealing its campaign to be a predetermined and deliberately used agency to silence any opposition to statehood.

On January 17, 1948, on the fifty-fifth anniversary of the overthrow, Kamokila filed a lawsuit in *Campbell v. Stainback et al.* that challenged the legality of the financing of the Hawaii Statehood Commission. In the suit, Kamokila charged that the \$200,000 used by the territorial government to campaign nationally and locally for statehood were not validly used as public funds since they were spent for purely political aims.⁶⁹ In March 1949, Justice E. C. Peters ordered an injunction against the Statehood Commission that prohibited the use of public monies for a national campaign. Justice Peters argued: “To accord validity to expenditures for an indiscriminate publicity campaign upon the ground that it is for a public purpose would do violence to that term . . . and dignify as ‘public’ what obviously is purely ‘political.’”⁷⁰ Though the court found that the territory could not “petition the public” in favor of statehood, it did not, more fundamentally, go so far as to declare the commission invalid, and in fact left room for “reasonable” expenditures for the Statehood Commission to promote statehood.

In 1953, Kamokila wrote a letter to Congress arguing that of the \$475,000 that had been appropriated for the statehood campaign since 1947, no money had been apportioned to opponents of statehood. Kamokila by then had begun to campaign for commonwealth status for Hawai'i and admitted that while the majority of people in Hawai'i were in favor of statehood, this was the only option being discussed: "So much has been said and published favoring Statehood for Hawaii that it is only fair that the opposition be heard. Unfortunately, equal treatment under law is denied the opponents of Statehood."⁷¹ To be sure, the Statehood Commission in 1949 had "roundly denounced" a plan by Papakōlea Hawaiian Homesteaders to write a letter to Senator Hugh Butler opposing statehood. Homesteaders explained that they were visited by a member of the Statehood Commission who made them "afraid to make the written statement."⁷² In 1957, the Hawaii Statehood Commission determined strategies to counter taxi drivers and tour guides who were telling tourists that statehood was not desired by Hawaiians.⁷³ While the views of proponents of statehood were expressed openly and repeatedly in the public, the actions of Kamokila and others operated in a climate of fear. If in fact a democracy relies on an educated populace, by 1959 Hawai'i residents were deliberately only educated about the benefits of statehood. Such deliberate containment of Hawai'i's options for political status, combined with a highly partial opinion campaign to secure support for statehood, speaks volumes about the actual status of democracy in Hawai'i.

As a part of its yearlong plans to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Hawai'i statehood, the current Statehood Commission ran a series of television and radio vignettes, called "50 Voices of Statehood," designed to educate the public about different perspectives of Hawai'i statehood.⁷⁴ One such public service announcement featured Rev. Abraham Akaka's 1959 sermon, which was delivered at Kawaiaha'o church on March 13, 1959, the day after the statehood bill was passed. In this vignette, U.S. senator Daniel Akaka describes his older brother's sermon as a celebration of both statehood and the aloha spirit and gives the impression that the largely Hawaiian church was uniformly supportive of statehood. While the sermon did celebrate statehood as an achievement, Rev. Akaka's sermon also acknowledges the existence of Hawaiian opposition to statehood,

an antagonism premised on America's desecration of Native sacred sites and a government "motivated by economic greed": "There are some of us to whom statehood brings great hopes, and there are those to whom statehood brings *silent fears*. . . . There are fears that Hawai'i as a state will be motivated by economic greed; that statehood will turn Hawai'i (as someone has said) into a great big spiritual junkyard filled with smashed dreams, worn out illusions; that will make the Hawaiian people lonely, confused, insecure, empty, anxious" [emphasis added].⁷⁵ Indeed, in the post-statehood era, Rev. Abraham Akaka was one of many who opposed the appointment of the aforementioned Matsuo Takabuki to Bishop Estate trustee, citing his connections to the Democratic Party and penchant for politics in the service of land and power. After Takabuki's confirmation, Rev. Akaka rang the bells at Kawaiaha'o Church for an hour in protest stating: "We are now a nobody as far as the government is concerned."⁷⁶

Through a critical reconsideration of the ways that state agencies framed the rules of discourse to normalize the U.S. occupation of Hawai'i, we are better able to understand how Hawai'i statehood became expected, how it came to be considered an inevitable outcome of history, and how ideas about history and race were arranged so as to invalidate and silence opposition to statehood. These stories of American egalitarianism, besides silencing Hawaiian opposition, obscure how desires for capital expansion largely underpinned elite desires for statehood. Thus, contemporary Hawaiian demonstrations on Admission Day challenge the state's narration of itself and, in so doing, also illuminate how the state's present power was taken historically by illegal force and at the expense of Hawaiian rights to self-determination. Both Japanese Americans and Native Hawaiians were contending with very different histories and political possibilities shaped by both U.S. foreign policy and the needs of a rapidly growing tourism industry. Within an ever-growing system reliant on imperial accumulation and Native dispossession since its very inception, American liberation and exploitation are two sides of the same coin. Perhaps until we become multilingual in each other's histories, we will continue to renew a system of imperial violence and capitalist exploitation.

Notes

1. Diana Leone, "Statehood Celebration at Palace Gets Heated," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, August 19, 2006.
2. At a statehood celebration held at the open-air rotunda at the state capitol on March 18, 2009, the Hawaiian Independence Action Alliance (HIAA), a coalition comprised of more than ten different Hawaiian groups, organized a peaceful demonstration to draw attention to statehood's more obscured history. With tall red and black banners fastened to bamboo poles that read "HAWAIIAN INDEPENDENCE" and with each participant wearing a single bright green letter on black T-shirts, the group spelled out the phrases "FAKE STATE" and "HISTORY OF THEFT" to critically link the celebration of Hawai'i statehood to a history of U.S. occupation and imperialism in the islands.
3. Peter Sur, "Group to Protest Strykers," *Hawaii Tribune-Herald*, November 9, 2009; "Uranium Revelation Upsets Isle Activists," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, January 6, 2006.
4. Mark Niesse, "Peaceful Protests Greet Admission Day," *Honolulu-Star Bulletin*, August 21, 2009.
5. U.S. Public Law 103–150, commonly known as the "Apology Bill," was passed on November 23, 1993. It stated that "Congress apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination."
6. Genetically modified organisms are organisms whose genes are modified by combining the DNA from other species. Furthermore, genetic testing on *Hāloa*, a kind of taro that is the sibling of Hawaiian people in origin stories, has caused many to oppose these multinational corporations.
7. Some Hawaiians argue that they are not "homeless" but rather are "houseless," since Hawai'i is their home.
8. Andrew Walden, "No Freedom to Celebrate Statehood," August 29, 2006, frontpagemag.com; Kenneth R. Conklin, "Hawaii Statehood—A Brief History of the Struggle to Achieve Statehood, and Current Challenges," www.angelfire.com/hi2/hawaiiansovereignty/statehoodhistandcurr.html.
9. Ali Behdad, *A Forgetful Nation: On Immigration and Cultural Identity in the United States* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005), 4–5.
10. Secretary of Hawaii, "Results of Votes Cast (Three Propositions) Held 27 June 1959," Hawai'i State Archives, Honolulu.
11. Mililani Trask, "Hawai'i and the United Nations," in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura, 68–70 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008).
12. Pat Gee, "Hawaii Diversity Applauded at Statehood Celebration," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, March 19, 2009.

13. Andrea Smith, "Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy: Rethinking Women of Color Organizing," in *Color of Violence: The INCITE! Anthology* (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 2006), 66–67.
14. Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1984); Gary Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, (1865–1945)* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Edward D. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii: A Labor History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985); Moon-Kie Jung, *Reworking Race: The Making of Hawaii's Interracial Labor Movement* (New York: Columbia University, 2006).
15. See Dylan Rodriguez, *Suspended Apocalypse: White Supremacy, Genocide, and the Filipino Condition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 190–217; Patrick Wolfe, "Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time, and the Question of Genocide," in *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, ed. A. Dirk Moses, 102–132 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008).
16. Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa, *Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea La E Pono Ai?* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1992); Jonathan Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, *Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002); Noenoe K. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004); J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008); Ty Kawika Tengan, *Native Men Remade: Gender and Nation in Contemporary Hawai'i* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008); Sally Engle Merry, *Colonizing Hawai'i: The Cultural Power of Law* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Fujikane and Okamura, *Asian Settler Colonialism*; Rodriguez, *Suspended Apocalypse*.
17. See Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai'i* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
18. Keith Aoki, "No Right To Own? The Early Twentieth-Century 'Alien Land Laws' as a Prelude to Internment," 40 *B.C.L. Rev.* 37 (1998).
19. Smith, "Three Pillars of White Supremacy," 69.
20. Roger Bell, *Last among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1984).
21. John S. Whitehead, *Completing the Union: Alaska, Hawai'i, and the Battle for Statehood* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004).
22. Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-colonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold*

- War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Nikhil Pal Singh, "Culture/Wars: Recoding Empire in an Age of Democracy," *American Quarterly* 50 (1998): 471–522; Derrick A. Bell Jr., *Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
23. Derrick A. Bell Jr., "Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma," in *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement*, ed. by Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, 22–23 (New York: New Press, 1995).
 24. See Larry Tye, *The Father of Spin: Edward L. Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations* (New York: Henry Holt, 1998), 23–50, 155–184.
 25. Edward L. Bernays, "HAWAII—The Almost Perfect State?" *New Leader*, November 20, 1950.
 26. Interview with John S. Whitehead in *Perspectives on Hawai'i's Statehood* (Honolulu: Oral History Project, Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 1986), 27.
 27. Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1944–1961* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 250–251.
 28. Walter Dillingham was an incredibly powerful and influential member of the white elite who amassed large capital through his dredging and construction work under military and government contracts. Dillingham and others were opposed to statehood primarily because their connections in Washington, D.C., allowed them to benefit from the structure of the territorial government and their concerns that statehood would attract competition by bringing wealthier settlers to the islands.
 29. Interview with Malcolm McNaughton in *Perspectives on Hawai'i's Statehood*, 52–53.
 30. Lorrin P. Thurston and the *Honolulu Advertiser* often expressed ambivalence for statehood as a result of a militant labor movement. See Bell, *Last among Equals*, 169–170; Summary Report of Public Relations Activities, Executive Office, Citizens' Statehood Committee, 1 August 1946, Hawai'i State Archives.
 31. Bell, *Last among Equals*, 124.
 32. Jung, *Reworking Race*, 98–105.
 33. *Ibid.*, 82.
 34. Roland Kotani, *The Japanese in Hawaii: A Century of Struggle* (Honolulu: Hawaii Hochi, 1985), 115.
 35. Tom Coffman, *The Island Edge of America: A Political History of Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 84–87.
 36. Bosley Crowther, "The Screen in Review; 'Go for Broke!' Tribute to War Record of Nisei Regiment Opens at the Capitol," *New York Times*, May 25, 1951.

37. For an in-depth reading of this film, see T. Fujitani, "Go For Broke, the Movie: Japanese American Soldiers in U.S. National, Military, and Racial Discourses," in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, ed. T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 2001).
38. Robert Pirosh, *Go For Broke!* movie script, University of Hawai'i Hamilton Library Hawaiian and Pacific Collection, 7.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 89.
41. J. Garner Anthony, *Hawaii under Army Rule* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955).
42. Romanzo C. Adams, *The Peoples of Hawaii* (Honolulu: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1935).
43. Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1998), 171.
44. Matsuo Takabuki, assisted by Dennis M. Ogawa, Glen Grant, and Wilma Sur, *An Unlikely Revolutionary: Matsuo Takabuki and the Making of Modern Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), 79.
45. Ibid., 65–66.
46. Ibid., 65.
47. Ibid., 81.
48. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 67–68.
49. Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*, 176.
50. Bell, *Last among Equals*, 293.
51. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, 130, 133, 148, 150, 161, 194.
52. Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, "The Incomparable Kamokila: Kathleen Mellen Recalls Mrs. Campbell's Greatest Coup d'état: She Blitzed the Election on Maui," *Paradise of the Pacific*, July 1962, 12.
53. Bell, *Last among Equals*, 116.
54. "Maui Woman Senator, at Washington, Sees Flaws in 'Reservation System,'" *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, June 17, 1943.
55. John S. Whitehead, "The Anti-Statehood Movement and the Legacy of Alice Kamokila Campbell," *Hawaiian Journal of History* 27 (1993): 49–50.
56. "Alice Campbell Resigns from Democrats," *Honolulu Advertiser*, January 6, 1946; "Senator Campbell Resigns as Democrat; Opposes Statehood," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, January 7, 1946.
57. "Text of Kamokila's Testimony: Senator Discusses Objections in Detail; Cites Racial Issues," *Honolulu Advertiser*, January 17, 1946.
58. Takabuki, *Unlikely Revolutionary*, 64.
59. Kathleen Dickenson Mellen (1895–1969), MS 19, Bishop Museum Archives, Honolulu, Hawai'i.
60. "A Petition signed by several hundred Chinese will be presented to the Councils today, asking that the Chinese in Hawaii be given the voting franchise," *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, May 17, 1894.

61. Virgilio Menor Felipe, *Hawai'i: A Pilipino Dream* (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 2002), 198.
62. Joseph C. Finney, "Attitudes of Others Toward Hawaiians," 79, Hawaiian and Pacific Collection, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; see also Tengan, *Native Men Remade*, 45.
63. Karl Marx, *Capital* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1990), 873–874.
64. Smith, "Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy," 66–67.
65. "Senator Campbell Is Not a Candidate for Delegate, She Says," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, September 4, 1944.
66. "Kamokila in Die Hard Fight against Hawaii," *Maui News*, January 23, 1946; "Editorial: Beware of What You Sign," *Maui News*, January 26, 1946.
67. *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, September 18, 1947.
68. Whitehead, "Anti-Statehood Movement," 44.
69. "Public Funds Misused, Says Kamokila," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, January 17, 1948.
70. "Decision on Statehood Case Fund Reversed," *Honolulu Advertiser*, March 29, 1948; "Opinion of the Court," *Campbell v. Stainback et al.*, 315.
71. Hawaii Statehood Commission, Honolulu Office General Records, Tavares, N.C.–Campbell, Kamokila, 1953, Hawai'i State Archives.
72. Kathleen Dickenson Mellen to Senator Hugh Butler, February 27, 1949, Box 97, "Confidential Letters," Nebraska National Historical Society, Lincoln.
73. Whitehead, "Anti-Statehood Movement," 46.
74. 50th Anniversary of Statehood Commission, "Statehood Commission Announces Plans for 50th Anniversary Commemoration Activities: Special Focus Placed on Educational Programs," press release, August 13, 2008, <http://hawaii.gov/gov/news/releases/2008/statehood-commission-announces-plans-for-50th>.
75. Whitehead, "Anti-Statehood Movement," 54–55.
76. Samuel P. King and Randall W. Roth, *Broken Trust: Greed, Mismanagement & Political Manipulation at America's Largest Charitable Trust* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 67.



Why Asian settler colonialism matters: a thought piece on critiques, debates, and Indigenous difference

Dean Itsuji Saranillio

To cite this article: Dean Itsuji Saranillio (2013) Why Asian settler colonialism matters: a thought piece on critiques, debates, and Indigenous difference, *Settler Colonial Studies*, 3:3-4, 280-294, DOI: [10.1080/2201473X.2013.810697](https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.810697)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.810697>



Published online: 13 Sep 2013.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 1395



Citing articles: 9 View citing articles [↗](#)

Why Asian settler colonialism matters: a thought piece on critiques, debates, and Indigenous difference

Dean Itsuji Saranillio*

Department of Social and Cultural Analysis, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Examining multicultural forms of settler colonialism, this essay examines settler colonialism within a transnational view of global imperial politics, pulling formations of settler colonialism and imperialism together. Responding to arguments against the critique of Asian settler colonialism, this essay argues that while migration in and of itself does not equate to colonialism, migration to a settler colonial space, where Native lands and resources are under political, ecological, and spiritual contestation, means the political agency of immigrant communities can bolster a colonial system initiated by White settlers. An analysis of White supremacy is thus argued to be critical to a settler of color critique of the US Empire. White settlers in the islands managed Kanaka ‘Ōiwi and various Asian settler differences not through one binary opposition but multiple binaries. Taken together these oppositions produced a pyramidal view of the world that helped diverse non-White settlers to see their interests as aligned with the formation of a liberal settler state. This developmental discourse was and remains framed around an alterity that disqualifies Indigenous sovereignty and histories. While not uncomplicated, placing Asian American and Native histories in conversation might create the conditions of possibility where social justice-oriented Asian Americans might conceptualize liberation in ways that are accountable to Native aims for decolonization. The essay ends with a self-critique, applying these framings through personal reflections of the author’s family history in Hawai‘i.

In his 2009 memoir titled *Ben: A Memoir, from Street Kid to Governor*, former governor of Hawai‘i Benjamin J. Cayetano (1994–2002) casts a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi movement for self-determination as an ‘exercise in futility’. Cayetano, who is celebrated by many for being the first Filipino American governor of a US state, writes:

In my opinion, further pursuit of sovereignty was like the quest for the Holy Grail – an exercise in futility, an impossible dream. It was time to move on and in the best interests of all of Hawai‘i’s people that we do so ... It was easier for a non-Hawaiian like me, of course, to close the door on the issue of sovereignty ... Politically, it was difficult for any political leader – Hawaiian or non-Hawaiian – to argue that the drive for Hawaiian sovereignty should be abandoned. Besides, many Hawaiian activists were prisoners of the revisionist history they had taught to two or perhaps three generations of young Hawaiians ...¹

In order to justify calling for the elimination of a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi movement, in predictably liberal fashion, Cayetano characterizes Kānaka ‘Ōiwi as irrational prisoners of a racist ‘revisionist history’ and describes their movement as working at the expense of ‘all of Hawai‘i’s people’.

*Email: ds3859@nyu.edu

In further passages on his view of Hawaiian sovereignty, Cayetano says that certain professors at the Kamakakūokalani Center for Hawaiian Studies at the University of Hawai'i teach their students to hate rather than to think critically. To counter scholars and activists, Cayetano points to 'good' Hawaiians, who favor a notion that to be Kanaka 'Ōiwi is not about genealogical or, as Kahikina de Silva has noted, intimate ties to Hawai'i, but rather about being 'Hawaiian at heart'.² This common settler saying in Hawai'i is one that Cayetano has often repeated publicly and in 2000, he stated that 'I've lived in Hawai'i long enough to feel I'm Hawaiian.'³ Speaking on behalf of himself and in the interests of the settler state, Cayetano insists Kanaka 'Ōiwi existence to be of a certain kind – open to all via liberal multiculturalism, development and profit oriented, and accountable to non-Native interests while the reverse is never considered.

Cayetano's memoir received the Ka Palapala Po'okela Hawai'i Book of the Year award for non-fiction in 2010 from the Hawai'i Book Publishers Association and was hailed as the Number One Bestseller for more than four months by what was then the *Honolulu Advertiser*. Cayetano parlayed this recognition into a close but failed run for Mayor of Honolulu.⁴ The general popularity of the memoir has been attributed to what current governor of Hawai'i Neil Abercrombie refers to as his 'candor'.⁵ This candor is also cited as allowing Cayetano to fill a historical void by addressing a non-Hawaiian 'reticence about a Hawaiian sovereignty movement' in a post-statehood era.⁶ Indeed, the celebration of Cayetano's candor acts as a gloss for celebrating, if not rewarding, his settler racism. This manifests as a general call for maintaining status quo, functioning to alleviate the increasing ambivalence and anxieties many non-Hawaiians feel around an active and vocal Kanaka 'Ōiwi movement seeking the de-occupation of Hawai'i from the United States.

I begin this essay with Cayetano's memoir to illustrate the particular form of settler colonialism that shapes the political landscape of Hawai'i, but to also offer an example of the kind of liberalism, underpinning a multicultural form of settler colonialism, that scholars examining Asian settler colonialism are responding. This is a form of settler colonialism that is obviously distinct from White settler colonialism. Cayetano is able to protect his settler innocence by narrating himself as an individual who has overcome racial and class discrimination, at the same time asserting his colonial authority by calling for a need to 'move on' and forget Kanaka 'Ōiwi self-determination.⁷ This representational strategy of working through racial difference, in other words, to use a multicultural non-White face as a means to further consolidate US settler and imperial hegemony, is itself the afterlife of Hawai'i's movement for statehood and its ideological function in post-war US empire building during the Cold War. While not entirely unique to Hawai'i, there is a history that sets the conditions necessary for Cayetano's comments. For the majority of the first half of the twentieth century, Congress deemed Hawai'i to be unqualified for statehood because it was considered a largely 'Asiatic' territory. In order to make Hawai'i statehood more attractive in the eyes of Congress, proponents of statehood began to use Hawai'i's alterity in the service of Cold War politics. In the 1940s and 1950s, when decolonization was transforming an international order and criticism of Western imperialism was the dominant international sentiment, Cold Warrior ideologues realized that Hawai'i's multiracial population had ideological value in winning the 'hearts and minds' of newly decolonized nations – an opinion campaign developed by the 'father of public relations' Edward L. Bernays.⁸ This US liberal multicultural discourse – articulated through a multicultural 'nation of immigrants' narration – helped achieve seemingly permanent control of Hawai'i through statehood while creating a multicultural image of the United States that facilitated US ambitions for global hegemony.⁹

Framing settler colonialism in Hawai'i within a similar transnational view of global imperial politics in this essay, I pull formations of settler colonialism and imperialism together in order to respond to three arguments that have been repeatedly made against the critique of settler colonialism, and more specifically Asian settler colonialism in Hawai'i. The first argues that the conceptual use of settler colonialism is a neo-racist argument that leaves the expulsion of Asian settlers as

the only resolution to settler colonialism. The second argument, tied to the first, views the use of settler colonialism as ahistorical, collapsing immigration into colonialism. Third, I challenge the notion that Kanaka 'Ōiwi nationalism is itself responsible for creating division between Asian 'Americans'¹⁰ and Kanaka 'Ōiwi, thus reaffirming binary oppositions. At the core of these arguments are different ways of conceptualizing power and alliance building around Indigenous difference. These differences are often cast as insurmountable, as though indigeneity or settler colonialism cannot be articulated without diminishing or contributing to a history of violent Asian American exploitation, exclusion, and even expulsion.

In this essay, I show that while each group is oppressed by structures of White supremacy, their historical oppressions are not the same.¹¹ In other words, these histories, while potentially transformative when assembled intersectionally, can be expressed without diminishing the complexities of each. This signals a need, as articulation theory argues, for an attempt to situate these different histories in complex unity – not flattening difference and assuming they are always in solidarity or falling into the pitfalls of difference and framing these groups as always in opposition.¹²

An analysis of White supremacy is thus critical to a settler of color critique of US Empire. Here, I show how White settlers in the islands were obsessively managing Kanaka 'Ōiwi and various Asian settler differences not through one binary opposition but multiple binaries. As Haunani-Kay Trask has argued:

The color of violence, then, is the color of white over Black, white over brown, white over red, white over yellow. It is the violence of north over south, of continents over archipelagoes, of settlers over natives and slaves. Shaping this color scheme are the labyrinths of class and gender, of geography and industry, of metropolises and peripheries, of sexual definitions and confinements. There is not just one binary opposition, but many oppositions.¹³

Taken together these multiple binary oppositions produced a pyramidal view of the world, an intricate arrangement of power relations that helped diverse non-White settlers to see their interests as aligned with the formation of a liberal settler state. This developmental discourse was and remains framed around an alterity that disqualifies and relegates Indigenous sovereignty and histories to anachronistic space, even while strategically utilizing popular images that center certain settler formulations of the 'Native'. With that said, White settlers shape and discipline but have never been able to determine the actions of non-White settlers. While not uncomplicated, placing Asian American and Native histories in conversation might create the conditions of possibility of using settler colonialism against itself, where social justice-oriented Asian Americans might conceptualize liberation in ways that are accountable to Native aims for decolonization. I thus end with a kind of self-critique, applying these framings through personal reflections on my family's history in Hawai'i.

My aim in this essay is not to argue over who is and is not a settler, but rather to question the political and pedagogical work that settler colonialism does to open one's visual world to the material consequences of aligning oneself with the settler state. Taking into account Native epistemes, histories, and knowledges can transform ways of knowing with implications for ways of observing the material force of settler colonialism, particularly injustices that are often obfuscated or ideologically invisible to settlers, the particular group who stands to benefit. Indeed, positivist discussions over who is and is not a 'settler' often dissolve into arguments where one cites their oppression like a badge of honor to shield themselves from having to contend with self-critique. Such discussions often take us everywhere but ultimately nowhere, sanitizing the critique of settler colonialism and side stepping the important questions posed. In my opinion, one's identification is one's own personal choice. I am less interested in the term settler, than in applying the critique of settler colonialism intersectionally. My simple point is that being a White settler is not a

requirement for questioning how one's choices, practices, and silences have bearing on structures of settler colonialism. Thus, I frame this essay along the lines of Scott Lauria Morgensen, where he succinctly asks in *Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization*, 'Who, under what conditions, inherits the power to represent or enact settler colonialism?'¹⁴

Reducing Native movements to expulsion and retribution

The first work in Asian American studies to relationally engage Indigenous history and politics is the 2000 special issue of *Amerasia Journal* titled 'Whose Vision? Asian Settler Colonialism in Hawai'i' edited by Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura. This collection was reprinted and expanded as *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i* in 2008. Aiming for accountability by calling for a re-examination of Asian interests for inclusion into a US settler state, Candace Fujikane argues:

For the larger, long-term vision of Hawaiian self-determination to be made a reality, the Native and settler contributors in this volume call on Asian settlers in Hawai'i to reexamine their interests within the US settler state and to hold themselves and their communities accountable for their settler practices.¹⁵

Since the anthology, responses to the application of settler colonialism to Hawai'i and particularly to different Asian groups have been mixed. An emerging body of scholarship studying Hawai'i has begun critically theorizing and pushing the use of settler colonialism in publications and projects outside of the *Asian Settler Colonialism* anthology in multiply distinct ways.¹⁶ On the other hand, critics of this work deem the application of settler colonialism theoretically problematic and ahistorical.¹⁷

In a book review, Nandita Sharma argues that the contributors of *Asian Settler Colonialism* conflate processes of migration with colonialism through neo-racist assumptions, an argument she had previously advanced in a co-authored article with Cynthia Wright:¹⁸

The ahistorical claim that 'Asians' colonized Hawai'i (especially after U.S. statehood) relies not on historical analysis but on neo-racist assumptions about the proper relationship between 'race' and space. Neo-racist thought, rooted in the basic assumption that ethnic boundaries are 'natural' borders, posits that 'different' people should be in 'their own' places. Significantly, in such a world-view, human migration becomes, by definition, an act of colonization. In conflating migration with colonialism, contributors to this collection try to redefine the dialectics of colonialism. Colonialism is no longer a dynamic of expropriation and exploitation where the key relationship is one between expropriators and the expropriated. Instead, colonialism becomes nothing more and nothing less than the co-presence of people who are 'Native' and 'non-Native'.¹⁹

My sense is that these are common criticisms and questions posed around the use of settler colonialism in Hawai'i, and possibly elsewhere, making these important criticisms to which to respond. Accordingly, in these next two sections, I wish to unpack and respond to these comments in two parts. Here, I address the argument of neo-racism and perhaps more importantly Sharma's contention that neo-racist arguments made by those who use the term settler colonialism could ultimately lead to a move for the expulsion of Asian settlers from Hawai'i. In the following section, I contend with the criticism that settler colonialism as a concept is ahistorical and conflates migration with colonialism.

Sharma's criticism relies heavily on a concept of neo-racism, while not contending with the arguments posed in the anthology, something to which I will return. Very generally, neo-racism describes an academic derived discourse in Europe that challenges biological reasoning at the same time that it maintains the premise that groups are wholly culturally different. This creates

an insurmountable difference whereby all people are bounded by culture. Ultimately, such differences lead to polarization, giving 'rise to defensive reactions, "interethnic" conflicts and a general rise in aggressiveness' when these differences are attempted to be abolished. Sharma's application of neo-racism to settler colonial sites, paints Indigenous difference as paralyzing and dangerous, as an obstacle to alliance building and tantamount to expulsion.

Sharma contends that the neo-racist arguments in *Asian Settler Colonialism* are making an implicit argument for expulsion, citing 'a very much changed world that European colonialism engendered – changes that brought various people together into a shared field of power – changes that cannot be undone, at least not without an enormous amount of state-directed violence'.²⁰ Sharma mentions the 1972 move by Idi Amin to expel Asians from Uganda and states that while not explicitly calling for repatriation, 'contributors to *Asian Settler Colonialism* consistently insist that "Asians" "stand behind" "Natives."' Citing the work of Eiko Kosasa(?),²¹ Sharma links the expulsion of Asians to Kosasa's argument that while Japanese settlers have 'ascended from being collaborators in a colonial system' they currently have the 'political and economic means to assist in terminating the U.S. imperial hold on the islands'. Kosasa is thus not calling for silence or expulsion, but rather the realization of the amount of political and economic power that Japanese Americans in Hawai'i hold, and a need to not assert settler interests in a self-determination process for Kanaka 'Ōiwi that has never taken place in Hawai'i since the 1893 US military-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. While the contributors have different ideas around accountability and alliance building, their arguments for alliances agree on the need to be mindful of a non-Hawaiian tendency to speak on behalf of Kānaka 'Ōiwi through a racist presumption of an Indigenous lack of political sophistication. None of these, however, are implicit calls for repatriation of non-Natives or silence.

It is important to note, as Candace Fujikane has responded to Sharma, that Kanaka 'Ōiwi have never called for expulsion but rather accountability for their discourses and practices that ultimately come at Native expense. Pointing to the inherent diversity within Kanaka 'Ōiwi notions of genealogy, Fujikane references activists and scholars who have long had to argue that their movement is not calling for the expulsion of non-Hawaiians, stating that they themselves have family who are not Kanaka 'Ōiwi. In order to dismiss Indigenous nationalisms and an Asian settler colonial critique, Sharma creates a straw man through a notion of 'blood' and 'soil' that logically extends to expulsion – something the contributors, including myself, oppose. Yet, Kanaka 'Ōiwi scholars have painstakingly shown that Kanaka genealogies, while having to contend with the profound impact of the genocidal legal and social discourse of blood, should be understood as distinct from blood logics. As J. Kēhaulani Kauanui argues:

genealogy is a Hawaiian form of world entanglement that makes nonsense of the fractions and percentage signs that are grounded in colonial (and now neo-colonial) moves marked by exclusionary racial criteria. Blood quantum can never account for the political nature and strategic positioning of genealogical invocation.²²

As Kauanui and Fujikane show, Kanaka 'Ōiwi notions of indigeneity via genealogy, is in Kauanui's words an 'expansive inclusivity', one that does not dissolve Indigenous difference and sovereignty, nor appropriate a blood logic that argues for Asian expulsion. Fujikane argues that the irony of Sharma's expulsion argument is that it 'diverts our attention away from ongoing state violence against Kānaka 'Ōiwi to a projected discrimination and violence on the part of Kanaka 'Ōiwi'.²³

Although Sharma directs critiques of neo-racism against those who use a concept of settler colonialism, she does not interrogate the kinds of cultural differences on the part of settlers that maintain unequal power relations between them and Kānaka 'Ōiwi. We can see this situation

illuminated amongst scholars contending with similar issues in Guatemala between ladino and Maya. Charles R. Hale's *Más Que Un Indio (More Than an Indian): Racial Ambivalence and Neo-liberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala* offers a more complicated picture of neo-racism that finds synergy with Hawai'i. Hale points out the racial ambivalence among many ladinos – who often themselves endorse a principle of equality between Mayas and ladinos, yet harbor anxieties and discriminatory cultural ideas about a growing Maya movement.²⁴ While ladinos affirm the position that Mayas should have the right to their own culture and identity, 'these egalitarian sensibilities do not require ladinos fully to acknowledge ongoing relations of racial dominance, much less to dismantle them'.²⁵ All of this is similar to the previously mentioned memoir of former governor of Hawai'i Benjamin J. Cayetano, who struggles for equality yet disqualifies a Kanaka 'Ōiwi movement as racist. Speaking specifically to such tendencies, where critiques of Native politics are often dismissals, Hale argues that neo-racism can be a useful concept for understanding such disagreements. Hale explains that critiques of Native movements can be framed with an understanding that neo-racism also exists on the part of the non-Indigenous, in the form of biological, structural, and especially cultural notions of difference that reinforce unequal power relations. To be sure, this is not to dismiss Sharma's important concerns around the potential pitfalls of both nationalism and difference. But rather to respond to another argument Sharma makes, that critiques of Native people are immediately presumed to be racist. It is not that Indigenous people are beyond reproach, but that these critiques are often cast as dismissals of Native politics that then obscures the specific forms of colonial power that Indigenous movements are forced to contend with. Yet, Hale's framing shows that critiques of Native movements should contend with the broader social formations that initiated these very movements. Hale argues that cultural difference often associates the Indigenous with 'immutable traditionalism, paternalism, and also an abiding fear that cultural difference tends inevitably toward vengeance and retribution'.²⁶ The notion that the current movement for self-determination in Hawai'i can only be resolved through an 'expulsion' of Asian settlers resonates with Hale's criticisms of a neo-racist political imagination.

Imagined violence on the part of Indigenous movements is a common trope that allows Native savagery to stand in for settler self-critique. Hale argues that the political imaginary is often limited by the insurrectionary Indian as a flashpoint, 'ignited not by physical threats, which are rare and generally implausible, but rather, by acts that call ladino people's relations of dominance with Indians into question'.²⁷ It is perhaps this critique that helps us to understand why Indigenous political aims are often reduced to an argument around expulsion. Although Sharma argues that Asian settler colonial critiques redefine the dialectics of colonialism, from expropriators and the expropriated, to 'nothing less than the co-presence of people who are "Native" and "non-Native"' this is an argument that does not reflect the work in the anthology. On the contrary, many of the articles tell the opposite story and, in fact, might offer us another way of understanding just who is being expelled from Hawai'i. Healani Sonoda's article, 'A Nation Incarcerated' shows how the state of Hawai'i's incarceration rate of Kānaka 'Ōiwi is one of the fastest rising in the United States, leading the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety under the directorship of Keith Kaneshiro (1996–1998) and Ted Sakai (1998–2002) to deport inmates to private prisons in Arizona and Oklahoma. Sonoda shows that a disproportionate amount of these inmates, 40%, are Kānaka 'Ōiwi. This expulsion is placed within a genealogy of the use of prisons in the colonization of Hawai'i and Sonoda further connects the high rates of Kanaka 'Ōiwi poverty to the seizure of Hawaiian national lands currently held in trust on their behalf by the state of Hawai'i. Indeed, the top offenses of adult Kanaka 'Ōiwi arrests are poverty-related non-violent crimes. And although Japanese Americans and Kānaka 'Ōiwi were both at 22% of the total population in Hawai'i in 2002, the Kanaka male inmate population was 38% and women at 44%, while Japanese American men were 6% and 4% of women. Sonoda argues that by deporting Kānaka 'Ōiwi to prisons on the US continent, particularly during a moment when many are

involved in a nationalist struggle for self-determination, the state of Hawai'i, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), and other industries have converged interests in maintaining a settler colonial system that sets the conditions for what amounts to expulsion.²⁸ Thus, Healani Sonoda's work is not about a future state expulsion of Asian settlers, but about the present and ongoing state expulsion of Kānaka 'Ōiwi from Hawai'i – an expulsion that Kaneshiro and Sakai helped orchestrate. Notably, Sonoda's essay includes a photograph of 'Boogie' Kealoha Kekahuna, a Kanaka 'Ōiwi inmate who protested his forced exile from Hawai'i by tattooing his face while in prison. Furthermore, it is Kānaka 'Ōiwi who make up the largest numbers of those who leave Hawai'i due to the high cost of living and rates of poverty.

Whose history determines what is ahistorical?

I now turn to Sharma's second claim that so-called neo-racist arguments conflate immigration with colonialism, thus deeming Asian settler critiques ahistorical. While migration in and of itself does not equate to colonialism, migration to a settler colonial space, where Native lands and resources are under political, ecological, and spiritual contestation, means the political agency of immigrant communities can bolster a colonial system initiated by White settlers. This is particularly so since the avenues laid out for success and empowerment are paved over Native lands and sovereignty. In this way, Sharma privileges what Moustafa Bayoumi has critiqued as a 'migrant's eye-view of the world', a way of seeing that is limited by an episteme that does not contend with an Indigenous history of dispossession of the very land beneath migrants' feet. In paying attention to the politics of location and settlement, Shalini Puri has argued that a more productive transnationalism might instead ask: 'How do I, even as a dissident, participate in nationally mediated structures of power and oppression?'²⁹

It is precisely this kind of historical contextualization around the specific political choices of settlers shaped by settler colonialism and imperial politics that I contend with here. Lorrin A. Thurston, a third-generation descendent of some of the first US Calvinist missionaries and architect of the 1893 overthrow, sought to dismiss Kanaka 'Ōiwi claims to nationhood by playing to a much more recognizable international threat to White settler order than that posed by Kanaka 'Ōiwi. This threat, the Yellow Peril, is one that Thurston learned to play-up from his dealings with US Secretary of State James Blaine who argued as early as 1881 that

the decline of the native Hawaiian element in the presence of newer studier growths must be accepted as an inevitable fact ... the replenishment of the vital forces of Hawaii presents itself for intelligent solution in an American sense – not an Asiatic or a British sense.³⁰

In 1897, Thurston similarly wrote that White settlers in Hawai'i understood their political dilemma as a contest not between Kanaka 'Ōiwi and White settlers, but rather between the White and the yellow race, stating: 'It is no longer a question whether Hawaii should be controlled by the Native Hawaiian, or by some foreign people; but the question is, "*What foreign people shall control Hawaii?*"'³¹ After facing defeat at the voting polls in 1890, Lorrin A. Thurston became heavily involved in promoting tourism as a means to attract a 'desirable population' to replace Kanaka 'Ōiwi. In 1911, the Hawai'i Territorial Legislature would act on this same sentiment when it passed a bill urging Congress to pay the fares of White farmers to Hawai'i to provide a militia to protect US interests.

As evidenced by these acts, White settlers overly presumed the Japanese to be participating in a 'peaceful invasion' of the islands.³² White settler anxiety over the possibility of such a large Japanese population gaining control of Hawai'i, however, had a *tiny* sliver of merit. In *Between Two Empires* Eiichiro Azuma asserts that the exodus of laborers from Japan to Hawai'i coincided

with a 'branch of Japanese imperialist thought' that viewed the western hemisphere as Japan's own frontier to be settled.³³ Azuma explains that the Meiji government understood that in order to be considered a 'civilized' nation, Japan would have to 'partake in the practice of colonization'.³⁴ Accordingly, Japan established its own form of manifest destiny by colonizing Okinawa, Taiwan, northern China, and then annexing Korea in 1910. In fact, the Meiji state's colonization of the Ainu in Hokkaido in 1869 was modeled after the conquest of Native Americans by the United States. Meiji leaders, Azuma explains, attached a nationalist meaning to the act of migration, seeing overseas settlements as economically and politically tied to the state's collective purpose.³⁵ At the same time, many of the Japanese who settled in Hawai'i viewed their emigration from the standpoint of personal interests, not as imperial subjects of Japan.

It was 'personal interest,' however, that motivated Japanese plantation laborers to initiate a petition on 9th of April 1893, less than three months after the US military-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Their petition did not oppose the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom – nor seek Japan's colonization of Hawai'i – but rather, demanded their electoral participation in the new settler government. The Japanese justified their inclusion by arguing that they were 'physical and intellectual' equals of any of the other foreigners.³⁶ Likewise in 1894, some Chinese in Hawai'i signed a petition, signed by hundreds, seeking their right to vote in the new settler government.³⁷ This is in stark contrast to the kū'ē (resistance) petitions by Kānaka 'Ōiwi in 1897, where over 90% of the Native population opposed US citizenship throughout the islands.³⁸ The overwhelming majority of Kānaka 'Ōiwi did not seek their incorporation into the settler state but rather opposed their forced inclusion as US citizens and the consolidation of the White settler controlled Republic of Hawai'i with the USA through the annexation of Hawai'i.

To be sure, during the Territorial period (1900–1959), a complex transition of White settler to a more liberal multicultural form of settler colonialism emerged.³⁹ Asians in Hawai'i, indeed, had historical reason to agitate. Labeled 'ineligible to citizenship' with the passing of racist US laws, this generation would have to wait for their children to come of voting age to gain political representation. In 1936, University of Hawai'i sociologist and proponent of the 'immigration assimilation model,' Romanzo Adams, predicted that, by 1944, two-thirds of Hawai'i's Asian population would be able to vote, consequently increasing the strength of the 'non-caucasian majority' and leading to a redistribution of power.⁴⁰ In order to reconsolidate and maintain a fragile and failing project of White racial power and privilege, White settlers were strategically seeking to converge their interests with certain East Asian settlers and forge a more liberal multicultural form of settler colonialism.⁴¹

Realizing that a previously closed window of political opportunity was poised to open, Asian Americans and Kanaka 'Ōiwi helped form the Democratic Party to challenge the Republican Party's control over the legislature. Indeed, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, many White businessmen left Hawai'i fearing martial law consequently leading to an economic vacuum in which many Japanese American and Chinese American entrepreneurs were able to capitalize on wide open markets. World War II veterans Daniel Inouye and Sakae Takahashi opened two banks receiving financial and administrative support from banking institutions in Japan and together, they capitalized on major housing and hotel developments in Hawai'i. By 1954, the Democratic Party, with the support of labor unions, dislodged the Republican plantation oligarchy from the legislature in what has been termed in Hawai'i as the 'Democratic Revolution'. In spite of a movement for genuine equality, the counter-hegemonic strategies of Asian Americans against *haole* supremacy challenged, modified, and yet renewed a hegemonic US settler colonial system.

Indigenous difference and questions around alliance building

The choices Asian settlers have historically made demonstrate how settler interests have come at the expense of Kānaka 'Ōiwi. This history has rarely been examined, as it has long been a taboo topic

that seemingly works against previous ways of organizing around shared victimization.⁴² In Dana Takagi's criticism of *Asian Settler Colonialism* she writes, 'my disagreement with the "settler" discourse is that it re-inscribes the dominant-subordinate relationship, or the landlord-tenant, capitalist-worker relationship, that is so fundamental to historical materialism'. These 'either/or' framings, Takagi contends, might instead emphasize 'through' as opposed to 'either/or'.⁴³ In my opinion, settler colonialism describes a formation of power that helps us to understand how difference does not necessarily lead to 'either/or' analyses. The constant criticism that settler colonialism reinscribes binaries, primarily an Indigenous and non-Indigenous binary, is itself often upheld by a White and non-White binarism, one that limits a conception of power in which one is *either* oppressed or oppressive. Here, an understanding that power does not simply target historically oppressed communities but also operates *through* their practices, ambitions, narratives, and silences, offers a way of examining other dynamics of power such as labor exploitation, anti-immigrant laws and sentiment, and imperialist wars that have historically shaped diverse Asian American groups without misrecognizing the context for framing Asian settlers on Native lands seized by the US settler state. That is to say, far from the 'either/or' framing that Takagi describes, settler colonialism and Asian settler colonialism in particular, allows us to see how power operates relationally such that groups are not *either* oppressed or oppressive.

Another concern of Takagi's is that settler colonialism backgrounds important historical changes including Asian and Kanaka solidarity. Pointing to the 2002–2004 debates around whether or not to officially include Pacific Islander American Studies within the Association for Asian American Studies, Takagi argues that tensions for and against the name change were conditioned by common-sense understandings of the term 'Local' in Hawai'i, a cultural identity in opposition to White supremacy with roots in Hawai'i's plantations. Takagi argues that opposition to the name change was shaped by a new 'us', not the previous Local formation of 'us' versus the 'haole', but new distinctions between 'Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians' that emerged as a result of Hawaiian nationalism.

It is not so much that a critique of settler colonialism backgrounds the category 'Local' but rather, that it directly challenges a hegemonic common sense position that assumes diverse non-White groups' interests are always aligned with Native peoples. Such critiques demonstrate how a Local category avoids difference through amalgamation while actually mystifying and upholding unequal power relations between Kanaka 'Ōiwi and Asian Americans.⁴⁴ This actually functions to background the Indigenous human rights issues of sovereignty, nationhood, and land claims that affect Kanaka 'Ōiwi in ways that do not affect Asian groups. This is attested to by the fact that Pacific Islander scholars attend the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association conferences in far greater numbers than conferences held by the Association for Asian American Studies. The assumptions underpinning the category Local, wherein non-Whites formed a united front to oppose haole supremacy by transcending race, largely traces such solidarity to the militant labor movements of Hawai'i's Territorial period. Moon-Kie Jung, in his book *Reworking Race: The Making of Hawaii's Interracial Labor Movement*, argues that this assumption cannot be proven in the historical archives and that it is based in part on a mistaken post-war belief that this historical moment can be defined as a move 'toward racial democracy'. Jung argues that laborers who expressed their 'interests in racially divided terms, come to rearticulate, rather than ineluctably disarticulate, race and class'.⁴⁵ Thus, a complex rearticulation of racial difference, not the extinguishment of it, allowed laborers to form a historical bloc and gain worker rights.

Furthermore, using Ronald Takaki's *Pau Hana* as evidence of a previous 'us' that encompassed both Kānaka 'Ōiwi and Asian Americans, Takagi writes that it is after Hawaiian nationalism that 'the question of who exactly is part of us in Hawaii has changed significantly'.⁴⁶ Despite its rich histories of plantation resistance and solidarity, *Pau Hana* often utilizes Asian American immigrant narratives to conflate Asian American experiences with Kanaka 'Ōiwi. Takaki describes a moment of transcendence that begins in the 1920 strike when 'laborers were beginning to feel a new consciousness – an

identity of themselves as settlers, as locals, and an understanding of the need for a politics that transcended ethnicity'.⁴⁷ In both *Pau Hana* and *Strangers from a Different Shore*, Takaki refers to Asian Americans as 'settlers' to challenge the notion that they were 'sojourners', a term that constitutes Asian Americans as 'perpetual foreigners'. The implications of the term 'settler' for Asian Americans in relation to Native people, however, are never considered.⁴⁸ In a similar way, Takaki's celebration of the initial moments of primitive accumulation illuminates how settlers are discursively constituted as more deserving over contested lands and resources. That is to say, Takaki's narrative celebrates the process of expropriating territories and the elimination of Indigenous modes of production. In *Pau Hana*, this ability for laborers to claim responsibility for developing modern Hawai'i into a wealthy and profitable place, as opposed to the seemingly uncultivated place it was prior to their arrival, is used as a point of articulation that brings together non-White working class groups:

While Hawaiians, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans Portuguese, Filipinos, and laborers of other nationalities retained their sense of ethnicity, many of them also felt a new class awareness. As they worked together in the fields and mills, as they built working class communities in their camps sharing their different ethnic foods and speaking pidgin English, and as they struggled together against the bosses on the picket lines, they came to understand the contribution they had made as workers to the transformation of Hawaii into a wealthy and profitable place. 'When we first came to Hawaii,' they proudly observed, 'these islands were covered with ohia forests, guava fields and areas of wild grass. Day and night did we work, cutting trees and burning grass, clearing lands and cultivating fields until we made the plantations what they are today'.

Citing a strike pamphlet written by Japanese laborers as capable of speaking on behalf of all groups, the relationship between the formation of capitalism, via primitive accumulation through elimination of Kanaka 'Ōiwi economies, and its ongoing process of 'accumulation by dispossession' shows how capitalism positions Native people differently than other groups.⁴⁹

Kanaka 'Ōiwi, though instrumental in the formation of the labor unions in Hawai'i, were often confronted with primitivist ideas that cast them as unfit for modern times and as such other union workers believed they could not be depended upon. Jack Hall, labor leader of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, writes: "'The Hawaiians," they said, "are too-easy going. All they want is a little fish and poi and their liquor"'.⁵⁰ In this way, the Indigenous comes to stand in for an outmoded and dead way of life, an anachronistic mode of production that is at once repulsive and romanticized as hedonistic. Similarly, in a study conducted in the 1950s, Joseph C. Finney argued that the 'primitive stereotype' defined common views of Hawaiians as 'lazy'. As one woman listed as Japanese said: 'You see the Hawaiians are ... popularly known to be lazy, and they don't have a tradition for literacy and they're not the conscientious type, industrious type'.⁵¹ This is itself an old tale of capitalism wherein Karl Marx takes Adam Smith to task for creating a 'nursery tale' around the so-called primitive accumulation that necessitates the construction of two kinds of people, 'one, the diligent, intelligent and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living'. Marx goes on to argue that '[i]n actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part'.⁵² To offer a more contemporary example, in the *Asian Settler Colonialism* anthology, Momiala Kamahele's article, "Īlio'ulaokalani: Defending Native Hawaiian Culture,' traces the successful resistance on the part of mostly hula practitioners against the actions of state Senator Randy Iwase. Iwase, in the interests of powerful landowners, developers, and title insurance companies, introduced a bill in 1997 that sought to criminalize Hawaiian practitioners by requiring them to get a certificate of registration to practice gathering rights – woods, ferns, flowers, fibers, and cordage necessary for hula. Senate Bill 8 would not only have forced Native practitioners to establish proof that they were Kanaka, but also to prove through documents that their current customary practices were identifiable and continuous on

undeveloped land prior to 1892. Through this, the bill would have eased difficulties in selling, buying and financing property by criminalizing Hawaiian cultural practices as trespassing.⁵³

While I politically agree with an anti-capitalist vision, particularly in a global capitalist system that increasingly has relied on war to sustain itself, these movements should be accountable to Native people by considering a preceding moment in time, a different arrangement of land, resources and a way of life that predates the settler state. Indigenous knowledges are, in fact, grounded in both centuries old knowledges and ongoing creative practices – that are often antithetical to anthropocentric views. Not a romantic process of ‘going back’, this work is an articulation of present environmental, social, and economic problems in conjunction with ongoing Indigenous technologies and knowledges, particularly a deep historical knowledge of the specific environmental features of the interconnectedness of different parts of Hawai‘i. Viewing Indigenous knowledges and self-determination as irrelevant to present problems replicates the initial logics of colonialism that subjugated these knowledges by deeming Kanaka ‘Ōiwi culture a giant ‘wasteland of non-achievement’.⁵⁴ Or as Jodi Byrd has noted in response to Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright’s call for a global commons, indigeneity is seen as an ‘obstacle to the gaining of a commons as the means to the end of oppression within the lands that once did, but no longer can or should, belong to indigenous peoples’.⁵⁵ It is for these above reasons that to call for decolonization around the theft of the commons without accountability to Kanaka ‘Ōiwi culture and addressing settler racism presumes anti-capitalist settlers as a still more deserving power over Native lands.

Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua’s, *Seeds We Planted: Portrait of a Native Hawaiian Charter School*, illustrates just how Native scholarship addresses current problems through Indigenous knowledge, in ways that imagine alternative power relations to the structures of colonialism. Contrary to decolonial visions that do not take Kanaka sovereignty into account or notions that settler colonialism creates conditions for differences that ultimately lead to expulsion and violence, Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua talks about her project educating both Native and settler students through Indigenous economies at Hālau Kū Māna, stating

this story is not exclusively about Kānaka Maoli. Rather it is about how an educational community comes to understand and define itself as a collective that makes Hawaiian culture foundational to its day-to-day life, including both ‘Ōiwi and settlers as valuable members within this ‘ohana [family] without glossing over the differences between them’.⁵⁶

Such a framing, indeed, much of Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua’s work aims for non-statist forms of decolonization, sets the conditions for cultivating mutual respect through cultural difference. In this way, Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua theorizes through a Native and Pacific studies inflection to articulation theory, the rearticulation of settler and Native relations ‘in the face of the fragmenting and harmful forces of racism and settler colonialism’.⁵⁷

Conclusion

I would like to end this piece with a kind of self-critique by sharing stories of my family in order to show how we have been positioned within what Andrea Smith has termed the logics of White supremacy (labor exploitation, war, and settler colonialism) and how, ultimately, I have come to understand my family’s positionality as settlers. My family has been in Hawai‘i for five generations. On my Japanese side, we arrived to Maui in 1894, one year after the overthrow and four years prior to forced annexation. My great-grandfather Kumakichi Abe traveled from Fukushima, which recently made headlines as a result of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. While he was said to have traveled with a trunk of books that he would read over and over again, he was also considered the ‘plantation drunk’. My mother remembers walking to school and finding him

passed out in ditches but believed his alcoholism was a result of the frustration he felt for being educated yet having the job of removing the waste from the plantation's outhouses. On my father's side, my great-grandmother and great-grandfather arrived to the Ola'a plantation on the island of Hawai'i in 1919. Crispine Bibilone and Sabas Saranillio left Badian, Cebu, a place torn by the Philippine-American war during which over 2 million Filipinos died in the Philippines as a result of the US occupation. Cebu is a place noted for its fierce resistance to the US occupation.⁵⁸ Members of the family moved to the island of Lāna'i where they helped to set up the Federation Camp, a fishing village with housing structures made out of driftwood. They participated in the successful pineapple strike of 1951, which lasted 201 days leading to an increase in wages industry-wide. My grandfather, Itsuji Inouye, who I am named after, worked his entire life for the sugar plantation on Maui where he labored as a surveyor helping to route water to sugar cane fields. This water was stolen from watersheds making it impossible for lo'i kālo (taro farms) to survive, a process of primitive accumulation that Kanaka 'Ōiwi on Maui continue to fight in order to regain this water and reimplement an Indigenous mode of production. At the same time, my grandfather, who was known as Uncle Fats, was a part of another kind of commons as a healer and masseuse. I remember the house, and sometimes garage, filled in the afternoons and well into the evenings with people waiting for my grandfather to work on them. He never accepted money, so instead some brought mango, papaya, banana, and often candy for us, his grandchildren. My mother, Eloise Yamashita, grew up in McGerrow Camp in Spreckylsville, Maui and her mother, Masako Inouye, was a noted strike captain receiving recognition from labor leaders such as Jack Hall. At the age of 14, my mother was a live-in housemaid for Ray Allen, the Wailuku Sugar Company manager, and she can tell you volumes of stories about how pilau (rotten with connotations of immoral) that family was. My father, Dick Saranillio, grew up on Del Monte's CPC (California Packing Corporation) plantation camp in Wahiawa. He remembers singing songs, more like playground blues, about wars in the Philippines: 'Oh Philippines, Oh Philippines, long time fight but no can win.' He enlisted into the Air Force in 1968 at 18 in order to avoid being drafted by the Army, believing the Air Force might give him a better chance of surviving Vietnam. He was an aircraft mechanic and loaded bombs on planes that were a part of the covert bombing of Cambodia – the United States dropped 2,756,941 tons of ordnance on Cambodia, more tons than used in all of World War II, leading to a casualty rate of upwards of 150,000.⁵⁹ He returned to Hawai'i to labor as an ironworker helping to build harbors, condominiums and hotels as a part of the post-statehood economic boom. One of the hotels he helped build is the Sheraton Kapalua, where I also worked serving drinks and food to tourists who lounged poolside. This hotel is built on a sacred site called Pu'u Keka'a, which Ty Kāwika Tengan notes is the leaping point for the spirits of the departed.⁶⁰

As Candace Fujikane (my oldest sister) argues, only by learning to work in support of Indigenous peoples 'can we as Asian American settlers liberate ourselves from our positions as agents in a settler colonial system of violence'.⁶¹ Indeed, she and I come from an Asian settler genealogy of *both* resistance to and collusion with US systems of violence. I share my family stories to demonstrate that what I write is a self-critique, and more specifically to give a human element to the kinds of Asian settlers I am talking about. Some of them are barely coping and often living pay check-to-pay check, a strategy that Paul Isenberg, prominent leader of the sugar industry in the nineteenth century, argued would make controlling their workforce easier, so that the 'Chinese and Japanese had to work or be hungry'.⁶² It is for this reason that I identify myself as a settler, placing me in direct engagement with an ongoing history of settler colonialism in the United States one that is often deliberately obscured, while simultaneously critical of the logics of White supremacy that have impacted my family and communities. Settler states have no interests in non-Natives identifying with Native movements, as it opens their purview to processes of settler accumulation by Native dispossession, thus serving to oppose a system set by White supremacy that while *differently*, ultimately comes at the expense of *all of us*.

Notes

1. Benjamin J. Cayetano, *Ben: A Memoir, From Street Kid to Governor* (Honolulu: Watermark Publishing, 2009), 445.
2. Kahikina de Silva, 'Ka'ala, Molale I Ka Mālie: The Staying Power of Love and Poetry' (paper presented to the Native American Indigenous Studies Association Conference, Mohegan Sun, June 3–6, 2012).
3. As cited in Candace Fujikane, 'Foregrounding Native Nationalisms: A Critique of Antinationalist Sentiment in Asian American Studies', in *Asian American Studies After Critical Mass*, ed. Kent A. Ono (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 81; for an analysis of this term see Lisa Kahale'ole Hall, "'Hawaiian at Heart' and Other Fictions', *The Contemporary Pacific* 17, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 404–13.
4. While Benjamin Cayetano's bid for mayor was supported broadly by the left due to his opposition to the development of a rail transit system, he was not opposed to rail because of the desecration of Hawaiian burials, but rather the added economic costs due to a delay of the project when uncovering Hawaiian burials.
5. Neil Abercrombie, 'Preface', in *Ben: A Memoir, From Street Kid to Governor* (Honolulu: Watermark Publishing, 2009), 7–8.
6. Dan Boylan, 'Book Review: Ben: A Memoir, From Street Kid to Governor', *Hawaiian Journal of History* 44 (2010): 107.
7. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, 'Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor', *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–40.
8. Dean Itsuji Saranillio, 'Colliding Histories: Hawai'i Statehood at the Intersection of Asians "Ineligible to Citizenship" and Hawaiians "Unfit for Self-Government"', *Journal of Asian American Studies* 13, no. 3 (2010): 283–309.
9. Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1944–1961* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 250–1.
10. I use the term Asian American here to signify Asians groups living in territories occupied by the USA. However, in the Hawai'i context, it is a term that is not a geographical marker, but rather a national one – Hawai'i is not in the Americas. As opposed to placing quotation marks such as Asian 'American' throughout the entire essay, I hope this footnote will mark my apprehension of the term.
11. Andrea Smith, 'Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy: Rethinking Women of Color Organizing', in *Color of Violence: The INCITE! Anthology* (Cambridge: South End Press, 2006), 67.
12. Stuart Hall, 'Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity', *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10, no. 2 (1986): 5–27; Stuart Hall, 'On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall', *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10, no. 2 (1986): 45–60; Andrea Smith, *Native Americans and the Christian Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 1–8.
13. Haunani-Kay Trask, 'The Color of Violence', in *Color of Violence: The INCITE! Anthology* (Cambridge: South End Press, 2006), 82.
14. Scott Lauria Morgensen, *Spaces Between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 20.
15. Candace Fujikane, 'Introduction: Asian Settler Colonialism in the U.S. Colony of Hawai'i', *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 36.
16. Noelani Goodyear-Ka'ōpua, *The Seeds We Planted: Portraits of a Native Hawaiian Charter School* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Hokulani Aikau, *Chosen People, a Promised Land: Mormonism and Race in Hawai'i* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2012); Judy Rohrer, 'Attacking Trust: Hawai'i as a Crossroads and Kamehameha Schools in the Crosshairs', *American Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2010): 437–55; Hokulani Aikau, 'Indigeneity in the Diaspora: The Case of Native Hawaiians at Iosepa, Utah', *American Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2010): 477–500; Bianca Isaki, 'HB 645, Settler Sexuality, and the Politics of Local Asian Domesticity in Hawai'i', *Settler Colonial Studies* 1, no. 2 (2011): 82–103; Julie Kaomea, 'Indigenous Studies in the Elementary Curriculum: A Cautionary Hawaiian Example', *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2005): 24–42; Stephanie Nohelani Teves, 'We're All Hawaiian Now: Kanaka Maoli Performance and the Politics of Aloha' (PhD diss., University of Michigan. Ann Arbor: ProQuest/UMI, 2012); Ida Yoshinaga, 'Pacific (War) Time at Punchbowl: A Nebutsu for Unclaiming Nation', *Chain* 11 (Summer 2004): 328–43; Candace Fujikane, 'Foregrounding Native Nationalisms: A Critique of Antinationalist Sentiment in Asian American Studies', in *Asian American Studies After Critical Mass*, ed. Kent A. Ono (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 73–97; Candace Fujikane,

- 'Asian American Critique and Moana Nui 2011: Securing a Future Beyond Empires, Militarized Capitalism and APEC', *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 13, no. 2 (2012): 1–22; Cristina Bacchilega, *Legendary Hawai'i and the Politics of Place: Tradition, Translation, and Tourism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Laura Lyons, 'From the Indigenous to the Indigent: Homelessness and Settler Colonialism in Hawai'i', in *Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture*, ed. Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 140–52; Karen K. Kosasa, 'Searching for the "C" Word: Museums, Art Galleries, and Settler Colonialism in Hawai'i', in *Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture*, ed. Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 153–68; Dean Itsuji Saranillio, 'Colliding Histories: Hawai'i Statehood at the Intersection of Asians "Ineligible to Citizenship" and Hawaiians "Unfit for Self-Government"', *Journal of Asian American Studies* 13, no. 3 (2010): 283–309; Dean Itsuji Saranillio, 'Kēwaikaliko's *Benocide*: Reversing the Imperial Gaze of *Rice v. Cayetano* and Its Legal Progeny', *American Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2010): 457–76; Kim Compoc, 'Filipinos and Statehood: Reflections on American Assimilation and Settler Complicity' (Master's Project, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 2010); Roderick Labrador, *Filipino Community Building* (forthcoming); Kristy Hisako Ringor, 'The War at Hanapepe' (PhD diss., University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, forthcoming); Yuichiro Onishi, 'Occupied Okinawa on the Edge: On Being Okinawan in Hawai'i and U.S. Colonialism toward Okinawa', *American Quarterly* 64, no. 4 (2012): 741–65; Kēhaulani Vaughn, 'Desecration of 'Iwi: Native Hawaiian Deracination at Kawaiaha'o Church' (Dissertation Proposal, University of California, Riverside, 2012).
17. Dana Y. Takagi, 'Faith, Race, and Nationalism', *Journal of Asian American Studies* 7, no. 3 (2004): 277; Davianna Pomaika'i McGregor, 'Un-melting 20th Century Myths of the Chicago School about Hawai'i,' (paper presented at the Association for Asian American Studies, Chicago, IL, April 9, 2008); Gary Okihiro, *Island World: A History of Hawai'i and the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 4.
 18. Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright, 'Decolonizing Resistance, Challenging Colonial States', *Social Justice* 35, no. 3 (2008–9): 120–38.
 19. Nandita Sharma, 'Book Reviews', *Hawaiian Journal of History* 44 (2010): 107–10.
 20. Nandita Sharma, *Hawaiian Journal of History*, 109.
 21. I am uncertain as to whether this is the specific argument that Nandita Sharma is referencing, as the page number she lists is not to Eiko Kosasa's article. There are also two contributors with the last name Kosasa, including Karen Kosasa. Judging by the description of the work, however, I am assuming it is referencing Eiko Kosasa, 'Ideological Images: U.S. Nationalism in Japanese Settler Photographs', in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 225–6.
 22. J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 13.
 23. Candace Fujikane, 'Mapping Mo'olelo Against the Fragmenting Fictions of the Settler State: Protecting the Sacred Places of Lualualei, Pōhākea, and Mauna a Wākea' (Lecture, English Department Colloquium, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 6, 2011).
 24. I thank Alex Villalpondo for alerting and helping me to better understand this debate. Charles R. Hale, *Más Que Un Indio (More Than an Indian): Racial Ambivalence and Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 2009 third printing), 111–36.
 25. Charles R. Hale, *Más Que Un Indio (More Than an Indian)*, 19.
 26. *Ibid.*, 134.
 27. *Ibid.*, 139.
 28. Healani Sonoda, 'A Nation Incarcerated', in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 109.
 29. Shalini Puri, *The Caribbean Postcolonial: Social Equality, Post-nationalism, and Cultural Hybridity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 24.
 30. James G. Blaine to James M. Comly, Department of State, 1 December 1881, in Thurston, Lorrin A. Miscellaneous Papers, M-144, Hawaii State Archives.
 31. Lorrin A. Thurston, *A Hand-book on the Annexation of Hawaii* (Michigan: A. B. Morse Company, Printers and Binders, 1897), 5; Also cited in Noel J. Kent, *Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, reprint 1993), 61.

32. Gary Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865–1945* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Temple Press, 1991); William Adam Russ, *The Hawaiian Republic (1894–1898): And Its Struggle to Win Annexation* (Pennsylvania, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1961), 132.
33. Eiichiro Azuma, *Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 10–11; Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 84–90.
34. Eiichiro Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, 18.
35. *Ibid.*, 20.
36. Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, Bishop Museum Archives, MS 19, Box 3.4.
37. 'A Petition Signed by Several Hundred Chinese will be Presented to the Councils Today, Asking that the Chinese in Hawaii be Given the Voting Franchise', *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, May 17, 1894.
38. Noenoe Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
39. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 67–8.
40. Romanzo C. Adams, *The Peoples of Hawaii* (Honolulu: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1935).
41. George Cooper and Gavan Daws, *Land and Power in Hawaii: The Democratic Years* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1990).
42. Andrea Smith, 'Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy'.
43. Dana Takagi, 'Faith, Race and Nationalism', *Journal of Asian American Studies* 7, no. 3 (2004), 281.
44. Patrick Wolfe, 'Nation and Miscege Nation: Discursive Continuity in the Post-Mabo Era', *Social Analysis* 36 (October 1994): 93–152.
45. Moon-Kie Jung, *Reworking Race: The Making of Hawaii's Interracial Labor Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
46. Dana Takagi, 'Faith, Race and Nationalism' 277.
47. Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1983), xi.
48. Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1988); L. Ling-chi Wang, 'A Critique of Strangers from a Different Shore', *Amerasia Journal* 16, no. 2 (1990): 71–80; Sucheng Chan, 'Strangers from a Different Shore as History and Historiography', *Amerasia Journal* 16, no. 2 (1990): 81–100; Elaine H. Kim, 'A Critique of Strangers from a Different Shore', *Amerasia Journal* 16, no. 2 (1990): 101–11.
49. David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 137–82.
50. As cited in Sanford Zalburg, *A Spark Is Struck!: Jack Hall & the ILWU in Hawaii* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1979), 40.
51. Joseph C. Finney, 'Attitudes of Others Toward Hawaiians,' 79, *Hawaiian and Pacific Collections* University of Hawai'i, Mānoa; see also Ty P. Kāwika Tengan, *Native Men Remade: Gender and Nation in Contemporary Hawai'i* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 45.
52. Karl Marx, *Capital: Vol. One* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1990), 873–74.
53. Momiala Kamahale, 'Īlio'ulaokalani: Defending Native Hawaiian Culture', *Asian Settler Colonialism in Hawai'i*, 81 (2008).
54. Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong'o, *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 1986), 3.
55. Jodi Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 204.
56. Jennifer Noelani Goodyear-Ka'ōpua, *The Seeds We Planted: Portraits of a Native Hawaiian Charter School* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).
57. *Ibid.*
58. Resil Mojares, *The War Against the Americans Resistance and Collaboration in Cebu: 1899–1906* (Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1999).
59. Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan, 'Bombs Over Cambodia', *The Walrus*, October, 2006.
60. Ty Kāwika Tengan, *Native Men Remade: Gender and Nation in Contemporary Hawai'i* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 1–3.
61. Candace Fujikane, 'Asian American Critique and Moana Nui 2011' 4.
62. As cited in Ralph S. Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom 1874–1893: The Kalakaua Dynasty* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1967), 637.

ESCS Committee

From: Jennifer N. Ahia
Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2023 11:07 AM
To: ESCS Committee
Subject: ESCS Readings 3.23.2023
Attachments: J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, _"A Structure, Not an Event"_ Settler Colonialism and Enduring Indigeneity_ - Lateral.pdf; Wolfe_Interview.pdf; Trask_SettlersOfColor.pdf; Saranillio Colliding Histories.pdf; Saranillio_Why Asian settler colonialism matters a thought piece on critiques debates and Indigenous difference.pdf

Noelani Ahia | Legislative Analyst
Councilmember Keani Rawlins-Fernandez
County of Maui | Molokaʻi Residency Area

200 S High St, 8th Fl, Wailuku, HI 96793-2155
Email: noe.ahia@mauicounty.us
Phone: (808) 270-5538